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Occupational accidents continue to occur at a frequency unacceptable to the offshore oil
and gas industry. Current information and approaches related to the topic have been
studied. Using reliability techniques, a holistic quantitative model has been developed and
validated which can predict accident frequency. Model inputs include factors directly
affecting accident frequency as well as corporate and external elements.
Literature related to occupational accidents has been reviewed, concentrating on (i)
modelling approaches taken by researchers over the past half century, (ii) statistical
information currently available and (im influencing factors suggested by researchers for
inclusion in accident models. A gap in the knowledge was confmned, specifically the
absence of a holistic, quantitative approach to oil and gas occupational accidents.
An analysis of current global offshore oil and gas occupational accident statistics was
performed, which revealed significant inter-regional and inter-company differences in
accident frequency. This result helped to confirm that the group of factors affecting
occupational accidents extended beyond the traditionally ineluded direct and corporate
elements to include external societal factors.
Based partially on the literature review and database analysis, a model was developed
which can predict occupational accident frequency in the offshore oil and gas industry.
The model's holistic approach combines accident theories often preferred by
representatives from the management, safety, engineering, and psychology disciplines.
The approach is based on a chain of influence originating with external factors, which act
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through corporate elements to affect factors directly influencing the accident process.
Expert opinion was used extensively to quantify (i) the relative strengths of the model
elements directly affecting accident frequency and (ii) the relationships between the
external, corporate, and direct layers.
Using further expert opinion to provide input values, the model was validated by
comparing its predictions with known results on Canadian production installations and in
the Gulf ofMexico drilling sector.
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1) Introduction
Occupational accidents constitute a significant and continuing problem for the oil and gas
industry. The data show that workers face a similar level of risk from occupational
accidents as they do from more catastrophic events (sometimes referred to as
organisational accidents) such as explosions, fires, and helicopter crashes (see Figure 1.1).
While major events have the potential to cause multiple serious injuries and fatalities,
occupational accidents, with their relatively higher frequency but lower number of
individuals affected per instance, pose similar dangers overall.
Significant Incidents by Category,
1998-2002 Oil & Gas Industry
Air Transport
2%
Drowning
1% Electrical
4%
Struck by
29%
Fall
14% Caught
between
10%
Explosionl
Burn
18%
Vehicle
8%
Othe,
14%
Figure 1.1 - Significant incidents by category
(International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, 2004)
The situation is repeated in the general workplace. It has been documented (UK HSE,
1996) that over a third of all reported major injuries result from a slip or trip, this being
the single most common cause of injuries at work. Whilst occupational safety is regulated
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under various national legislative schemes, analysis is not nearly so rigorous in this area
as for the treatment of major accident hazards. The level of overall risk presented by
occupational accidents suggests that the situation would benefit from an increase in the
degree of quantification applied to their study.
A contributing factor to the ongoing occupational accident issue may be the presence of a
line of thinking which adopts a certain inevitability to the events, i.e. "accidents will
happen". An unfortunate reaction to this position would be to accept the inevitable and
relax efforts to reduce accident frequency. Fortunately, this reaction is not widespread in
the oil and gas community or industry in general. Following a review (International
Labour Organisation (ILO), 2003) of global industrial accidents, the ILO makes the
following comment: "Fatalities are not fated; accidents don't just happen; illness is not
random; they are caused." Most oil and gas operators' views and policies mirror these
comments. Particularly for projects based in mature markets, safety culture, systems, and
equipment are well developed and effective, resulting in a relatively low likelihood of
accident (International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP), 2005). However, as
reserves are depleted in traditional locations (for example the" North Sea and the Gulf of
Mexico) and companies tum to frontier regions (for example Africa, China, Latin and
South America), the implementation of an effective safety culture becomes more difficult.
Accident statistics in these regions show less favourable results (OGP, 2005).
Attempts to address the problem have been ongoing for more than a quarter of a century.
For example, Sweden's Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm set up a special
occupational accident research unit in 1978, with a mandate to use a USD $3M budget to
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conduct accident research and establish occupational injuries as an important discipline
for teaching and applied research within the technical faculty.
Despite all the excellent efforts, however, the problem remains. Current research on
occupational accidents is mostly qualitative in nature, compared to the more quantitative
methods often employed to understand and mitigate the effects of explosions and the like.
The relative lack of quantitative model development represents a specific gap in the oil
and gas occupational accident research. Also, while most models specifically consider
factors directly affecting accidents, and some include corporate elements, few address the
effect of factors outside the organisation, and none do the latter with an extensively
numerical approach.
The present work applies reliability theory to the occupational accident problem. A model
has been developed which, given a series of inputs, can
• predict the likelihood of occupational accidents on a specific offshore platform
• estimate accident rate within an industry sector (for example Gulf of Mexico
drilling or North Sea production)
• provide a means to effectively direct resource deployment to produce optimal
safety results
In taking a holistic approach to accident causation, the model combines accident theories
usually favoured (and sometimes applied in isolation) by specialists representing the
management, engineering, safety, and psychology disciplines. Three groups of factors, or
layers, are considered to affect accident frequency:
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1. direct factors, including individual staff behaviours and capabilities, weather,
safety design, and personal protective equipment
2. corporate factors provided by the supporting organisation, including the level
and quality of safety procedures, training, and culture
3. external factors, such as societal value placed on life and financial pressures such
as shareholder pressure, price of oil, and royalty regime
The model recognises the relationships between the layers and the relative importance of
the factors affecting accidents. Expert opinion has been used extensively in the
quantification of the relationships and element importance and also in the application of
the model to specific cases.
The remainder ofthis thesis has been structured in line with the general progression of the
work from literature review to model development and testing, as follows:
• Chapter two summarises the literature reviewed. The goals of the review were to
understand the approaches taken by other researchers, and to provide a basis for
the choice of the most appropriate set of influencing factors possible for inclusion
in the subsequently developed model.
• Chapter three describes a series of statistical analyses conducted with a view to
demonstrating that both inter regional and inter company safety performance
differed significantly. The successful demonstration supported the contentions that
both external societal issues and corporate programmes affected safety
performance. The results of a survey of safety professionals, which invited
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quantitative opinion with respect to relative factor importance and inter layer
influence, are discussed.
• Chapter four describes the development of the occupational accident predictive
model. The choice of a reliability model is defended, and the model structure is
detailed. The mathematical methods by which relative factor importance and inter
layer influence are accounted for are described. The effects of changes in
individual factor performance on overall safety results are demonstrated, and a
series ofhypothetical realistic scenarios are presented.
• Testing of the model is described in chapter five. Three hindcasting exercises
were performed, in which the model's ability to "predict" known accident results
in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia offshore industries and the Gulf of Mexico
drilling sector were evaluated. An expert panel provided the necessary input
respecting the actual safety situations existing in the areas. Results were
satisfactory in the Nova Scotia and Gulf of Mexico cases, and some explanations
are provided for the less encouraging results achieved in the Newfoundland
example.
• Chapter six summarises the conclusions of the work together with some
suggestions for further research.
Literature review
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2) Literature review
There is no shortage of public information describing industrial accidents. Analyses of
incidents occurring in many fields are available, describing approaches to the problem
from many different angles - by cause, by type, by region, and other variations. The
literature review* has been conducted in a systematic way, designed to support the
primary research goal of developing a quantitative, holistic model to analyse offshore
occupational accidents and predict their frequency. This chapter has been structured as
follows, in line with the natural progression from a general review of accident analyses to
the specific work of formulating the accident model.
Existing models - A review of existing accident models is presented. The first models
were proposed more than half a century ago, and there is much to be learned from the
philosophies developed by previous researchers. It was also important to confirm that no
model currently exists to cover the specific problem under consideration.
Statistics associated with occupational accidents - A review of literature which analyzes
existing accident data and the associated source databases is· presented. The databases
offer subdivisions of the data along many different lines - for example by region, by
(anonymous) company, by age, according to activity undertaken, by type of installation,
and others. An analysis of the data has been conducted and is described in Chapter 3.
* Attwood, D, Khan, F, and Veitch, B, 2005a. Occupational accident models - where
have we been and where are we going? Accepted for publication in the Journal ofLoss
Prevention in the Process Industries.
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Factors affecting occupational accidents - An important activity in the development of
the model proposed by this research was the choice and organisation of factors affecting
occupational accident frequency. Literature offering insight into the factors important to
the problem has been reviewed.
Other literature on occupational accidents - Some literature has been reviewed which did
not fit well into the above categories, for example papers offering detailed evaluations of
the importance of safety culture, human factors studies, and discussions analysing costs
associated with offshore accidents. Reviews of this literature are presented at the end of
the chapter.
The literature deals with both occupational and large scale (organisational) events.
However, since the basic philosophy of accident causation is considered to be similar for
both cases, and the model development discussed later in this thesis adopts a first
principles approach which is independent of accident size, the review has not been
subdivided according to accident size.
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2.1) Existing models
Although model development and refinement is just one of a number of ways of
attempting to understand and positively affect a problem, it is considered to be the most
suitable way of studying the occupational accident issue. The effectiveness of models in
the study of accidents has been noted by several authors (Lees, 1996a,b). Wolfram (1993)
went so far as to say that the practice of engineering revolves around the use of models.
He described how they have been used for centuries for many different purposes and with
great success. This section presents a review of some of the models which have been used
in the study of accidents. The section concludes with a summary and description of the
novelty of the present approach to the problem.
2.1.1) Early accident models
Early accident models studied the fundamental process of accident occurrence and
provided the foundation for later models employing more current analysis techniques.
In the late 1940's, Gordon's (1949) "Epidemiological Model" recognised the parallel
between the general accident process and the popular theory of how a disease
overwhelmed a susceptible patient. Essentially, an accident situation was considered to
require the same elements as a person falling ill - a host, an agent, and an environment.
The "agent" in the accident analogy was considered to be some form of damage-inflicting
energy. For example, in a shock accident, the agent would be electromotive force. In a
fall from height, the agent would be gravity.
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The philosophy proposed by Houston (1971) in his "Driving Force" model was similar to
Gordon's, with the elements replaced by a driving force (agent), a target (host) and a
trigger, which caused the driving force to injure the target. The usual driving forces were
energy and toxins. Threshold values were considered for the targets and triggers, below
which the accident could not occur. Both probabilistic and deterministic parameters of the
model were considered, including:
• the probability that all required factors (driving force, target, and trigger) were
present simultaneously
• the fraction of the driving force which reached the target
• the ratio of damage done under actual conditions to that seen under standard
conditions
• the total time for process execution
Various actions were proposed to reduce accident likelihood, including removal of input
factors, reduction (via preventive action) of the probability of the simultaneous presence
of all factors, and/or reduction of the driving force fraction and damage ratios.
Haddon (1973) subsequently contributed to the model witH" a consideration of how
accident likelihood or effect could be reduced by limiting the "energy" driving force's
effectiveness. Examples of the proposed methods for achieving this were:
• reduction of the initial amount of energy
• prevention of energy release
• separation (in space or time) of the released energy from the target
• erection of a barrier between the released energy and the target
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• strengthening of the target's ability to withstand deleterious effects of the energy
• rapid detection, evaluation, and reaction to the encroaching energy
2.1.2) Models based on holistic approaches
The recognition of causal elements distinct from the obvious direct factors has become a
common feature in many recent accident models. Approaches which took a holistic view
of accident causation are discussed in this section.
2.1.2.1) Le Bot's analysis of Three Mile Island
The benefits of considering, and dangers of ignoring, all elements of corporate safety
programmes have been accepted for some time (see for example Owen and Raeburn,
1991). Le Bot (2004) reviewed ongoing attempts to integrate human reliability data in
accident models, and retrospectively analysed the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster. Le
Bot concluded that either of the two commonly cited causes of the accident, (i) a
commissioning error, specifically the inappropriate shutdown of safety injection, or (ii)
operator error resulting from a situational misdiagnosis, should be discounted in favour of
a fundamental holistic system breakdown, including the follow~ng elements:
• insufficient operator training
• incomplete or incorrect procedures
• ineffective system and human interfaces
• organisational inefficiencies, specifically in failing to take proper note of previous
incidents
• poor design of the control room
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The present work's inclusion of corporate factors in the analysis is philosophically similar
to Le Bot's conclusions about accident causation, although related to a very different type
of accident.
2.1.2.2) Wang's comments on offshore structure design
In some disciplines, holistic, multi-level approaches have historically been taken only if
traditional deterministic methods have failed. Recently, however, holistic approaches
have been applied to areas previously solidly in the realm of deterministic strategies, such
as basic design. For example, Wang (2001), in a paper describing novel approaches to the
design of offshore structures, made the following points:
• It is difficult to accurately apply probabilistic risk assessment in circumstances
where human error contributes to accident likelihood.
• Approximate reasoning techniques may be appropriate in the analysis of the risks
associated with offshore systems.
• Experts' knowledge should be used in the design process.
Wang has noted the importance of the inclusion of human.factors, the recognition of
uncertainty, and the need for expert knowledge in basic offshore structure design. The
inclusion of these elements in a field generally considered to be primarily deterministic
confirms the absolute necessity to include them in the less deterministic business of
predicting occupational accident frequency.
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2.1.2.3) Geyer and Bellamy's approach
Geyer and Bellamy (1991) have proposed a model to study pipework failure which
included the broader, socio-technical background to accidents, including elements at the
direct, corporate, and external levels, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 - Factors proposed by Geyer and Bellamy
Top Level
Direct
Corporate
External
Impact
Accidental release
Operator reliability
Organisation
Information
Engineering reliability
System climate
Lower Levels
I Mitigation
I Communication
I Management
I Feedback control
Although the application under consideration was comparatively narrower in scope than
that studied by this research, the model offered insight into the multi-causal nature of
accidents and further supported the validity of the holistic approach adopted for the
present model.
2.1.2.4) McCauley-Bell and Badiru's application of fuzzy set theory
McCauley-Bell and Badiru (1996a, 1996b) have applied fuzzy set theory (FST) to the
study of risk factors associated with occupational injuries, albeit specific to cumulative
trauma disorders (CTD) of the hand and forearm.
Details of the principles of FST are conveniently available on websites such as
en.wikipedia.org and www.doc.ic.ac.uk. or through texts such as Klir et al. (1997). As the
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name suggests, fuzzy set theory is associated with the logic underlying modes of
reasoning which are approximate rather than exact. Fuzzy logic is therefore helpful in
quantifying approximate concepts such as common sense and human reasoning.
Similar to the strategy adopted for this research, the first part of the authors' work
involved the choice and categorization of factors influencing the likelihood of injury.
A systematic process identifying likely contributory factors in hand/forearm CTD's was
executed, which included the following elements:
• preliminary, followed by detailed, text analysis
• expert interviews
• observations of medical exams of individuals thought to have hand/forearm CTDs
• concept mapping
The latter involved a structured and facilitated meeting during which related concepts
were manipulated and placed by experts at strategically important locations on an initially
blank screen. The relationships between, and relative importance of, the different aspects
emerged as factors were physically moved around the map.
The result of these activities was the identification of a series of three groups of factors,
which are listed below, together with some examples of individual factors within the
groups.
• factors associated with the task itself - awkward joint posture, force applied, task
duration, vibration, etc.
- 16-
• factors related to personal situation - health condition, age, hobbies and habits,
previous cumulative trauma disorders, etc.
• factors related to organisational and workplace environment - equipment, peer
influence, training, awareness, etc.
The holistic nature of the categories was consistent with results determined by other
researchers. These accidents were considered to have been caused partially by task,
partially by personal situation, and partially by corporate/environmental aspects.
Analysis of the groups and factors revealed the following relative importance weightings
of the groups:
• task related factors: 0.64
• personal situation factors: 0.25
• organisational factors: 0.11
Within the groups, the importance of individual factors was analysed using a process of
pair comparison, during which experts were asked to identify which of a pair of factors
was more important than the other, and to what degree. Repeating this process for all
pairs produced a ranking of the individual factors within each group.
Analysis of the data revealed the following:
• clustering of factors - For example, arthritis and age tended to appear
simultaneously, as did diabetes and obesity.
• synergy - It could be shown that, in some cases, the combined effect of two
factors was greater than the sum of the effects of the individual factors.
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Following the analysis of all inputs, defuzzification (the process of combining all fuzzy
outputs into a specific composite result) produced the final, "crisp" output, which
quantified the risk of a subject injury for a given person while conducting a specific task
in a given environment. The model was tested in an assembly plant environment, and
proved quite accurate in predicting injuries, with ninety six of one hundred twenty cases
correctly predicted.
This model provided an example of a tool used to bring a degree of quantification to a
generally qualitative dataset. Such capability was also needed for the present research,
which required the quantification of the relative importance of corporate culture, safety
programmes, and other factors, in the occupational accident process. No readily available
data usually exist for these types of analyses, but the authors have proposed a way of
overcoming this obstacle.
The degree of rigour applied to the initial data gathering process described in Part I of the
research was also noteworthy. As was the case for the study of cumulative trauma
disorders, there is no shortage of opinion regarding the pri~ary causes of oil and gas
occupational accidents. The challenge has been to use a systematic approach in order to
arrive at accurate and useful conclusions.
2.1.2.5) Trontin and Bejean
Trontin and Bejean (2004) have studied the role of the relationship between insurance
companies and the firms (and their employees) they insure, in accident prevention. They
considered the incentives and resulting willingness of the insured companies and
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employees to take accident preventive measures within their respective insurance
environments. The sizes of the companies and other behavioural motivations were also
considered. Some results, and theories proposed by the authors, were as follows:
• The frequency of occupational accidents was inversely proportional to the size of
the company. This was true for all categories of company considered, but
particularly so in the construction industry. The accident frequency showed an
increase from firms of 1-9 employees to 10-49, but a steady drop-off with increase
in size from there on up to >1000 employees.
• Large firms sometimes lost the motivation to apply measures to prevent
occupational accidents following the procurement of an insurance policy, which
eliminated most of the potential for financial loss resulting from accidents. If
accident rates rose in response to this phenomenon, the insurance company
sometimes reacted by instituting a bonus/penalty programme. This usually
resulted in the insured company again improving its preventive action programme.
• Relationships between staff and their employers were also considered, including
such elements as the tendency to falsely report illnesse~ as occupational accidents
in the face of different compensations available for each, and the reduction in
attention paid to safety activities following improvements in safety equipment and
machinery.
• The alternative perspective of smaller firms was considered as well. Many of the
motivations were similar, but smaller firms likely had proportionally fewer
resources to apply to accident prevention, and relationships tended to be more
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family-like than those within larger organisations. The authors proposed that these
factors may have played a role in the motivations for accident prevention and
reporting. For example, employees in smaller, "family" businesses may have been
less likely to report injuries or take time off because they may have believed
themselves to be more essential to day-to-day company success than large-firm
counterparts.
• The differing roles of managers and supervisors in small and large firms were
considered in the evaluation as well.
Trontin and Bejean's work provided insight into the motivational factors which affect the
likelihood of occupational accidents and staff willingness to report them. Individual and
group psychology, and their effect on day-to-day behaviour, are important considerations
in this research. The present model adopts a holistic view of the process, which includes
elements of staffbehaviour and motivation.
2.1.2.6) Embrey's MACIllNE
Embrey (1992) has proposed a model, named "Model of ~ccident Causation using
Hierarchical Influence Network", or "MACHINE", which considered accident causation
to be a three-level process, as below.
• direct causes, for example, failure to carry out specified equipment checks or to
follow prescribed maintenance procedures
• level one causal influences, for example incomplete definition of responsibilities,
insufficient or ineffective training, or unclear procedures
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• level two causal influences, for example design errors, poor human resource
management, or risk management errors
Embrey recognised three categories of accident causation - human errors, hardware
failures, and external events. The first two were investigated from the perspective of the
three process levels mentioned above. The third category (external events), examples of
which are seismic and geological events, was considered to be outside the scope ofwork.
Embrey's model recognised the probabilistic nature of links in the causative network,
stating that:
"the existence of a good human resource management policy will increase the
probability that there will be an adequate match between demands and resources
and effective training. However, the existence of the good human resource
policy does not guarantee that resources will be matched or training optimised."
In order to describe the calculation methodology, Embrey presented an example
application, in which the model attempted to predict operator error based on three inputs:
quality of training, availability of operating instructions, and time pressure. These, in tum,
were considered to be affected by a series of lower level causations, including project
management, assignment ofjob roles, staffing levels, and task complexity. An assessment
team of suitably qualified experts was used to assign numerical values to the linkages
between factors, considering concepts such as the degree to which operational experience
had been fed back to the training department, the effect of task complexity on time
pressure, and the ability of the instruction generating policy to positively affect
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instruction availability. These values were combined to determine outputs, both
intermediate, including measures of quality of training and time pressure, and fmal, the
probability ofhuinan operator error.
Embrey's model recognised the complexity of the accident process. He referred to the use
of a three-level model as a convenient first approximation and later cautioned that it did
not attempt to cover every interrelationship involved, instead concentrating on only those
deemed critical. To keep the work to a manageable level, he chose an example, operator
error, which constituted only a subset of the total accident process. Despite this, the
figures included in the paper were complex (see for example the partial re-creation in
Figure 2.1), and he described the pattern of influences between levels as being "many on
many".
IEmbrey's MACHINE Model
Figure 2.1 - Embrey's "MACHINE" model
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Embrey's approach was not dissimilar to that proposed by this research. He saw the
accident process as complicated and influenced by factors at several levels, including
management and organisational. The quantitative combination of the various factors
produced an overall estimate of accident likelihood. The current proposal applies many of
Embrey's concepts to the offshore occupational accident problem.
2.1.3) Primarily quantitative and statistical models
One of the objectives of the current research was to apply a quantitative approach to the
prediction of accident frequency. The intention has been to offer a tool to assist in
management decisions associated with safety programme implementation. In this section
several previous models are discussed which have included quantitative elements in their
approach.
2.1.3.1 Kjellen's comparison analysis
In an attempt to include occupational accident risk in the overall design process of
Norwegian offshore projects and thereby satisfy existing legislative requirements, Kjellen
and Sklet (1995) evaluated the existing risk analyses methods specific to occupational
accidents. They concluded that there were no combinations of types of accident criteria
and risk analysis methods that covered the full range of occupational accidents.
In light of this conclusion, Kjellen (1995) went on to propose his own "Comparison
Analysis" method for calculating the likelihood of occupational accidents on offshore
installations. The method relied on a comparison of conditions on a case system with
those observed and documented on an existing, or reference, system. A panel of experts
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was asked to judge whether, and to what degree, the case system's safety programme was
different from that of the reference system. Next, a comparison was made between the
frequencies of the various activities being executed on the two systems.
As an example, injuries occurring during a particular drilling activity can be considered.
Suppose that it had been documented that the rate of a specific type of injury during this
activity on a specific drilling rig (i.e. the reference case) was one per man year worked.
Suppose also that a superior (compared to the reference rig) safety system on a proposed
new (i.e. case) system was expected to produce a 20% reduction in the specific type of
accident under consideration. Furthermore, improvements in drilling technology might
mean that the specific activity need only be undertaken half as frequently on the case rig
as previously. Comparison analysis could then lead to the conclusion that the likelihood
of occurrence of this type of injury would be 1 x 0.80 (covering the 20% safety
o
improvement) x 0.5 (covering the reduced frequency of the activity) = 0.4 per man year
worked. The total type of accidents foreseen for each activity and the total type of
activities would then be summed to provide a total accident rate for the case installation.
Kjellen has proposed an interesting method for predicting accident rates on offshore
platforms based on historical results from existing platforms. However, several areas for
improvement in the model have been noted by the author, including stricter definitions of
decision rules, improvements in assumptions, and recognition of ongoing databases.
The current work expands on the concepts employed in the "Comparison Analysis"
approach. Kjellen's method accounted for safety improvements in specific areas and
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changes in activity frequency, but the current work includes factors at the direct,
corporate and societal levels, proposes relationships between them, and recognises their
relative importance and specific contribution to the overall safety programme.
2.1.3.2) Quantitative risk assessment
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA, defined as a risk assessment procedure that
determines both probability of occurrence and consequences) is an increasingly popular
way of assessing risks in the offshore industry. Pietersen and Engelhard (1991) have
described the process, which makes use of, among other tools, traditional fault and event
trees. Some general comments on the current use of QRA follow:
• QRA is used primarily to model large catastrophic accidents, for example
• unintended release ofhydrocarbons from process equipment and pipelines
• primary structural failure
• helicopter crashes
• ship collisions
• QRA has gained sufficient popularity to be the subject of regulatory requirements.
• The process involves quantitatively evaluating the likelihood of occurrence of
accident-inducing, preventive, and mitigative events, and combining these with
the respective consequences to provide a measure of risk (both individual and
group), which is then evaluated against a required value. The sequence of steps is
as follows:
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• determine inventory of basic data
• identification of initial events
• inventory of protective measures
• determination of accident scenarios (utilises an event tree process)
• determination of effects and damage (event tree)
• determination of failure frequencies (event trees and fault trees)
• risk determination
• risk evaluation
• escape route evaluation
• recommendations for risk reduction (if necessary)
Quantitative risk assessment is gaining increasing respect in the offshore industry. Whilst
limited evidence exists of the inclusion of corporate or societal factors when using QRA,
and its application to date has primarily been to larger accidents, it does offer possibilities
for the occupational accident problem, particularly by offering a degree of quantification
to the problem. The biggest challenge to an effective application of QRA to the study of
occupational accidents would likely be the assignment of accurate input values to factors
usually understood on a qualitative basis only.
2.1.3.3) Fault tree models
Wells et al. (1992) have proposed a traditional and relatively simple fault tree approach to
the accident problem. The authors proposed that accidents are initiated by an event having
the potential of escalating into a more serious situation, but doing so only if a series of
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enabling events occurs or a series of preventive actions fails to occur, including for
example:
• operator protection
• equipment protection
• operator recovery
• mitigative measures
Johnson (1980) has developed a fault tree based model referred to as "The Management
Oversight and Risk Tree" (MORT) model. MORT is more complicated than Wells et al.'s
approach, incorporating more elements of the safety system.
Fault tree models offer the same benefits and challenges to the study of occupational
accidents as the QRA methods discussed in the previous section.
2.1.3.4) Event tree models
Munteanu and Aldemir (2003) have applied a dynamic event tree approach to accident
modelling, considering the specific example of pressure retaining equipment in nuclear
facilities. The key benefit oftheir model, whose elements are listed below, was its ability
to use probabilistic arguments to provide advice to operators on a real time basis.
• The model uses state/parameter estimation capability within a module referred to
as a "dynamic system doctor (DSD)". The system states and parameters are user-
defined, and the algorithm models system evolution in terms of the probability of
transitions in time between the respective states (referred to as "cell-to-cell
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mapping technique"). A Markov chain analysis is used to determine the
probability of finding the system in a given state at a particular time. The
principles and limitations of Markov analyses are described in Billinton and Allan
(1983). The basic concept involves considering the components of a system to be
in one or another of a number of states (for example working or failed),
determining the probabilities of the system moving from one state to another, and
then using probability theory to calculate the likelihood of the system being in
particular states following a number oftime intervals.
• Dynamic event tree capability resides in a module called "integrated safety
assessment (lSA)". This module is comprised of a plant simulator, a scheduler,
and a probability module. The analysis commences with the occurrence of an
initiating event, and the resulting evolution is followed by the plant simulator. The
scheduler initiates and controls events along the respective event branches, and
terminates the simulation when no further "branching" is expected. The
probability module calculates the probability of each scenario, and also contains
stopping or "branch pruning" rules which prevent t,he creation of numerically
unmanageably sized trees.
The authors proposed the following advantages of the approach.
• an appropriate choice of cells to effectively manage uncertainties in the monitored
system states and inputs
• a probabilistic measure to rank the likelihood of system faults
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• capability to use any of a series of methods to generate the cell-to-cell transition
probabilities
• provision of the upper and lower bounds of state variables and parameters during
model execution, which is important in the determination of safety margins
• production of fewer branches, thereby reducing problem size and computational
effort
Munteanu and Aldemir's work provided an example of a mathematical approach to
accident modelling, as applied to pressure retaining hardware in the nuclear industry.
Weaknesses in the approach, when considered in the context of occupational accident
modelling, were the inherent complexity in the event tree approach, and the failure to
include non-traditional (i.e. corporate, human, societal) factors in the calculation.
2.1.3.5 Thompson's confirmatory model
Thompson et al. (1998) have statistically analysed the relationships between safety
climate (defined by Mearns et al. (1997) as a 'snapshot' of the current perceived state of
safety on a plant or installation), management support for safety, and perceived safety
conditions at a US federal aviation administration logistics centre. Witt, Hellman, and
Hilton (1994) had previously modelled the relationships, as shown in Figure 2.2, with the
elements defined as below.
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Thompson's ConfIrmatory Model
Safety
Compliance
~
------------....
Figure 2.2 - Thompson's confirmatory model
• "Organisational Politics" is the process of influencing others' decision making
through means outside those prescribed by organisational policy. Examples
include such actions as social ingratiating, hiding agendas, or not elevating
unpleasant or controversial matters.
• "Goal (in)congruence" is the degree to which the goals of management are
matched by those of the workforce. It is heavily affected by the workforce's
perception of management attitudes. An example from the safety field is the
degree to which management is perceived to be willing to set aside safe practices
in order to meet operational targets.
• "Supervisor fairness" is essentially a measure of how strongly employees believe
their concerns, once passed to their supervisors, will receive a fair hearing by
management.
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• "Management Support for Safety" is delivered at two management levels. Senior
managers establish priorities, set production schedules that may accommodate
safe operations, and control incentives and penalties associated with safety (and
other) compliance. Supervisors are the "conduit" linking management safety
concerns to the shop floor. They are more influential in indicating safety priorities
to the workforce than senior managers.
• "Safety Perception", as measured by surveying workforce opinion, is the authors'
preferred method ofmeasuring overall workplace safety. They view accident rates,
accident costs, and safety audits as less reliable alternatives.
Thompson et al. have refined the original model, which considered the three climate
factors (politics, congruence, and supervisor fairness) to be mediated by a single
management element to influence workplace safety environment. They hypothesized that
the political element was mediated by the more senior managers to affect safety
conditions, whereas supervisor fairness was considered to act through supervisory support
to be the primary driver for safety compliance.
The hypotheses were tested by reviewing survey results from two years (1992, 1995) at
the facility. Results of the exercise ar~ summarised as follows:
• In general both hypotheses were shown to be supported by the survey results.
Safety compliance was heavily affected by the supervisory management level,
whilst safety conditions, probably as would be intuitively expected, drew more
heavy influence from the more senior levels of management. Moreover, senior
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management was more directly influenced by the organisational politics than the
other top level factors.
• Management influence was shown to be pervasive, not only influencing
workplace climate and safety, but also affecting the influence of supervisors on
safety perceptions.
Although originating from a very different industry, Thompson et al.'s research and
conclusions were consistent with the philosophy proposed by the present work.
Thompson et al. proposed that corporate climate and processes influence the workplace
safety situation through the intermediate levels of senior management and supervisory
personnel. The present work applies similar concepts to a different industry and on an
even more extended basis, to include elements outside the organisation, for example,
societal and regulatory aspects.
2.1.3.6 Tomas' structural equation model
Tomas et al. (1999) have evaluated the suitability of a structural equation modelling
(SEM) approach to describe occupational accidents (Figure 2.3). The authors defended
their approach by suggesting that accidents should be treated as if they had resulted from
a complex sequence of events, and that SEM best handles such complexity. The data for
the work were obtained by questionnaire from three Spanish companies, chosen because
of their categorisation as high risk on insurance company and regional government lists.
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Tomas' Structural Equation Model
Figure 2.3 - Tomas' structural equation model
The authors have suggested that the overwhelming majority of accidents are blamed on
human factors. However, they have taken the analysis to a higher level, attempting to
understand the relative importance of factors such as lack of attention, lack of training,
co-workers' attitudes toward safety, workers' own attitudes, and organisational processes
in determining why workers behave in an unsafe way.
The authors have measured each element in Figure 2.3 by asking a series of related
questions. For example, safety behaviour was evaluated by asking about correct use of
machines, observance of safety rules, speed at work, alcohol ingestion, etc. Three
hypotheses were evaluated, as follows.
• Attitude toward safety influences workers' behaviour.
• Safety behaviour has a direct effect on the occurrence of accidents.
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• Hazards predict the real probability of accidents occurring (i.e. the hazard, rather
than the workers' ability to deal with it, presents the primary indicator for accident
occurrence).
The paths between the elements were evaluated statistically, and some conclusions (based
on one of the three datasets) were as follows.
• There was a significant explanatory chain that flowed from safety climate through
supervisors, co-workers and worker attitudes and behaviours, to accidents.
• Unexpectedly, safety climate did not have a significant direct effect on either
safety behaviour or co-workers response.
• Supervisor response significantly affected co-workers' response, attitude and
safety behaviour.
• Attitudes affected behaviour, while behaviour influenced the actual probability
ofaccidents occurring.
• Hazards did not have a direct impact on accidents (i.e. most hazards are dealt
with effectively by a capable and motivated workforce).
The results from the other two datasets were similar, with an exception being an increased
level of significance associated with the hazard/accident relationship.
The work supported the concept that using number of accidents as a measure of safety
can be problematic. This is because, in general, most corporate participants have few or
no accidents, resulting in a highly skewed, low variability distribution. Following some
statistical investigation, the authors concluded that the most consistent method of
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measuring safety included a combination of raw accident number and the relative severity
of the previous three accidents.
The results were interesting in the context of the present research in a number of ways.
For example, the concept of attitudes affecting behaviour and behaviour in turn causing
accidents is a cornerstone of the layered approach of the proposed accident model. Also,
Tomas et al.'s work showed a relatively low explanatory connection between hazards and
accidents, as indicated by the final conclusion above. This result contradicted the notion
that accidents are caused by hazards impinging on helpless workers. Rather, the
conclusion to be drawn is that accidents generally occur when staff are ill prepared to deal
with hazards which, in general, can be reasonably expected. The present work makes use
of several of the authors' conclusions, but transposes them to a specific industry on a
much broader geographic scale, and also expands the philosophy outside the company to
include societal, regulatory, and global fiscal issues.
2.1.3.7) Guastello's cusp model
Guastello (1989) has proposed a quantitative model to study occupational accidents in the
sheet metal business in the mid 1980's. The research concluded that accident rate in the
industry usually took one of two approximate values. Either a near-zero result was
achieved, or a rate of approximately eleven accidents per 100 person years of exposure
was observed. The model implied a sharp transition in safety perfonnance between the
two levels. Once a particular threshold (cusp) in the characteristics of influencing criteria
had been surpassed, perfonnance moved to the other level. However, Guastello noted that
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the return to the original level did not necessarily occur at exactly the same point, similar
in principle to the re-seating of a safety relief valve, which does not occur at the exact
popping pressure.
Accident rate data were collected from the same eight companies in two different years
(1984, 1985), thereby ensuring relative similarity between the two populations. Following
the initial data gathering, a series of safety recommendations were made, and one goal of
the work was to see if, and how quickly, implementation of the recommendations would
actually improve measurable safety results. Some of the hypotheses investigated were as
follows.
• Accident rates will decrease in proportion to the time available for the
organisations to work on their recommendations.
• Accident rates will decrease in proportion to any shrinkage in workgroup size.
• hnprovements will occur to a greater extent where safety management is good,
anxiety and stress are high, and staff believe that accidents are controllable.
Some of the primary conclusions of Guastello's work were as fQllows:
• Larger group size was associated with higher accident rates.
• Accident rates decreased more for groups having greater time to implement safety
recommendations.
• Groups with initially high accident rates combined with high safety management
ratings, a significant belief that accidents can be controlled, and longer amounts of
time with recommendations showed the strongest improvement as a result of the
intervention.
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• Surprisingly, groups with high anxiety and high physical and social stress were
also better disposed to improvement than other groups.
• No relationship was confirmed between the physical hazards and danger level
criteria.
Guastello noted that his model was unlikely to be valid in other industries. A traffic
environment was specifically mentioned as being an unsuitable application, since, unlike
the factory setting studied, environmental factors (e.g. sleet, rain, snow) impose a
constantly changing set of external factors on the situation on an ongoing basis. This
indicates that the cusp model would also be unsuitable for offshore occupational accident
research, where external factors, including both the weather effects mentioned in the
automobile example, and other factors such as politics, fiscal regime, etc., are considered
to provide significant influence.
Despite this, many of the concepts discussed in Guastello's paper were similar in
philosophy to those proposed by this research. Examples of this are:
• the notion that appropriate employee attitudes and ~~liefs will positively affect
safety results
• the concept that accident occurrence need not necessarily be directly correlated
with the existence of hazards, instead depending more strongly on corporate and
personal factors
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2.1.3.8) Brown's sociotechnical / safe behaviour model
Brown et al. (2000) have studied safety in the steel industry. They considered the accident
process from the three perspectives mentioned below.
• person as cause - This view contends that employee attitudes and behaviours are
the most important factors in the accident process.
• system as cause - Proponents almost always point to system design as the
dominating factor. The example of an accident resulting from the location of
brake pedals on opposite sides of crawler crane floors in similar vehicles used at
the same yard is offered to demonstrate how operator error is often blamed for
accidents having a significant design flaw element in the root cause.
• system-person sequence as cause - Central to this view, which is also embedded
in the present research, is the notion that system factors influence safety outcomes
through people. Proponents recognise the existence of social factors, personal
predispositions, and the role systems play in affecting personal behaviour.
Brown et al. tested the validity of the three views through a survey of more than five
hundred employees in a southeastern US steel mill. A series of eighty items was
developed to investigate the proposed factors, and the workers were as~ed t~
quantitatively indicate the level at which the items were applicable to their specific work
situation. The workers were also asked to rate the seriousness of the factors in the
accident process.
Brown et al.'s model is shown schematically in Figure 2.4. Some comments with respect
to the specific factors follow the figure.
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Brown's Sociotechnical / Safe Behaviour Model
Figure 2.4 - Brown's sociotechnicaVsafe behaviour model
• Safety hazards - these affect safety results on two levels. Firstly, their presence
can cause accidents. Secondly, the existence of preventable and unnecessary
safety hazards can negatively affect staff confidence in management commitment
to safety. The resulting poor attitude can negatively affect safety results.
• Safety climate - the authors supported the view that a positive safety climate, as
manifested by such things as an open door policy for hazard and accident
reporting, a sincere concern for employee well-bein~, and fairness in accident
investigations, would provide tangible safety result improvements.
• Pressure - The authors reported a spike in accident rates during periods of peak
production at virtually every plant investigated. They reported a significant
relaxation of safety concerns with an associated worsening of safety results upon
the application of increased operating pressure.
- 39-
• Cavalier attitude toward safety - This factor is manifested in various risky
behaviours, for example ignoring safety procedures, moving through watertight
door openings when the door is still in motion, etc. These behaviours are
particularly prevalent in industries popular with the more risk taking type of
individual. It is likely that offshore oil and gas production would fall into this
category. The authors suggested two methods for reducing the negative effects of
this factor: (i) care taken at the hiring stage to avoid candidates who test high on
"risk taker" personality tests, and (ii) the appropriate rewarding (and punishment)
of safety behaviours, as opposed to safety results.
• Safety efficacy, defined as an employee's confidence that he or she has the skill to
work safely in the context of a specific environment, must be considered in
relation to the higher level factors which precede it in the model (i.e. hazards,
safety climate, and pressure). The authors promoted the importance of hands on
training in the development of a satisfactory level of safety efficacy.
Several versions of the model shown in Figure 2.4 were evaluated. For exa,mple,
eliminating the relationships shown by dotted lin~s produces the "system-person
sequence" model. Including those relationships produces the added effect whereby safety
hazards, safety climate, and pressure, in addition to their existing role in the system-
person model, also impinge directly on the final accident result. Removing the lines from
pressure to cavalier attitude and safety efficacy removes the influence of corporate factors
on personal behaviour.
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Correlational analyses were perfonned on the data when considered within the three
distinct model configurations. The analyses confInned that the version best fItting the
data was a direct relationship from hazards and climate through people to the accident, i.e.
without the direct influence of safety hazards and climate on safety, but with the influence
ofpressure on personal behaviour.
Brown et al.'s view of "system-person sequence" as the major accident dynamic may be
summarised as "although the individual performs the act, factors in the operating and
social environment playa role in the person's disposition toward safe practices".
The authors' conclusions were similar in principle to the concept proposed by this
research, i.e. that although accidents result directly from the acts of people, work
environment plays a vital role in those acts. The authors recognised several limitations to
their work, as below.
• The research was carried out within one fInn in a single industry, resulting in a
limited and biased dataset.
• The factors included were not exhaustive (others such.as age, gender, and time on
the job were mentioned).
• The work indicated correlation between factors, although the validity of
directionality was questionable - for example they could not positively conclude
that increased pressure necessarily produced negative safety climate.
The authors' conclusions included a reference to the "dearth of theory development and
testing in the safety arena". They recommended that future researchers expand upon their
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methods by including multiple organisations, monitoring change over time, and
considering a greater range of data sources. The present work addresses these
recommendations in combination with its other objectives.
2.1.3.9) Cheyne's employee safety attitude model
Cheyne et al. (1999) have modelled employee attitudes to safety in three UK based
industries: manufacturing, dairy produce, and transportation. Their model, shown in
Figure 2.5, was similar to others described in this section, in that its elements dealt with
the effect ofmanagement actions and training on employee attitudes.
Management
Actions &
Responsibility
Cheyne's Employee Safety
~titUdeModel
Figure 2.5 - Cheyne's employee safety attitude model
The authors' analysis included a statistical evaluation of nearly twenty-five hundred
survey questionnaire responses. The questions were grouped according to their
association with management actions, personal actions, and safety training quality.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Tukey's honestly significantly different (HSD)
- 42-
evaluations were used to study differences in the results. Relationship patterns were
studied using a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach.
Some conclusions of the work were as follows:
• The main determinant of commitment to safety was the strength of employee
attitude toward management actions.
• Attitude to management actions was related to quality of safety training.
• Surprisingly, an inverse relationship was found between safety training and
personal safety actions. The authors proposed that this may be partially explained
by personal actions compensating for training which was perceived negatively by
workers.
• Managers were identified as the key group through which attitudes to safety could
be influenced and improved.
• The model relationships were shown to be valid across the three industries studied.
• Contrary to those working in the other two industries, transport sector workers
perceived no relationship between how their managers acted and how they, as
individuals, acted in the context of safety.
The final two conclusions were important to the present research from two perspectives.
Firstly, the validity of the model across the three industries studied indicates that the
authors' general accident philosophy, which has similarities with the one presently
proposed, correctly models accidents in many fields. Secondly, the inter-industry variance
of some aspects reinforced the importance of industry-specific studies of safety behaviour,
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such as this one. Employee attitudes may differ between industries, as may corporate
behaviours.
Cheyne et al.' s work offered further confirmation of the importance of corporate-personal
relationships, such as the ones accounted for in the present research, but it did not include
external influences, or offer a practical predictive model. Also, the study was specific to
three industries distinct from the oil and gas sector comprising the arena for this work.
2.1.3.10) Pate-Cornell and Murphy's SAM approach
Pate-Cornell and Murphy (1996) have applied their "System-Action-Management
(SAM)" approach to two catastrophic accidents, the Piper Alpha disaster and the space
shuttle Challenger crash, and also to problems associated with anaesthetics during surgery.
The authors proposed that while bad luck is a fact of life, the fraction of accidents
involving some human and/or corporate responsibility ranges from 50% to 90%.
Accordingly, the objective of the SAM approach was to facilitate the inclusion of
corporate and human factors in a probabilistic risk analysis (pRA, which is defined as a
risk assessment procedure that includes a probabilistic e1eme~t), thereby improving it as a
tool for managing and reducing risks. SAM offered a link between management
approaches, the decisions and actions they affect, and system failures. The approach used
basic conditional probability theory as defined by the following equation.
p(F) = LiP(FIIEJp(IEJ
where
p(F) = probability of system failure
(2.1)
p(FIIE) =
p(IE) =
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conditional probability of system failure given an initiating event
probability of occurrence of the initiating event
Management decisions and actions (DA) were included by using the following equation.
where
p(F) = Li L p(FIIEi,DA)p(IEiIDA)p(DA) (2.2)
p(FI IEi,DA) =
p(IEiIDA) =
p(DA) =
conditional probability of failure given an initiating event and a
specific management decision/action
conditional probability of an initiating event given a specific
management decision/action
probability of occurrence of the specific management
decision/action
The SAM philosophy is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
1
Management
if
&
Organisation
Decisions
& Actions ~
Figure 2.6 - Pate-Cornell and Murphy's "SAM" approach
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A series of general observations emerged following the application of the SAM approach
to the accidents mentioned above, which are listed here.
• In many organisations, "risk management" means "insurance".
• Too much emphasis is often put on technical rather than corporate risk mitigation
• Operators are generally predictable, competent and well intentioned.
• People are basically rational (or at least intend to be).
• Under excessive constraints, people tend to cut comers in ways that are difficult to
predict.
• General policies seem to receive lower priority than specific directives.
• Management is sometimes unaware of the hidden costs of the constraints it sets.
• Informal rewards seem at least as important as formal ones.
• Organisations seem to have difficulty in communicating the importance of safety.
• Informal organisational structure may be as important as formal channels.
• Physical systems change faster than the behaviours of their operators.
• Normal operations do not prepare people for crisis siMitions.
• In crises situations, it is essential that someone be clearly in charge.
• Trainers often receive insufficient supervision.
• People have difficulty understanding and communicating uncertainty.
• People tend to ignore information that conflicts with their beliefs and wishes.
The authors included an illustration of the specific organisational factors and related
deci~ions and actions which were considered important in the Piper Alpha disaster, which
-46 -
is partially re-created in Figure 2.7. The diagram is interesting in that (i) it gives examples
of specific organisational factors which may be important in the offshore industry, and (ii)
it shows the complicated and multiple relationships between organisational factors and
decisions/actions.
Personnel Issues:
• Production
culture
• Insufficient
experience
• Learning
mechanisms
Figure 2.7 - Piper Alpha analysis
Inspection &
Maintenance Practices:
• Permit to
work system
• Inadequate
regulatory
oversight
Pate-Cornell and Murphy's concepts were similar to the holistic approach to occupational
accidents proposed by this research. There is no doubt that policies, procedures, and
attitudes imprinted on an organisation by its senior management will affect the frequency
of occupational accidents, as evidenced by the models reviewed in this chapter.
2.1.4) Summary
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Accident models have been developed and tailored in reaction to the specific needs they
attempted to address. Medicine and the nuclear industry have historically demanded
overwhelming attention to accident causation, prevention, and mitigation. This has
probably been due to the high emotional attachment associated with problems in these
industries - medicine due to the obvious distress caused by the illnesses of loved ones,
and the nuclear industry due to the many and varied catastrophic consequences of nuclear
accidents. Because of these emotional issues it is no surprise that many of the earliest
accident models originated in these industries. These early models provided a valuable
philosophical foundation for subsequent work.
Other models have concentrated on direct or obvious causes, for example drawing from
investigation results or zeroing in on elements such as personal protective equipment,
number of shifts worked, effect of safety regulations, and the like. These models provided
a vehicle to produce improvements in specific areas, such as protective helmets and boots,
and working hour expectations for usually fatigued offshore staff, but they did not adopt a
holistic view of the occupational accident problem.
Some models have taken a broader view of offshore accidents, but this approach has
usually been applied to catastrophic accidents rather than occupational ones. Significant
attention has been paid to holistic modelling of large accidents such as explosions, toxic
releases, and boat collisions, a single occurrence of which can have dire consequences.
These holistic models often included attempts to consider the effect of the overall
organisation in the analysis and some also considered external factors, but, as mentioned,
they concentrated on large accidents.
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Human performance and personal reaction to dangerous situations has provided the basis
for some models. The occurrence (or not) of the accident was essentially considered to be
a question of how well individuals satisfactorily reacted to their environment in order to
prevent, mitigate the results of, or recover from, the accident. These models offered
insight into human aspects of the problem, but the present research considers the human
element as just one of many different factors in a holistic analysis.
Other models have adopted a statistical approach, but they tended to use historical data to
study existing relationships between factors, as opposed to offering a predictive model
which can be used to help guide management decisions. In cases where predictive models
have been proposed, the applications have either been in industries other than oil and gas,
the factors have been limited to direct and corporate ones, or the regional coverage has
been narrow. These models have provided valuable input to the present research, but the
current proposal is to provide a quantitative holistic view of occupational accident
prediction and causation within a specific industry, thereby offering the possibility of
directing resources to maximise safety result improvements.
The literature also describes significant work which has provided a qualitative view on
the process. Opinions and case studies have been used as input data to propose graded or
ranked causes of offshore accidents. Suggestions for corrective/preventive actions were
then offered to improve safety performance. The present work brings mathematical rigour
to the analysis, thereby providing benefits unavailable in qualitative studies, such as
• sensitivity studies
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• calibration to known results
• application to existing installations
• calculation of "maximum improvement per resource allocation"
The types of accident models studied have contributed expertise to the offshore
occupational accident problem from a wide range of perspectives. Some models have
dealt specifically with occupational accidents, some have taken a holistic approach to the
other more catastrophic types of offshore accidents, and others have considered non-
traditional elements (i.e. societal, human). However, no presently available model has
adopted the holistic, quantitative approach to offshore occupational accidents proposed by
this research.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the various types of accident models
available today. Blackened squares indicate that the model type complies with the
element indicated.
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Driving Force
Normal Operating State
Human Information
Processing
Fault Tree
Event Tree
Quantitative risk assessment
Socio Technical/Holistic
Neural Networks
MACHINE
Accident Investigation
Comparison Analysis
Thompson's confIrmatory
Tomas' Structural equation
Brown's Sociotechnical
model
Guastello's Cusp model
Cheyne's safety attitude
SAM approach
New perspective at the time
Attempts to explore the human
reaction to danger
Brings classic methods to the
problem
Complex algorithm - nuclear
application
Broader, but possibly lacks
quantitative / offshore appl.
Possible candidate for model
basis
Lacks application offshore /
occupational accident
Retrospective analysis, essentially
non-predictive
Most applicable model of those
cons"dered
Relational, not oil & gas related
Relational, not oil & gas related
SpecifIc to the steel industry, no
resulting practical model
Relational, not predictive, not oil
& gas related
Relational, not predictive, not oil
& gas related
Retrospective, little attention
outside the organisation
Figure 2.8 - Summary of accident models
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2.2) Statistics associated with occupational accidents
A variety of sources of offshore occupational accident statistics and associated literature
analysing the data have been investigated and are described in this section. These include
internet based databases (for example the United Kingdom (UK) Health and Safety
Executive (HSE) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD)), open literature
offering statistical analyses, and company-supplied documentation.
2.2.1) Slips, trips and falls from height offshore
BOMEL (UK HSE, 2002a) has conducted a statistical study of slips, trips, and falls from
height (STF) in the UK offshore industry. The objectives of the study were to establish a
firm understanding of the causes of STFs and to develop a strategic plan to bring about a
15% reduction in these accidents over a three year period.
The study comprised the following elements:
• literature review
• accident data analysis
• interviews with HSE inspectors and trade union represe{ltatives
• focus groups, including offshore installation managers and safety representatives
• an offshore visit
Some conclusions of the accident data analysis were as follows:
• The rate of STF was seen to be dependent on the activity being undertaken, as
illustrated in Table 2.2. The ratio ofhighest to lowest values (1500/325 = 4.6) was
relatively higher than for other influencing factors, which leads to the conclusion
that activity being undertaken is a strong factor in STF occurrence likelihood.
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Table 2.2 - Slips, trips and falls by operation
Activity Being Rate of Slips, Trips and FaDs (per 105 people), 1996-1999
Undertaken
Deck operations 1500
Drilling 1workover 600
Production 600
Construction 600
Maintenance 525
Transport 425
Diving 325
• The rate was not as dependent on age, where the ratio of the rate (550) for the
group (21-40 yrs) most likely to have an accident compared to that (450) for the
group (41-50 yrs) least likely to have an accident, was only 550/450 = 1.2. This
result, compared to the ratio associated with activity being undertaken, indicates
that age related issues (perhaps capability, attitude, or experience), may be
relatively less important than activity being undertaken.
• STF rates for work on fixed and mobile units were compared, and they differed by
a relatively small ratio of 1.08, with the rate on fixed installations being greater.
The similarity in results is not particularly surprising in light of the generally
similar activities executed on each type of unit. If anything, the rate on mobile
installations might have been expected to be slightly greater, owing to the
continuous, albeit slight, wave induced motion present on floating units.
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2.2.2) Multivariate analysis of injuries data
The University of Liverpool (UK HSE, 2001b) has conducted a statistical analysis of a
database of more than one thousand offshore accidents, in an attempt to extract possible
relationships between the accidents and the operations being undertaken at the time.
Some results were as follows.
• The percentage of injuries categorised as fatal or major was greater on mobile
installations than on fixed installations (23% vs 17%). Note this is an opposite
trend to that suggested by the data in UK HSE (2002a), and may result from the
additional complexity introduced to activities by vessel motion.
• 32% of injuries between lOam and llam were categorised as fatal or major,
compared to 19% for the remaining 23 hours.
• 27% and 33% respectively of injuries categorised as slips/trips/falls and
lifting/crane operations, were fatal or major, compared to 12% for the remaining
categories. This result supports the notion that occupational accidents are more
dangerous than generally thought.
2.2.3) Health and safety performance of the global E & P industry 2000
Smith (2002) has analysed the global safety performance of the exploration and
production industry. Some of Smith's results are summarised below.
• The dataset was extensive, including results from 39 companies operating in 71
countries over 10 years. Data from the latest year surveyed, 2000, represented
over 1.6 billion hours worked.
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• The data represented both onshore and offshore work, and little significant
difference was seen when comparing safety performance onshore and offshore.
However, since 30% of the onshore accidents were caused by driving incidents, it
is reasonable to conclude that if vehicle accidents were disregarded to allow a
"like for like" comparison, onshore safety performance results would have been
superior.
• A regional analysis produced the following results.
• Where fatal accident rate (FAR, defined as fatalities per 100 million hours
worked) is concerned, the region performing poorest was South America,
followed by Africa, the Middle East, Asia/Australia, North America, and
Europe.
• Considering lost time injury frequency (LTIF, defined as injuries per
million hours worked), again the region performing poorest was South
America, but in this case the next poorest was Europe, followed in turn by
North America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia/ Australia.
• In 2000, the overall FAR was 7.28, which was not appreciably different from the
figures generally recorded over the preceding 10 years, during which the values
ranged between 7 and 13, with no particular trend in either direction.
• The 2000 fatal incident rate (FIR - which eliminates the number of fatalities
associated with each incident from the calculation) was 6.73 per 100 million hours
worked. As was the case for FAR, there has been no particular directional trend in
the statistic between 1991 and 2000.
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• LTIF values showed significant inter-company variability. The worst performing
company had an LTIF exceeding 30, and the best, lower than 1. Eight of the thirty
nine companies performed significantly better than the average frequency of 1.88,
and fifteen significantly worse than the average.
Smith's work supports the view that both cultural and corporate factors can affect safety
performance. The ratio of worst to best FAR between regions approached five. The ratio
of worst to best LTIF approached a similar figure. Results from different organisations
indicate that corporate safety programmes can have a very significant effect, in that the
ratio ofworst to best company performance exceeded thirty.
Although not as consistent or obvious, Smith's work also showed that improvements in
safety performance over time can be realised. LTIF in 2000 was less than one half of the
figure achieved in 1990.
Smith's results and conclusions support the validity of the holistic approach proposed by
this work, which considers cultural and corporate factors as inputs within a wide range of
influencing elements affecting occupational accidents.
2.2.4) Safety and environmental performance measures in offshore E&P operations:
empirical indicators for benchmarking
Hedare et al. (1998) have conducted a statistical analysis to test the hypothesis that the
expanded role of small independent operators in the Gulf of Mexico poses an increased
danger to personnel safety or the environment. The authors used several indicators to
study the situation from 1987 to 1993, including the following.
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• fire and explosion incident rate - the ratio of the total number of reported fires and
explosions within a given time period to a weighted normalising factor (for
example, number of installations for production companies, or number of wells
for drilling contractors)
• blow-out incident rate - the ratio of total number of blowouts to total wells
Some results and conclusions associated with the analysis were as follows.
• Average fire and explosion incident rate for major operators was more than twice
that for independents.
• Independents (especially smaller ones) had a higher average blow-out incident
rate than the majors.
• From the general safety perspective, independents were seen to have performed
marginally better over the period than the majors.
• Independents also bettered the majors when accidents of greater severity were
studied.
Iledare's work suggests an interesting conclusion about the effect of company size on
safety culture, and its subsequent effect on safety performance. Size and fmancial strength,
usually associated with major operators, might be expected by some to be correlated with
a high attention to safety culture, but some of the results indicate the reverse. A possible
explanation may be associated with the family company atmosphere in smaller
organisations, which may produce a more favourable safety culture than that existing in
larger companies, and in turn, better safety results.
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2.2.5) Risk perception and safety in the UK offshore oil and gas industry
Flin et al. (1996) have presented the results of a questionnaire-based survey which
investigated the risk perceptions of a series of some 622 UK offshore oil and gas workers.
Some of the results of the work were as follows.
Workers' perception of their risk
• 80% of the workers considered themselves basically safe while working on
offshore platforms.
• Slipping was the individual hazard about which the highest percentage (14) of
workers felt unsafe, outdistancing weather conditions (13), hit by a falling object
(11), food poisoning (5), crushed by machinery (4), electric shock (4), fall to a
lower level (4), medical problems (3), burns (3), and fall overboard (2).
• Vessel hitting platform was the installation hazard about which the highest
percentage (11) of workers felt unsafe, outdistancing sabotage (8), helicopter
crash (8), explosion (7), toxic gas leak (7), blow-out (6), fire (6), and structural
failure (4).
Workers' views on accident causation and safety culture
• 60% or more of the workers disagreed with the following statements:
• Sometimes it is necessary to take chances to get a job done.
• The permit to work system is just a paperwork system.
• Sometimes it is necessary to ignore safety issues to keep production going.
• Accidents just happen, there is little one can do to avoid them.
misses are often the result of bad planning and
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• The use ofmachines and technical equipment makes accidents unavoidable.
• I never think about the risks now that I am used to the work.
• 60% or more of the workers agreed with the following statements:
• Good proposals on how to improve safety are often stopped if they cost too
much.
• Whenever I see safety instructions being ignored, I point them out.
• Lots of minor accidents and injuries are a sign that more serious accidents
could also occur.
• Most accidents could be prevented if a little care and attention was paid to
preventive measures.
• Accidents and
management.
• Most accidents are due to human failure.
Some psychological aspects of risk perception were discussed by the authors. They
suggested, for example, that people are generally too frightene? of strange situations and
too casual about familiar ones, and that people tend to underestimate the risks they choose
to take and overestimate the risk associated with mandated activities. Because there was
evidence that actual accident rates were higher in groups that underestimate risks, it is
important to try to ensure that the workforce assesses risk as accurately as possible.
The results provided a consolidated picture of UK offshore workers' perspectives of the
occupational accident situation. It is encouraging that the workers were aware of the
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relatively high risk associated with occupational accidents. Furthermore, the workers'
responses to the agree/disagree statements indicated a mature safety culture. There
seemed to be little fear of reporting safety violations, little cynicism regarding
management attitudes and procedures, and a generally positive attitude with respect to the
ability to avoid accidents.
2.2.6) Rig floor accidents: who, when and why? - an analysis of UK offshore
accident data
Dobson (1999) has presented a summary of accidents on UK. drilling rigs, subdivided by
a range of categories, including activity at the time of the accident, occupation of the
injured, age group, and type of injury. An analysis of the data was conducted, which led
to the proposal of some causal factors associated with the accidents and a series of
proposed remedies. Tables 2.3 - 2.5 present some of Dobson's results.
Table 2.3 - Accident occurrence by type
,>;." Accident Type Number of Occurrences (Apr. 1997- Sept. 1998)
Manual handling 53
Trips and slips 2$
Moving load 24
Dropped load 15
Dropped object 7
Pressure 4
Hand tools 4
Release ofhazardous substance 1
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Table 2.4 - Accident occurrence by occupation
Occupation
Toolpusher
Driller
Assistant Driller
Derrickman
Floorrnan
Deck foreman and rigger
Roustabout
Subsea engineer
Service hands
Well service and wireline
Other
Number of Occurrences
57
30
15
Table 2.5 - Accident rate by age
Age Group Injuries/!000 Employees ' •.>
<21 80
21-25 62
26-30 66
31-35 22
36-40 30
41-45 8
46-50 8
Dobson has offered the following comments with respect to the results.
• The critical factors were shown to be the level of experience of those involved and
the number of days they had been working offshore.
• A high proportion of accidents occurred in the first hour following a shift change.
• The accident rate for individuals was highest among those who had been offshore
for six or seven days or for thirteen or fourteen days.
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• A significant proportion of accidents happened to those with less than one year's
offshore experience.
• Those with between seven and ten year's experience appeared more likely to be
involved in accidents than some of their less experienced colleagues.
Dobson has suggested the following series of remedies to reduce accident occurrence.
• rigorous safety training for all new starts and follow-on training when promoted to
another position
• provision of full information on hazards and how to avoid and mitigate them
• development of a safety culture with regular tool-box talks where hazards and
risks are discussed
• commitment to good housekeeping on the rig floor
• assessment ofmaterial handling risks
• design of rigs to reduce human factors problems
Dobson's work offered valuable input to the present research. Statistical information was
provided regarding drilling rig occupational accidents and their breakdown by various
categories. The subdivision of the data helped to indicate which factors are important in
the occupational accident problem. The suggested list of remedies added support to the
view that accident causation must be considered on a multi-level basis (i.e. design,
equipment, human factors, safety culture, etc.).
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2.2.7) Organizational factors, safety attitudes and workload among offshore oil
personnel
Rundmo et al. (1998) have conducted a statistical study comparing attitudes and
perceptions of Norwegian offshore workers in 1994 with a similar group surveyed in
1990. The work made use of the following statistical techniques.
• a "t" test to show whether respondents' evaluation of the 1994 work environment
differed significantly from their view in 1990, and to test for differences by
employment status
• "Pearson's r" to quantify the association between dimensions of the working
environment and the respondents' satisfaction with management and manning
The data analysis confirmed significant differences in perception between the two groups,
even within this relatively short time span. Some results of the work were as follows.
• Personnel reported greater influence over decisions regarding their own work in
1994 than in 1990.
• Personnel reported a reduction in "experiencing workload", i.e. feeling the
adverse effects of draft, cold, noise and vibrations in 1994 compared to 1990. Said
differently, working conditions were considered better in 1994.
• Personnel were generally more satisfied with safety and contingency measures
(protective and safety equipment, instructions, training) in 1994 compared to 1990.
• A reasonable correlation was shown between dissatisfaction with management
and manning and perceived accident risk.
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Rundmo et al.'s work showed that improvements in safety perception are possible over
time, and also that a relationship exists between corporate factors and the risks perceived
by personnel. Both of these concepts are important to the present work, the first because it
confirms the worth of taking steps to improve safety, and the second because it confirms
the existence of a link between corporate and direct factors in the accident process.
2.2.8) International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) safety performance
indicators data
Comprehensive offshore oil and gas occupational accident data are available from the
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers' (OGP) annually released "Safety
Performance Indicators" reports (OGP, 2002, 2004, 2005). The data are supplied to the
OGP by a significant (- 35-40) group of oil companies, including both large multi-
nationals such as ExxonMobil, Shell, BP, ConocoPhillips, and ChevronTexaco, and
growing operators such as Petro-Canada, OMY, Occidental, Marathon, and Premier Oil.
In 2003, the information was based on more than two billion hours worked in seventy
four countries. The primary indicators used to benchmark saf~ty performance are number
of fatalities, fatal accident and incident rates, lost time injuries, and total recordable
incident rate. The present research has drawn heavily from the OGP reports, particularly
because the data have been subdivided by both region and company. As an example of
the information provided, total recordable incident rate versus time from 1995 - 2003,
subdivided by companies and contractors, is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9 - OGP Total recordable incident rate versus time
2.2.9) The International Labour Organisation (lLO), Safety in numbers, global
safety culture at work (2003)
The ILO (2003) has presented global workplace accident statistics, subdivided according
to world bank regions, which were primarily defined not geographically, but instead by
their respective degrees of commercial development. For example, one group has been
referred to as "established market economies", and included both the United States and
Europe. India and China were individually considered as se arate markets, and others
included the Middle Eastern crescent and sub Saharan Africa. This data, although not
specific to oil and gas, gave an indication of the potential of local wealth to effect safety
results. The model proposed by this work recognises this concept by including financial
elements within the group of external influencing factors.
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Takala (1999) has studied the ILO data with a view to evaluating the willingness to report
accidents in different cultures and regions. The results are described in Section 3.2.4, and
it is clear that the percentage of accidents actually reported varies regionally.
2.2.10) The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) website
The NPD (2004) internet based database offers a year-by-year presentation of accident
statistics covering operations on the Norwegian continental shelf. Whilst the data lack a
global view and are not company specific, they do provide a detailed account of the
relative results when conducting different activities, for example drilling, production,
maintenance, catering, and administration. Additionally, the data are split between mobile
and fixed installations, and between operators and contractors, which provided
opportunities for statistical analysis, the results of which are presented in Chapter 3.
2.2.11) The United Kingdom (UK) Health and Safety Executive (HSE) database
The UK HSE maintains an extensive database of accident statistics, and several authors
and organisations (for example UK HSE, 2001b, HSE, 2002a) have produced reports
analysing the data in different ways (for example by activity atid over time).
2.2.12) Company annual reports
Annual reports, containing limited safety performance data, are publicly available from
all major oil companies and contractors involved in the oil and gas industry (for example
TotalEltFina, 2002, Halliburton, 2003, ExxonMobil, 2003, ConocoPhillips, 2002). A
selection of the data has been included in Appendix 1.
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These documents provided opporhmities to compare one company with another, albeit
generally between companies (major operators) which tend to have very similar attitudes
toward safety issues. The reported data lack detail, often comprising one or only a few
data points per year - for example company-wide injury and illness rates. Since the
results are typically reported slightly differently from one company to the next, a perfect
like for like comparison is not always possible. Nevertheless, with some manipulation, a
reasonable comparison is achievable.
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2.3) Factors affecting occupational accidents
A primary goal of this research has been the development of a quantitative predictive
model to study offshore occupational accidents. An essential step in the model
development was the identification of constituent factors and the formulation of realistic
interrelationships between them. The literature related to occupational accidents offered a
variety of suggestions for factors and their relationships and groupings, a cross section of
which is described in this section. In some cases, the work reviewed has been discussed in
detail elsewhere in this document, in which case the comments in this section are brief.
2.3.1) Organisational factors: the SAM approach
Pate Cornell and Murphy's (1996) SAM approach was described in Section 2.1.3.10. The
authors' proposed factors and their grouping is shown in Table 2.6. There is some
similarity between the authors' proposal and the present model's structure at the direct
and organisational levels.
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Table 2.6 - Pate Cornell and Murphy's proposed factors
Top Levels
Organisational
Factors
Decisions
Actions
Level 2
Economic Pressures
Personnel issues
Flaws in design guidelines
Inspection and maintenance
practices
and Personnel problems in crisis
Production decisions
Design and expansion
problems
Inspection and Maintenance
Errors
Level 3
Production vs. safety
DefInition of profit centres
Production culture
Insufficient experience
Learning mechanisms
Bad layout rules
Poor safety system
No structural resistance to
large fires
Permit to work system
Inadequate regulatory
oversight
2.3.2) BOMEL Ltd, Slips, trips and falls from height (STF) offshore
Following an analysis of UK occupational accident statistics, RaMEL (UK HSE, 2002a)
concluded that factors contributing to STF's could be grouped into four main levels, as
shown in Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 - BOMEL factors
Main level
Environmental
Corporate
Sub levels
Political influence
Regulatory influence
Company profitability
Ownership and control
Company culture
Market influence
Societal influence
Organisational structure
Safety management
Labour relations
Organisational I-- W_o_rk_o-'rg=--aru_·_sa_tio_n -t-__Sa_fe_ty_c_ul_t_ur_e_--t
Inspection & maintenance process Supervision
Terms & conditions Procedures
Accident/incident management loop Management
Training Equipment purchasing
Direct Housekeeping Quality ofPPE
Fatigue Inspection/maintenance
Quality ofhardware Attentiveness
Physical fitness Experience
Weather Motivation
Risk perception Compliance
Communication Visual environment
Availability of suitable human resources
Following factor identification, a process ofprioritisation and weighting was conducted to
identify (i) critical factors, and (ii) paths of influence, for STF. Table 2.8 shows the
critical paths for the six direct causes deemed most influential. This process and result
proposed, in a qualitative manner, a causal chain extending from external market
influence, through corporate elements such as profitability and corporate culture, to the
direct causes of accidents, for example housekeeping and experience. Corporate culture's
importance to the occupational accident process was reconfirmed by its inclusion as an
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influencing factor of five of the six direct causes. The extension of the causal link to
external factors is fundamental to the present research, which goes further still by taking a
quantitative approach to accident frequency prediction.
Table 2.8 - BOMEL critical paths
Six Most Organisational factor(s) Corporate Environmental
Influential affecting direct cause factor(s) affecting factor(s)
Direct organisational affecting
Causes factor corporate factor
Housekeeping Accident/incident
management loop
Supervision
Safety Culture Company Culture Market Influence
Inspection! Inspection & maintenance
maintenance process
Safety Culture Company Culture Market Influence
Quality of Equipment purchasing
hardware Insp.l maintenance process
Safety Culture Company Culture Market Influence
Experience Management
Training
Weather Work organisation Safety management
Safety Culture Company C~lture Market Influence
Risk Accident/incident Company
Perception information loop Profitability
Training
Safety Culture Company Culture Market Influence
BOMEL then formulated a series of actions and strategies in the hope of reducing STF's.
Some of the proposed strategies were as follows:
-71-
• safety case regulation re-focus
• more detailed review of STP (for example to understand how corporate factors
influence STP frequency)
• STP database to be developed
• HSE inspectors to be more completely educated on STP
• coefficients of friction (decking, grating, stairs, etc.) to be re-evaluated
• workforce survey to be conducted
• human factors to be studied
BOMEL's work identified and grouped a series of the factors considered to affect STP
frequency. The result provided one possibility for the present model's structural
arrangements. The present research builds on BOMEL's suggestions for future work, for
example with the inclusion of more untraditional elements, a more detailed examination
of the influence of corporate factors, and by taking a quantitative approach to accident
frequency prediction.
2.3.3) Balkey and Phillips, Using OSHA process safety ~anagement standard to
reduce human error
Balkey and Phillips (1993) have categorised the fourteen sections of the United States
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Process Safety Management
Standard into five governing sections as shown in Table 2.9. The categorisation was
based upon the overall issues considered to affect process safety. There is some
consistency between the authors' elements and those suggested by the present research,
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but, unlike Balkey and Phillips' proposal, the present model includes factors external to
the organisation.
Table 2.9 - Balkey and Phillips' levels
Top Levels
Global
Lower Levels
Employee participation Training
Contractor
Design / Change
Work Planning
Operations
Release / injury
Process safety information
Process hazard analysis
Analysis methods
Analysis content
Pre-startup safety review
Operating procedures
Mechanical integrity
Accident investigation
Analysis teams
Analysis follow-up
Management of change
Trade Secrets
Hot work permits
Compliance safety audits
Emergency planning and response
2.3.4) McCauley-Bell and Badiru, Fuzzy modelling and analytical hierarchy
processing - means to quantify risk levels associated with occupational injuries -
part II: the development of a fuzzy rule - based model for the prediction of injury
McCauley-Bell and Badiru (1996b) have proposed and grouped a series of factors (Table
2.10) considered to affect the likelihood of occurrence of occupationally-induced
cumulative trauma disorders. The work was discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.2.4.
Whilst the application was different from that presently studied, the factors and their
grouping were reasonably consistent with the direct and corporate levels proposed in this
work (i.e. a series of direct (or task related) elements, elements associated with the
characteristics of the person, and the effect of the employing organisation).
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Table 2.10 -McCauley-Bell and Badiru's levels
Top Levels
Organisational
Personal
Task-related
Equipment
Production rate / layout
Ergonomics programme
Peer influence
Previous CTD
Hobbies and habits
Diabetes
Awkward joint posture
Repetition
Hand tool use
Lower Levels
Training
Cumulative trauma disorder (CTD) level
Awareness
Thyroid problems
Age
Arthritis
Force
Task duration
Vibration
2.3.5) Embrey, Incorporating management and organisational factors into
probabilistic safety assessment
Embrey (1992) has proposed a model, named Model of Accident Causation using
Hierarchical Influence Network, or MACHINE, which considered accident causation to
be a three-level process, as illustrated in Table 2.11. Embrey included direct and
corporate elements (training, procedures), which were similar to the direct and corporate
factors of the present model, which additionally includes an external layer. Further
comments on Embrey's approach were made in Section 2.1.2.6.
Table 2.11 - Embrey's levels
Top Levels
Level Two
Level One
Direct
Causes
Lower Levels
Design Errors IPoor Human Resource
Management
Risk management Errors I
Incomplete definition of responsibilities I Ineffective training
Unclear Procedures
Failure to conduct equipment checks I Failure to follow
maintenance procedures
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2.3.6) Kjellen and Hovden, Reducing risks by deviation control - a retrospection
into a research strategy
Kjellen and Hovden (1993) viewed the accident process as having two levels - the
accident sequence, and the underlying detennining factors. The proposed underlying
factors were grouped as shown in Table 2.12. The groups were not unlike those proposed
by the present research, although the authors did not include external elements to the
same degree.
Table 2.12 Kjellen and Hovden's levels
Top Levels Lower Levels
Sociall
individual
Work management, instructions
Infonnal infonnation flow
Workplace nonns
Individual nonns and attitudes
Individual knowledge and
experience
Special circumstances
Organisationall Routines of decisions, construction, or buying of equipment
economical l-S-y-st-em-s-o-f-re-m-u-ne-ra-tt-'o-n,-p-ro-m-ot-io-n-,s-an-c=-ti-=om=-·n-g---=---=-------I
Controls of other type, e.g. economic, "third party"
Maintenance routines Education, training
Quality control Organisation ofwork, manning
Activity planning SystehIs of shift, work-time
Instructions, rules Routines in safety work
Organisation of first aid
Physicall
technical
Workplace layout
Design of equipment
Physical hazard (energy)
Physical environment
Protective equipment
Intensity of work
Method ofwork
Work material
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2.3.7) International Labour Organisation, Safety in numbers, pointers for global
safety culture at work
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2003) has investigated work related (all
industries) deaths on a global basis. As part of the research, the ILO proposed a series of
main contributing and preventable factors associated with occupational accidents, which
can been grouped into those associated with the individual, the organisation, and
originating outside the primary workplace environment, as illustrated in Table 2.13. As
was the case with much of the literature discussed, these factors, though not chosen based
on specific oil and gas experience, are similar to those proposed by the present work.
Table 2.13 ILO levels
Top Levels
Organisational
Individual
External
Lower Levels .,\ ~.
[Lack of] Company safety and health policy
[Lack of] Safety and health structure
[Lack of] Worker/employer collaborative mechanism
[Lack of] Occupational safety and health management system
[Lack of] Available solutions
[Lack of] Information centres
[Lack of] Incentive based compensation system
[Lack of] Training
[Poor] Safety culture t
[Lack of] Knowledge
[Lack of] Awareness
[Lack of or poor] Government policies
[Lack of or poor] Legal enforcement
[Lack of or poor] Advisory system
[Lack of or poor] Tripartite cooperation
[Lack of or poor] Occupational health services
[Lack of] Research and proper statistics for priority setting
[Lack of] Training
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2.3.8) BP - Getting HSE right - a guide for BP managers
As part of its primary safety programme, BP (2004) identified and utilised a series of key
HSE processes, as shown in Table 2.14. There is some consistency between BP's
collection of key processes and the factors proposed by the other literature and the present
research, for example:
• external pressures (in the BP case, customers and community awareness)
• corporate factors (BP's training, documentation, and management)
• direct and individual elements (behaviours, people)
Table 2.14 - BP key processes
BP Key Processes
Leadership and Accountability
Risk Assessment and Management
People, Training and Behaviours
Working with Contractors and Others
Facilities Design and Construction
Operations and Maintenance
Management of Change
Information and Documentation
Customers and Products
Community and Stakeholder Awareness
Crisis and Emergency Management
Incidents Analysis and Prevention
Assessment, Assurance and Improvement
2.3.9) Hurst, Risk assessment - the human dimension
Hurst's (1998) analysis of the accident phenomena resulted in a model which had some
philosophical similarities to the one proposed by the present research. Building on
previous work by Reason (1990), Hurst concluded that accidents resulted from a
breakdown in a three way (hardware-people-corporate) infrastructure described below
and shown in Table 2.15.
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Table 2.15 - Hurst's levels
Design
Top Levels Lower Levels Lower Levels
Reliability Technical
Engineering hardware failures
Ergonomics
Human errors:
Types: slips, lapses, mistakes, violations
Causes: skill, rule, knowledge
Safety culture
Management control
Socio-technical systems failures
Assessment tools for safety management
systems
Hierarchical task
analysis
Human reliability
assessments
People failures
Failure of safety
management
systems
People failures are a constituent factor in Hurst's model, and their causes are subdivided
according to the underlying nature of the errors, which are considered to fall into one of
three categories (knowledge, rule, or skill). Knowledge based actions are based on
knowledge worked out from first principles, rule based decisions or diagnoses are based
on, as expected, rules, and skill based actions are simple, almost automatic behaviour
patterns.
Supplementing the direct benefits of protective equipment such as boots and hard hats,
Hurst suggested that the quality of design of technical hardware and equipment affected
accident occurrence likelihood. He recognised that safe designs necessarily incorporated
human factors and included such things as non-slip flooring and appropriately constructed
handrails.
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Corporate systems considered by Hurst to affect the accident process included both softer
items such as safety culture, and more prescriptive items such as procedures, training, and
management systems.
Hurst's philosophies were consistent with the multi-layer modelling approach adopted by
this work, which takes a further step by including factors external to the organisation.
2.3.10) Thompson, Hilton, and Witt, Where the safety rubber meets the shop floor: a
confirmatory model of management influence on workplace safety
Thompson et al.'s (1998) statistical study of the relationship between company culture
and shop floor safety conditions is described in Section 2.1.3.5. For completeness, their
proposed set of factors is shown in this section (Table 2.16). There is a degree of
consistency between Thompson's philosophy and that proposed by this research, but the
present work additionally includes an external view, a practical methodology for
predicting accidents, and a cost element.
Table 2.16 - Thompson et al.'s levels
Top Levels
Organisational politics
Goal congruence
Supervisor fairness
Lower Levels Lower Levels
Manager support for safety Safety conditions
Supervisor support for safety Safety Compliance
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2.3.11) Tomas, Melia, and Oliver, A cross-validation of a structural equation model
of accidents: organisational and psychological variables as predictors of work safety
Tomas et al. (1999) have investigated a set of factors, shown in Table 2.17, believed to
affect the accident process (also discussed in Section 2.1.3.6). Several of Tomas et al.'s
elements have also been included in the present model, but the calculation methodology
and industrial application are very different. Tomas et al.'s work provided further support
to the concept that accidents are caused only partially by hazards, and that their
occurrence is heavily influenced by individuals' behaviour and their work environment.
Table 2.17 - Tomas et al. 's levels
Top Levels
Climate ICo-workers response
Supervisors response IWorker attitude
Safety behaviour IActual risk
Lower Levels
Hazards
Lower Levels
Accidents
2.3.12) Brown, Willis, and Prussia, Predicting safe employee behaviour in the steel
industry: development and test of a sociotechnical model
Brown et al. (2000) have compared three different accide~t philosophies, one where
system effects dominated, one where individual employee actions dominated, and the
favoured choice, where corporate climate and hazards affected accident results through
staff actions. Brown et al.'s work is described in more detail in Section 2.1.3.8, but for
completeness, the proposed constituent factors, which have some consistency with the
present model's direct and corporate factors, are shown in Table 2.18.
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Table 2.18 - Brown et al.'s levels
Lower Levels
2.3.13) Cheyne, Tomas, Cox, and Oliver, Modelling employee attitudes to safety: a
comparison across sectors
Cheyne et al.' s (1999) comparison of staff attitudes toward safety in three UK based
industries is described in Section 2.1.3.9. For completeness, Cheyne's proposed factors
are shown in Table 2.19. The approach had similarities with the present model's
interaction between the corporate and direct levels, whereby management actions act
through staff behaviours to affect safety results.
Table 2.19 - Cheyne et al.'s levels
Top Levels Lower Levels
Management actions and Personal actions and
...r_es...p_on_sl_·b_ili.....ty -t responsibility
Quality of safety training
Lower Levels
Appraisal of
Commitment
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2.4) Other general literature on occupational accidents
This section offers a discussion of literature which, though relevant to model
development, did not fit well in either of the three foregoing sections.
2.4.1) Safety culture
Safety culture, as defmed by the Advisory Committee for Safety in Nuclear Installations
(ACSNI, 2003) is "the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions,
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine commitment to, and the style and
proficiency of, an organisation's health and safety management. Organisations with a
positive safety culture are characterised by communications founded on mutual trust, by
shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by the efficacy of preventive
measures." Several papers related to corporate safety culture were reviewed. Some
resulting comments are included below.
Fleming (UK HSE, 2001a) has evaluated corporate safety culture using a maturity model,
which had been previously applied to software development, project management, human
resources, and quality. The stages through which a competence-·was considered to mature
are shown in Table 2.20. Fleming concluded that the model may be applicable to safety
culture, but a practical demonstration was not offered.
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Table 2.20 - Fleming's maturity stages
Maturity stage
Emerging
Managing
Involving
Cooperating
Continually improving
Activity required to move to the next level ~.
Management commitment
Realisation of frontline staff importance;
development ofpersonal responsibility
Staff engaged to develop cooperation/commitment
to improving safety
Develop consistency and fight complacency
Not applicable; maturity achieved
Both Olsen et al. (2004) and Tharaldsen et al. (2002) have conducted statistical
evaluations of safety culture in the offshore industry. It was concluded that good safety
culture could be defined by satisfactory performance in a series of key elements,
examples of which are listed below. The present model includes variations of these
elements.
• communication and awareness
• focus and involvement
• dangerous tendencies
• safety promoting behaviour
• information
• competence
Flin et al.'s (1996) work provided evidence of the level of safety culture achieved on
some UK offshore platforms, as demonstrated by the results of a questionnaire-based
survey of offshore workers. The results, discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.5,
indicated that the maturity of the safety culture was more advanced than might have been
expected.
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2.4.2) Human factors
One challenge with the present research was to realistically include human factors in the
analysis. This section discusses literature related to the influence of human factors on the
accident process.
2.4.2.1) General comments
Wolfram (1993), in a paper describing the historical use of various types of models in the
engineering profession, emphasised the importance of human factors as follows.
"One area in particular has received scant attention from engineers given its
importance: human behaviour. People are crucial components in most large
engineering systems. They are also, historically, the most unreliable. People
are the source of the vast majority of accidents that occur - not from
malicious intent, but from ignorance, oversight, overstress, misinterpretation
and fatigue, among other factors."
The importance of including human factors has also been recognised and reinforced by
the UK HSE in their document "Good practice and pitfalls in r~sk assessment" (UK HSE,
2003b). It was suggested therein that 80% of accidents may be attributed, at least in part,
to the actions or omissions ofpeople.
2.4.2.2) The University of Aberdeen - Human factors study
The University ofAberdeen (UK HSE, 2003a) was contracted by the UK HSE to execute
a human factors study, one goal of which was to better understand human and corporate
factors in safety.
- 84-
The work was comprised of the following three packages:
• a benchmarking study to identify, analyse, and share best practice on human
factors safety-related issues
• a systematic analysis of trends in human factors causes of offshore accidents
• the development of a programme to train staff in human factors issues
The work concluded that several human factors significantly affect safety, including the
following:
• propensity to report accidents and incidents
• communication about health and safety
• satisfaction with safety activities
• health and safety policy awareness
The authors' work confirmed the importance to the accident process of human factors,
which are recognised by and included in the present model.
2.4.2.3) BAE Systems - Integration of human factors into offshore design
BAE Systems (UK HSE, 2002b) provided the UK HSE with,guidance on the integration
of human factors principles into the offshore design and development process. Some of
the major conclusions of the study were as follows:
• Systems will operate safely only if they have been designed to support their
operators.
• Human factors issues must be considered as a central part of design development.
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• Guidance is needed on approaches that place human factors at the heart of system
design and development.
• Good management is needed to address human factors comprehensively.
• The human factors discipline is considered to be comprised of the following
domains.
• staffing
• personnel
• training
• human factors engineering
• health hazards
system safety
The paper provided a comprehensive analysis of human factors and further confirmed the
importance of their inclusion in predictive models such as the one proposed by this
research.
2.4.2.4) Gordon et at's human factors investigation tool
Gordon et al. (2001) have proposed a model to describe how human factors affect the
accident process. The model formed the basis of a tool used to systematically collect data
on the subject. illustrated in Figure 2.10, the Human Factors. Investigation Tool (HFIT)
was developed in consultation with the UK HSE and five participating oil companies.
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Figure 2.10 - Gordon et al.'s human factors integration tool
Human interaction within the accident process was considered to include four basic stages,
or elements, as below.
• action errors, which occur immediately before an accident, and can be divided into
the categories shown in Figure 2.10
• error recovery (referred to as error response in Figure 2.10), during which
consequences of the accident can be prevented or at least mitigated
• situation awareness, which is a measure of the ability of individuals to accurately
recognise and react to dangerous situations
• threats - factors (external or internal) which may initiate an accident or affect how
serious it becomes
The HFIT structure provided the basis for the creation of a series of systematic questions
posed to experts studying the human factors - accident interface. Gordon et al.'s
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methodology suggested a structured approach for the incorporation of a human factors
capability in accident models, which was useful in the model development phase of the
present work.
2.4.2.5) Strutt et al.'s quantification of human un-reliability
Strutt et al. (1998) have proposed a method for including human reliability in quantitative
risk assessments. Probabilistic values were assigned to both task completion and resource
consumption as execution was attempted. The likelihood of successful completion was
then considered to be a matter of accomplishing a set of actions prior to exhausting the
available resources. The overall probability of successful task completion was determined
using joint probability distribution theory, i.e. the product of the probabilities of
successfully completing the task and not consuming the resources.
The example chosen to illustrate the model was a diver attempting to salvage an asset
from a submerged wreck before running out of air. As part of the presentation, the authors
included a series of estimates of human unreliability while attempting to complete tasks,
assuming different levels of experience, supervision, training, and time pressure. For
illustration, the proposed values are shown in Table 2.21.
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Table 2.21 - Quantification ofhuman un-reliability
Task Nominal
Human
Un-Reliability
Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely 0.55
consequences
Shift/restore system to new or original state on a single attempt 0.26
without supervision or procedure
Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16
Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09
Routine highly practiced task involving relatively low level of skill 0.02
Restore or shift system to original or new state following procedures 0.003
+ checking
Completely familiar, well designed, highly practiced routine task 0.0004
occurring several times per hour, performed to the highest possible
standards by highly motivated, highly trained and experienced
person, totally aware of implications of failure with time to correct
potential error but without the benefit of significant job aids.
Respond correctly to system command even when there is an
augmented or automated supervisory system providing accurate
interpretation of system state
Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found
The authors considered the accident process to include four steps, as below.
0.000002
0.03
• initiating event - most often human error or equipment failure - The authors
supported the view that the underlying causes of accident-triggering events often
include the interaction ofhuman, corporate, and hardware factors.
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• loss of safety barriers/defences - Triggering events need not necessarily lead to
accidents, but the ability to control the situation depends on a robust and efficient
control system.
• deterioration of conditions/escalation - usually the transformation point between
minor and major accidents - This depends on such things as fuel inventory and
over-design of structures.
• failure to escape or evacuate - usually the factor determining whether or not
fatalities occur - This depends on the physical availability of escape possibilities
combined with individuals' abilities to take advantage of them.
Strutt's et al.'s work illustrated one way of quantifying human reliability for inclusion in
probabilistic analyses. The present model does include human reliability in the calculation
methodology, although in a different way than proposed by Strutt et al.
2.4.2.6) Mosleh and Chang's comments on human reliability analysis
Mosleh and Chang (2004) have presented an ambitious approach to include the effects of
human performance (human reliability analysis (HRA)) in probabilistic safety
assessments, primarily as applied to nuclear power plant operators. They perceived the
following limitations in current HRA models.
• failure to address the most common type of human error, errors of commission (as
opposed to errors of omission)
• lack of confidence in the resulting numerical predictions, with respect to
theoretical foundation and quality of existing data
• failure to cater for analyst-to-analyst variability
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Moreover, the authors believed that the lack of a causal perspective on operator error was
a fundamental flaw in existing models, and used this as the predominant element of their
model, illustrated in Figure 2.11.
Figure 2.11 - Mosley and Chang's human reliability analysis
Mosleh and Chang believed that the future of human reliability modelling depended upon
the capability of (i) understanding and (ii) properly modelling, the essential manner in
which individuals receive information, and how and why tqey act upon it. While the
approach seems reasonable, it may be slightly ambitious. For example, the authors
themselves mentioned the following substantial list of limitations or needed
enhancements.
• improvement or validation of essential assumptions inherent in the basic model
• the ability to inject a degree ofmemory or learning into the model
• the inclusion of crew interaction dynamics
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• the need for an extensive knowledge base for the system under study, including
• functional and physical characteristics
• technological knowledge of associated scientific and engineering principles
• database ofpast events
• database of allowable rules of thumb or shortcuts
• expected response of the system to perturbations
general guidance on knowledge of available options, preferences, and
accepted practices
• the requirement for more quantitative and qualitative evidence and internal and
external calibration of conditional probabilities
• the enhancement of overall model calibration
• calculation time may make the model impractical for many applications
This extensive list may lead to the conclusion that a practical application of this approach
remains in the future. Nevertheless, it will be through ongoing efforts such as Mosleh and
Chang's, that the accurate inclusion of human factors elements in probabilistic
calculations will be realised.
2.4.2.7) Li et al.'s human factor event analysis
Li et al. (2003) have studied and reported on the use of a mathematical tool for
incorporating human factors in system reliability analyses. The tool, called Human Factor
Event Analysis (HFEA) relied on the following two analytical methods.
- 92-
• Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), which provided a human
event tree model
• Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR), which determined human errors during the
diagnosis stage of accidents
Although Li et al.'s research has been conducted within the nuclear industry, the concept
of using a mathematical method to analyse human factors and behaviour has contributed
to the present model development process.
2.4.3) Dealing with the cost and benefits of safety measures
Son et al. (2000) have proposed a method for optimising project safety spending. They
suggested that the cost ofproject safety is composed of two elements, as below.
• the cost of accidents, in terms of lost time, reduction in productivity, payouts in
compensation, etc.
• the cost of safety improvement measures, (or countermeasure costs) such as safety
meetings, improved safety equipment, and additional safety personnel
For the former, the relationship between cost and degree of safety is inversely
proportional; high accident costs are associated with a low degree of safety, and vice
versa. For the latter, the relationship is proportional. High safety improvement costs are
associated with a high degree of safety.
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Figure 2.12 - The cost of safety
As illustrated in Figure 2.12, the summation of the two costs then produced a "u" shaped
curve having a characteristic point of minimum cost. It was possible to detennine
parameters for the equations governing the two cost relationships and their sum, and
thereby arrive at a value for the minimum cost and the associated degree of safety. The
data used in Son et al.'s analysis were found in existing accident statistics, mainly in the
onshore construction industry. For example, it was assumed that:
• The countermeasure cost is a direct function of contract value.
• The accident costs are determined by reviewing accident rates in the industry and
combining with the costs (both direct and indirect) of typical accidents.
A theoretical example was presented, using a hypothetical construction company. It was
concluded that the optimal overall safety investment is 1.2 - 1.3 % of total project cost.
The paper suggested a procedure for optimising safety expenditure from an economic
perspective, albeit as applied to the onshore construction industry. One of the intentions
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of the work proposed here is to offer a similar analysis for the offshore occupational
accident problem, and Son's concepts offered guidance. However, attention should be
(and has been) paid to regulatory requirements and corporate culture when applying
models such as this. Cost minimisation may suggest a level of safety that is unacceptable
from other perspectives.
2.4.4 The effect of government policy on industry safety
The primary instrument through which public expectations are transferred to workplace
safety results is government legislation. Brotherton (2003) has described some
relationships, both current and historical, between regional societal cultures and
workplace health and safety legislation. Some examples are described below.
• In the United Kingdom, a redirection in approach was described upon the 1979
election of a conservative government whose agenda included a rejection of
welfare state attitudes and a commitment to privatisation. Under the newly
installed government, new and more stringent safety related legislation was
introduced which placed increased responsibilities oIl, organisations for many
workplace health and safety issues.
• Brotherton suggested that the central/national level of industrial regulation in the
Nordic countries may be rooted in their geopolitical history. For many years these
countries felt vulnerable to invasion, which produced a strong desire to avoid
internal conflict, leading in tum to a philosophy of centralised control. Safety
regulation received a significant injection of intensity in the region following a
period of worker discontent in the 1970's. Wildcat strikes and survey results
- 95-
indicating unhealthy working conditions characterised workplace relationships.
Eventually, dissatisfied workers successfully demanded government legislation
and programmes that transformed working conditions. Norway's safety reputation
in the offshore oil and gas industry is today the envy of many other regimes, and
societal pressures and history have played significant parts in this result.
• Brotherton discussed the United States' well-earned reputation as the global centre
of capitalism. Competition has formed the cornerstone of the economic model at
all levels of society. In this environment, efforts to encourage companies to
voluntarily improve safety results have not proved completely successful.
Consistent with the theme of competition as the driver of all improvements, the
development and enforcement of national safety standards resulted from friction
between company stakeholders and the workforce, groups with conflicting
motivations. Eventually, the perception by workers of excessive company interest
in profit at the expense of safety produced successful demands from workers for
government intervention.
The present model accounts for societal expectations such as "hose described above. The
model includes three layers (direct, corporate, external), and the external layer includes an
element to handle regional value placed on life. In much the same philosophical manner
as public expectations are directed to companies through government legislation, the
overall model philosophy has the expectations of society directed through the companies
to the workplace environment.
Data analysis
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3) Data analysis
This chapter describes a review and analysis of offshore occupational accident data,
including a discussion of both existing statistical information available in the literature
and on databases, and results gathered specifically for this work.
The primary goal of the review of existing data was to confirm that significant differences
exist between results achieved in different (i) regions and (ii) organisations. If, despite
many years of effort, no real inter-regional or inter-company differences exist, then one
might legitimately question the validity of the accident-reduction efforts expended by
companies and regulators. If instead, a broad range of results is observable, it could be
concluded that corporate and regulatory initiatives have produced real effects.
The results presented do confirm real corporate and regional differences in safety
performance. A series of statistical tests supplementing and supporting graphical
representations of the existing information has been presented, which shows that
significant differences have already been achieved.
Extensive use has been made of the statistical method known as the "t" test to compare
datasets representing different regions and companies. This test essentially compares the
means of two datasets within the contexts of each sets' variance. Strict validity of "t" test
results requires the data to have been distributed normally. However, in practice, an
evaluation of normalcy requires more than fifteen or twenty observations (Johnson, 2005),
and the data available for inter-company and inter-regional comparisons were typically in
groups of between five and fifteen. In order to confirm the conclusions implied by the "t"
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tests, an alternative method, the Mann-Whitney test, which did not require normally
distributed input data, was used to evaluate several of the data sets. In each case, the
conclusions implied by the "[" tests were confirmed by the Mann-Whitney tests.
Other tests have been utilised in the analyses in addition to the "t" and Mann-Whitney
tests, for example Tukey's honestly significantly different test and an analysis of variance
(ANOVA) approach. The use of multiple tests provided two valuable benefits. First, the
final conclusions could be proved despite any inherent weaknesses in individual methods,
and second, educational benefit was gained by investigating the different methods and
their respective strengths and weaknesses.
This section also describes the process and results associated with a survey questionnaire
developed specifically for this work. The goal of the questionnaire was to obtain
information required for the predictive model developed and described in Chapter 4.
Expert opinion was needed on two topics: (i) the relative importance of factors
influencing the accident process, and (ii) the degrees to w\rich external factors affect
corporate decisions, and to which the corporate decisions in turn affect the direct accident
process. Every safety professional has a view of which elements are most important in the
accident process, and also how the various layers (external, corporate, and direct) interact.
The process undertaken here combined the opinions of more than forty safety
professionals in a quantitative manner, thereby facilitating the direct injection of expert
opinion to the model.
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It is worth presenting here a series of definitions, as used by the International Association
of Oil & Gas Producers, applicable to the analyses which follow.
Occupational injury - Any injury such as a cut, fracture, sprain, amputation, etc., which
results from a work accident or from a single instantaneous exposure in the work
environment. Conditions resulting from animal bites, such as insect or snake bites, and
from one-time exposure to chemicals are considered to be injuries.
Fatal accident Rate CFAR) - The number of company/contractor fatalities per
100,000,000 hours worked.
Fatal incident rate (FIR) - The number of fatal incidents per 100,000,000 hours. Incidents
involving a third party fatality are included (since 1998) provided they directly result
from company or contractor operations.
Total recordable incident rate CTRIR) - The number of recordable incidents (fatalities +
lost workday cases + restricted workday cases + medical treatment cases) per 1,000,000
hours worked
Lost time injury CLTD - A fatality or lost workday case. The number ofLTI's is the sum
of fatalities and lost workday cases.
Lost time injury frequency CLTIF) - The number of lost time injuries (fatalities + lost
workday cases) incidents per 1,000,000 hours worked.
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The following sections discuss trends in occupational accidents from time, regional, and
company perspectives. Before addressing these issues, however, it is worth reiterating the
relative occupational accident risk faced by oil and gas workers compared to risks from
other dangers, such as air transportation, drowning, and explosions. Figure 1.1 showed
the subdivision by cause of significant injuries, and Figure 3.1 shows a similar breakdown
for fatalities in the industry over the period 1998 - 2002.
Electrical
4%
Struck by
16%
Air transport
18%
Explosion!
burns
13%
Drowning
6% Vehicle
22%
Falls
10%
Caught
between
6%
Other
5%
Figure 3.1 - Causes of oil and gas fatalities 1998 - 2002
(International Association of Oil & Gas Produ6'ers, 2004)
It is noteworthy that the sum of falls, struck by, and caught between (32%), is far greater
than either of the more widely discussed dangers of explosions, drowning, and air
transport.
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3.1) Overall trends
3.1.1) Historical offshore accident performance
The trend in offshore occupational accident statistics over the past fifteen years has been
generally downward, which is a testament to the efforts expended by offshore safety
professionals. See for example Figures 3.2 - 3.4, generated from data presented in the
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) 2003 database (OGP, 2004). The
curves show fatal accident rate (FAR), lost time injury frequency (LTIP), and total
recordable incident rate (TRIR) as a function of time. Over the past four years there has
been a levelling off trend in the FAR numbers. A similar effect is observable in the LTIP
and TRIR numbers, though not to the same extent.
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Figure 3.3 - Offshore oil and gas lost time injury frequency versus time
16.00
1
~ 14.00 --r,------------------1
:I: 12.00 --~---:;;;...,.-----------II! ==_-====_==_'\..==~_==zs==_-=== _-=~~==_-====_-= ==~~==s:==_- : :=_-:~=~=_- ===_-:===......: =_-====_-==
1994
Figure 3.4 Offshore oil and gas total recordable incident rate versus time
3.1.2) Relationship between TRIR and price of oil
It is interesting to consider fluctuations in the price of oil over a similar period (1995 -
2003), shown in Figure 3.5. Had the price of oil showed a steady increase over the period
one might be tempted to infer a relationship between increased available capital and
safety improvements. On the other hand, lack of a significant relationship between the
two parameters would lead to the conclusion that safety improvements have resulted from
other factors such as improved safety culture, equipment, and/or motivation. The safety
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result/price of oil relationship has been evaluated by considering the correlation between
the respective values, as described below.
!~!I-~~,----'====~\~\~====~2:=~~~====::===rI
1980
Figure 3.5 - Inflation adjusted price of oil versus time
A scatter plot of total recordable incident rate against price of oil is shown in Figure 3.6.
Observation indicates a moderate negative correlation, which is investigated below.
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~ ~ ::~~ ==============~=====:.:========~ 4.00 ---------------
8 2.00 ------------1----
~ 0.00 --,......--...----.---...........-.....,......---.---
0.00
Adjusted Price of Oil ($US/Barrell)
Figure 3.6 - Total recordable incident rate versus price of oil
The correlation coefficient ("r"), defined overleaf, has been calculated as -0.54 for the
two variables between 1995 and 2003 (see Table 3.1). This result indicates a modest
negative correlation, as we might expect.
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CorrelationCoefficient(r) (3.1)
Table 3.1 - Correlation coefficient between price of oil and offshore TRIR
Year Price of Oil(X) TRIR(Y) X Y XY
1995 18.17 13.80 330.15 190.44 250.75
1996 22.40 9.90 501.76 98.01 221.76
1997 20.39 11.86 415.75 140.66 241.83
1998 12.66 9.83 160.28 96.63 124.45
1999 17.78 8.66 316.13 75.00 153.97
2000 29.54 8.84 872.61 78.15 261.13
2001 23.39 6.85 547.09 46.92 160.22
2002 23.78 5.77 565.49 33.29 137.21
2003 28.42 4.87 807.70 23.72 138.41
Sums> 196.53 80.38 4,516.95 782.81 1,689.73
Correlation -0.54
Coefficient
A test of significance can be conducted on this result, using the Fisher Z Transformation
(Johnson, 2005) as shown below.
Fisher" Z"Transjormation(Z) =.l x In!..:!=..::.
2 1-r
(3.2)
The statistic "z", defined below and derived from the Fisher "Z" value, can be shown to
be distributed according to the standard normal distribution, an'd can therefore be used to
test the null hypothesis that the two sets of data are not correlated.
(3.3)
where n = number of observations
The results are as follows:
Z(-0.54) = -0.6042
z=-1.48
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Since the distribution of this statistic is normal, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the
0.15 level of significance. There is a reasonable basis to say that price of oil and TRIR.
are negatively correlated.
To investigate further, a Spearman rank order correlation coefficient analysis has been
conducted. The Spearman coefficient is defined as follows:
6fd;2
r =1 __,_°-1_
s N3-N
where
d; the difference between ranks of the paired variables
N number of observation pairs
(3.4)
In this case, we are investigating the hypothesis that a high price of oil will produce
improved accident results, so a ranking of "1" is assigned to years when price of oil is
highest and TRIR. is lowest. The results are shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 - Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient between price of oil and TRIR.
Year Price of Oil TRIR(Y) d l d l
1995 7 9 2 4
1996 5 7 2 4
1997 6 8 2 4
1998 9 6 -3 9
1999 8 4 -4 16
2000 1 5 4 16
2001 4 3 -1 1
2002 3 2 -1 1
2003 2 1 -1 1
r s Sum d l 56
0.53
Tables are available (McCall, 1970) to evaluate the significance of the calculated
Spearman rank-order coefficient. At the 0.10 level of significance, the acceptance value
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for N= 9 is 0.60, meaning the null hypothesis (no correlation) cannot be rejected with that
level of certainty. Most tables do not offer a result for levels of significance greater than
0.10, but with a degree of extrapolation, we can conclude that the result suggests a level
of confidence similar to that obtained for the "z" test discussed previously (0.15). Other
sources (revision-notes.co.uk, 2005) would categorise this correlation (0.53) as "strong
negative". The results imply a reasonable, but not definite, conclusion that price of oil and
safety results are negatively correlated. This indicates that factors other than price of oil
also playa significant role in the process. The result is entirely consistent with this work,
which adopts a holistic view of occupational accident causation including direct,
corporate, and external elements.
3.1.3) Conclusions
The efforts of offshore oil and gas safety professionals and workers have not been in vain.
By almost any measure, when considered globally, offshore workers face less risk from
occupational injuries today than they did fifteen years ago. Nevertheless, the danger from
these accidents is greater than that associated with explosions and helicopter crashes and,
in the general view of the industry, unacceptable.
The reasonably strong negative relationship between price of oil and TRIR demonstrated
above may indicate that availability of capital combined with a willingness to spend it on
safety measures can lead to improved safety results. An observation of superior safety
results in prosperous regions would be consistent with this result, which will be explored
in the next section.
-107 -
3.2) Regional analysis
3.2.1) Graphical presentation of historical performance by region
The OGP 2003 (OGP, 2004) database offered regional breakdowns and analyses of
occupational accident statistics. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 are based on data from this source.
The FAR results were as generally expected by industry safety professionals, with Africa
and South America having the largest FAR values, and Europe and North America the
lowest. The LTI data provide an interesting surprise, however, in that Europe's
performance was bettered by Africa, a region with a less attractive safety reputation. This
effect may have something to do with the relative propensities to report accidents in the
two regions. More will be said about this in Section 3.2.4.
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Figure 3.7 - Fatal accident rate versus time by region
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Figure 3.8 - Lost time injury frequency versus time by region
3.2.2) Statistical analysis of differences between regions
Observation of the above results indicates significant differences between regions. To
evaluate this statistically, a "t" level of significance test (Smith, 1970) was conducted
using the LTIF results for Africa and Asia/Australia. As can be seen from the analysis
shown in Table 3.3, there is a statistically significant difference between the two datasets,
with a probability less than 0.02 that the differences can be attributed to chance alone.
Table 3.3 - Ut" significance test for differences in safety results in Africa and Australia
4.09
3.17
1.70
1.26
1.05
0.98
0.65
0.55
0.47
0.45
7.04
3.00
0.07
0.03
0.15
0.21
0.62
0.79
0.94
0.97
1.64
0.94
0.62
0.57
0.57
0.52
0.43
0.40
0.26
0.25
0.24
0.00
0.00
1.31
0.20
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.25
0.25
t Result (df = 21)
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In Table 3.3 the following definitions of "Sdif!' and "t" apply.
where
Xl-X2
t=--
SdijJ
nl,n2 = sample sizes ofthe two datasets
XI,X2 = difference between individual values and the dataset means
Xl' X 2 = dataset means
(3.5)
(3.6)
A rigorous definition of these statistical indicators is available in textbooks of basic
statistics (e.g. Smith, 1970), but essentially the analysis involves an evaluation of the
difference between the means of two datasets relative to the difference in their standard
deviations. The larger the value of "t", the less likely it is that the two datasets originated
from the same population. In this application, the large observed "t" means that it is
extremely unlikely that the difference occurred due to chance alone and that both groups
were working under equally efficient safety systems. Rather, it is extremely likely that
there were real differences in the two safety regimes.
The "t" test has been applied in this instance without proving the required condition that
the data were distributed normally (Refer to the comments made in the introduction to
Chapter 3.). In order to confIrm the conclusion above, a Mann-Whitney test has been
conducted on the data, producing the result shown in Table 3.4 and below.
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Table 3.4 - Mann - Whitney test on Australia - Africa data
Data Rank Originating Data Rank Originating
point from point from
0.00 1.5 Australia 0.57 13 Australia
0.00 1.5 Australia 0.62 14 Australia
0.24 3 Australia 0.65 15 Africa
0.25 4 Australia 0.94 16 Australia
0.26 5 Australia 0.98 17 Africa
0.40 6 Australia 1.05 18 Africa
0.43 7 Australia 1.26 19 Africa
0.45 8 Africa 1.64 20 Australia
0.47 9 Africa 1.70 21 Africa
0.52 10 Australia 3.17 22 Africa
0.55 11 Africa 4.09 23 Africa
0.57 12 Australia
WAus = 1.5 + 1.5 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 10 + 12 + 13 + 14 + 16 + 20 = 113
WAf = 8 + 9 + 11 + 15 + 17 + 18 + 19 + 21 + 22 + 23 = 163
UAus=I13-(13 x 14)/2=22
UAf= 163 - (10 x 11)/2 = 108
PUl = (nj x n2Y/2 = 65
clUl = (nj x n2 x (nj+n2+1))/12 = (10 x 13 x 24)/12 = ~60
Z = (Uj-PUl)/eJUl = (22-65)/sqrt(260) = -2.67
where W; U, p, cl, and Z are as defined..-rohnson (2005)
Since the resulting value of Z is less than -2.57, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the
0.01 level of significance. This test confirmed the conclusion drawn using the "t" test, i.e.
that the samples are significantly different. The similar conclusions support the validity of
using the "t" test for other comparisons conducted in this chapter.
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As a further demonstration of the significance of the differences between regions, an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been conducted. The datasets are shown in Table 3.5.
The null hypothesis in this instance is that the samples all came from populations with
identical means, and that differences between the sample results are due to chance alone.
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Table 3.5 - Safety results in different regions
Africa Asia-Australia Euro e
4.09 7.04 1.64 1.31 6.01 9.87
3.17 3.00 0.94 0.20 4.75 3.54
1.70 0.07 0.62 0.02 2.88 0.00
1.26 0.03 0.57 0.01 2.70 0.03
1.05 0.15 0.57 0.01 2.49 0.14
0.98 0.21 0.52 0.00 2.45 0.18
0.65 0.62 0.43 0.00 2.25 0.38
0.55 0.79 0.40 0.01 1.41 2.13
0.47 0.94 0.26 0.06 0.88 3.96
0.45 0.97 0.25 0.06
0.24 0.07
0.00 0.25
0.00 0.25
Mean: Sumx Mean: Sumx Mean: Sum x"
13.82 0.50 2.22 2.87 20.22
n:
10 13
FSU North America
1.21 0.25 5.26 13.19 0.80 0.00
0.6 0.01 2.86 1.52 0.79 0.00
0.33 0.15 1.22 0.17
1.01 0.38
0.87 0.58
0.71 0.84
0.68 0.90
0.42 1.46
Mean: Sumx Mean: Sumx
0.71 1.63
h
South America )(
2.82 2.53
2.64 1.99
2.52 1.66
0.67 0.31
0.53 0.49
0.35 0.77
0.31 0.85
0.00 1.51
Mean:
1.23 10.12
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An ANOVA table has been constructed, shown in Table 3.6, where the following
definitions are applicable.
where
Tss =
Ess =
y=
k=
Ess =II(Yij-YY
i=lj=l
treatment sum of the squares
error sum of the squares
number of values ip each sample
grand mean (overall mean of all values)
mean of each sample
individual values
number of datasets
(3.7)
(3.8)
Mean squares =
F=
sum of squares / degrees of freedom
Mean treatment sum of squares/Mean error sum of squares
Table 3.6 - ANOVA table for safety results in different regions
Treatment
Grand Mean Sum of Squares
1.38 32.85
Degree of Freedom> 6
Mean Squares> 5.47
Error
Sum of Squares
65.81
46
1.43
"F"
3.83
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At the 0.01 level of probability, the "F' value for 6 and 46 degrees of freedom is 3.24, so
the above result means that the null hypothesis (i.e. that the samples all came from the
same population) can be rejected. There are significant differences in these safety results.
Finally, Tukey "t", or "Honestly significantly different" (HSD) tests have been conducted
to further evaluate the difference between means of selected regions. The defmitions
associated with the statistic are as follows:
Tukey "thsd" statistic is defined as follows
t =Mj-Mj
hsd rB§I
~---;;;,-
where
means of the samples under consideration
(3.9)
MSE= mean error sum of the squares, as defined above for the ANaVA
discussion
nh, or harmonic mean, = nh 1 1 1 1
-+-+-+ ..... -
n1 n2 n3 nk
(3.10)
The results, comparing several pairs of countries, are shown in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7 - Tukey test for safety results in different regions
Africa· Australia
Harmonic Mean
11.30
MSE
0.76
3.62
Africa - South America
Harmonic Mean
8.89
MSE
1.50
0.50
Australia· Europe
Harmonic Mean
10.64
MSE
1.12
7.31
Europe· Middle East
Harmonic Mean
8.47
MSE .\.
2.62
2.23
The relative significance of the results is shown in Table 3.8, which again confirms
significant differences between many regions (Africa - South America is an exception).
Table 3.8 - Significance of Tukey results
Regions compared Degrees of P = 0.05 level of Result Signifi-
Freedom significance for "t" statistic cant?
Africa - Australia 21 2.08 3.62 Yes
Australia - Europe 20 2.09 7.31 Yes
Africa-South 16 2.12 0.50 No
America
Europe - Middle 15 2.13 2.23 Yes
East
3.2.3) Company protection across regions
In order to evaluate the degree to which corporate culture and processes provide a degree
of protection for their employees, a brief analysis of safety results within a single
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(unnamed major operator) company in several different regions has been conducted. The
results of this are presented in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
Table 3.9 - Injury frequency in different regions within a single company
Region Mean recordable Sample size Sum of squares of
injury frequency difference from mean
North America 0.99 16 4.0
Europe 0.81 29 13.3
Latin America 0.61 4 0.13
Australasia 0.54 5 0.85
Table 3.10 - Significance of"t" result comparing safety results in different regions within
a single company
Comparison of North Degrees of "t" statistic Significant at the 0.1
America with... Freedom level?
Europe 43 0.91 No
Latin America 18 1.41 No
Australasia 19 1.71 No
The conclusion might be drawn that regional deviations, when viewed under the umbrella
of a large company with a substantial corporate safety programme, are not as significant
as the general industry deviations. This is as might be e'Xpected, and reflects the
philosophy of a chain of influence that includes both regional and corporate factors.
The above analysis compared the result from the region with the largest mean recordable
injury frequency (North America) with those from the other three. To provide consistency
with analyses done previously in this chapter, results from Europe and Australia were also
compared. The resulting "t" value for this comparison, 0.82, was also not significant,
which again contrasts with the general industry result obtained in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
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3.2.4) Likelihood of reporting accidents
Takala (1999) has conducted an investigation into the likelihood of individuals to report
occupational accidents in different regions. The reported country-specific accident rate
was multiplied by the number of workers comprising the country's workforce to give an
expected number of accidents. This was compared to the number of accidents actually
reported to the International Labour Organisation, thereby giving a potential indicator of
propensity to report accidents. The results are shown in Figure 3.9 for a cross section of
countries involved in the oil and gas industry. The results are approximately aligned with
both the safety results and general safety reputations of the countries. It is noted that the
calculation was unavailable for China, due to lack of data.
Figure 3.9 - Percentage of accidents reported versus country
3.2.5) Conclusions
As expected and commonly believed, there are significant regional differences in safety
performance. This has been shown in five distinct ways:
• by observation of graphically
presented results
• by "tOO level of significance tests
• by Mann-Whitney evaluations
• by an analysis ofvariance
• by a Tukey HSD test
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Company processes and procedures provide a degree of consistency in safety approach
across regions, and thereby attenuate the effect of regional variations.
The likelihood ofworkers to report accidents differs on a regional basis, which may itself
affect the resulting safety statistics.
In general, safety results were approximately aligned with regional prosperity, which is
consistent with the relationship between price of oil and safety results discussed in
Section 3.1.3. The fact that this result was not so in every case supports the holistic
philosophy of the model developed in this research, which includes financial issues as just
one of a number of elements.
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3.3) Organisational analysis
3.3.1) Variability in data sources
Data are available from many sources to compare safety performance between companies.
For various reasons, companies often report different statistics in their publications, in
some cases reporting lost time injury frequency, and in others total recordable injury
frequency or days away from work. The situation is further complicated by the inclusion
of illnesses in some company statistics. Data which include illness will not be considered
in the present analyses, since they are outside the scope.
Company comparisons are therefore more conveniently made using data compiled by and
available from government agencies and industry organisations such as the UK Health
and Safety Executive (HSE), the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), and the
International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP). A difficulty with such data,
however, is its associated condition of anonymity. The anonymity does not prevent the
evaluation of statistical differences between companies, but it does present difficulties
when attempting to match company specific safety initiatives, spending, and culture, to
results.
Some of the differences in statistical presentation are easily accounted for, for example
data reported in occurrences per 200,000 hours are easily translated to occurrences per
1,000,000 hours. As a general rule, it has been chosen to use, where available, the
measure of total recordable incidents per 1,000,000 hours worked, both because it is the
measure most often reported, and because it is most appropriate to this research.
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3.3.2) Organisational variability in OGP data
The OGP 2001 (OGP, 2002) database included lost time injury frequency for the thirty-
nine organisations which participated in the study, albeit on an anonymous basis. "t" test
comparisons of data from two pairs of companies are shown in Table 3.11. The analysis
shows that the difference in safety performance between the companies is statistically
significant. Note that for Table 3.11, the definitions of "sdifl' and "t" are identical to those
presented in Section 3.2.2.
Table 3.11 - Comparison of company specific safety results (LTIF)
Compare "C" with "JJ" Compare "G" with "CC"
c JJ G CC
13.06 28.84 0.63 0.01 4.27 0.27 1.09 0.04
9.13 2.07 0.67 0.02 3.08 0.45 0.98 0.01
6.89 0.64 0.43 0.01 4.94 1.42 0.76 0.02
4.69 9.00 0.55 0.00 2.97 0.61 0.83 0.00
4.68 9.06 0.38 0.02 3.48 0.07 0.79 0.01
Mean Sum x2 Mean Sum x Mean Sumx Mean Sum x2
7.69 49.61 0.53 0.06 3.75 2.82 0.89 0.08
SOiff t SOlff t
1.58 4.54 0.38 7.51
Result (d.f. =8) 0.002 Result (dJ. - 8) 0.002
<1 chance in 500 these came from the <1 chance in 500 these came from the
same distribution. same distribution.
A Mann-Whitney test has also been conducted on the data from companies C and n. The
result, shown in Table 3.12 and described below, confirms the conclusion resulting from
the "t"test.
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Table 3.12 - Mann - Whitney test on company JJ versus company C data
Data Rank Originated Data Rank Originated
point from point from
0.38 1 JJ 4.68 6 C
0.43 2 JJ 4.69 7 C
0.55 3 JJ 6.89 8 C
0.63 4 JJ 9.13 9 C
0.67 5 JJ 13.06 10 C
WJJ= 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 = 15
We = 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 10 = 40
Uj = Wj - (nj x (n]+1))/2
UJJ = 15 - (5 x 6)/2 = 0
Ue=40-(5 x 6)/2=25
!JUJ = (nj x n]j/2 = 12.5
clUJ =(nj x n2 x (nj+n2+1))/12 = (5 x 5 Xll)/12 = 22.9
Z = (Ur!JUJ)/(JUJ = (0-12.5)/sqrt(22.9) = -2.61
where W, U, !J, cl, Zhave the standard defInitions as defIned in Johnson (2005).
Since the value of Z is less than -2.57, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.01 level
of signifIcance. This test further confIrms that the samples are signifIcantly different.
3.3.3) Graphical and statistical comparison of results presented in company annual
reports
A second useful group of sources is oil and gas companies' annual reports, which
generally include safety statistics as part of their public information. A graphical
demonstration of organisational differences in safety results is shown in Figure 3.10,
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where total recordable incident rates for Shell, ConocoPhillips, Halliburton, and
ChevronTexaco are plotted against time over the past several years.
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Figure 3.10 - Total recordable incident rate versus time by company
Observation of the results indicated, for example, that Shell and ConocoPhillips were
outperforming Halliburton where occupational accidents were concerned.
Some would suggest that workers employed by operator companies (Shell,
ConocoPhillips, ChevronTexaco) would, by the nature of their relatively more office
based activities on an offshore platform, face a lower likeliliood of accident than those
employed by contractor companies such as Halliburton, since they are more likely to be
engaged in deck operations. This line of thinking suggests that the differences in
performance between Halliburton and the operators had more to do with accident
likelihood than an inferior safety programme. There may be some validity to this
suggestion, but the level of effort expended by oil and gas companies performing a
variety of roles indicates a strong preference for the view that accident likelihood can be
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controlled with similar efficiency whether in an office or heavy equipment environment.
It is noted that there were apparently significant differences between the performances of
the individual operator companies as well. For example, in 1999 ChevronTexaco's TRIR
was approximately 75% greater than Shell's or ConocoPhillips'.
To confirm that the differences in the results did not occur by chance alone, the statistical
analysis shown in Table 3.13 has been conducted. The analysis confirms a significant
difference between the Shell and Halliburton results. The hypothesis that the two sets of
results came from the same population, i.e. from companies operating equally effective
safety systems, is rejectable with a probability of 0.998.
Table 3.13 - "t" test for comparison of Shell and Halliburton safety results
Halliburton
14.65 13.26
15.60 21.08
11.40 0.15
8.85 4.66
8.15 8.17
7.40 13.02
Mean Sum x2
11.01 60.35
5 llH t
1.45 5.20
Shell
4.10
4.40
3.70
3.20
2.90
2.60
Mean
3.48
0.38
0.84
0.05
0.08
0.34
0.78
. 2.47
Result (dJ. =10) 0.002
< 1 chance in 500 these came from the same distribution
Figure 3.11 gives an indication of company variability in lost time incident frequency
statistics. No mathematical analysis has been conducted on these data, but the observable
differences in the curves suggest significant differences in results.
1998
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Figure 3.11 - Lost time incidents versus time by organisation
3.3.4) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) comparison between operator and
contractor groups
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate has compiled statistics which, among other things,
compared accident rates for operator and contractor staff while conducting similar
activities. Curves representing the results are shown in Figures 3.12 and 3.13. Analyses of
the significance of differences between the two datasets are presented in Tables 3.14 and
3.15. It can be concluded that for Norwegian offshore staff in~olved in both production
and maintenance activities, operators' staff had a significantly lower accident rate than
their contractor employed colleagues.
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Figure 3.12 - Injury rate versus time for Norwegian production workers - operators
versus contractors
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Figure 3.13 - Injury rate versus time for Norwegian maintenance workers - operators
versus contractors
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Table 3.14 - "t" test for comparison of safety results ofNorwegian production operators
and contractors
Production Production
Operators Contractors
Year Rate x Rate
1993 14.3 0.2 18.0 0.2
1994 15.6 3.1 19.9 5.8
1995 16.3 6.1 18.8 1.7
1996 16.2 5.6 20.5 9.0
1997 14.8 0.9 22.2 22.1
1998 14.5 0.4 16.2 1.7
1999 13.7 0.0 16.1 2.0
2000 13.1 0.5 19.4 3.6
2001 10.0 14.7 16.8 0.5
2002 9.8 16.2 7.1 108.2
Mean Sum x Mean Sum x
13.8 4.8 17.5 15.5
10 10
SOlff t
0.5 7.7
Table 3.15 - "t" test for comparison of safety results ofNorwegian maintenance operators
and contractors
Maintenance Maintenance
Operators Contractors
Year Rate x Rate x
1993 9.0 49.1 36.7 0.1
1994 15.0 1.0 38.0 1.0
1995 15.2 0.7 40.6 12.8
1996 15.0 1.0 44.2 51.6
1997 13.9 4.5 41.8 22.8
1998 15.9 0.0 37.9 0.8
1999 20.1 16.7 38.7 2.8
2000 18.4 5.7 38.4 1.9
2001 20.3 18.4 29.8 52.1
2002 17.3 1.7 24.1 166.9
Mean Sum x Mean f Sum x
16.0 9.9 37.0 31.3
n n
10 10
SOlft t
0.7 31.1
-127 -
3.3.5) Conclusions
There are significant differences in safety performance between companies, and between
classes of companies, for example the operator and contractor groups. This result should
be viewed positively, since it reinforces the importance to the accident process of
corporate factors such as company culture, training, and procedures, and confirms the
improvements achievable with the implementation of effective corporate safety
programmes.
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3.4) Analysis by activity
The activity being undertaken affects accident likelihood. Figures 3.14 and 3.15 show
relationships between activities and STF (slip, trip, and fall) accident rate in the UK
offshore region (UK HSE, 2002a). Whilst some would consider drilling activities to be
more dangerous than production work, the accident rates per person reported here for
these two activities (as well as construction) were identical. The most dangerous activity
appeared to be deck operations, where the accident rate per person was more than double
the others.
Rat&ofSTF(p&r100,OOOp&opl&)vsProc&ssEnvlronm&nt
"""
. 600 600 560 600
= ~
Figure 3.14 - STF rate versus process environment
Accidents by Activity
Figure 3.15 - Percentage of accidents versus activity
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"t" - test level of significance analyses (methodology described elsewhere) of accident
frequency versus activity, based on data in UK HSE (2000), have been conducted and are
presented in Tables 3.16 and 3.17.
Table 3.16 - "t" test comparing safety results for production and drilling activities
Production
o 1055551
o 1055551
730 88447
2688 2757592
893 18063
1393 133663
1384 127164
1648 385144
1538 260712
o 1055551
Mean Sum x2
1027 6937438
lh>jtl t
1353 2.05
Drillina
14706
2474
4231
4231
3761
2564
1449
4630
o
o
Mean
3805
118840522
1770496
181817
181817
1901
1539088
5548851
681285
14474981
14474981
157695740
Result (dJ. -18) 0.1
therefore null hypothesis (both sets from same distribution)
can be re'ected at the 0.1 level
Table 3.17 - "t" test comparing safety results for maintenance and deck operations
Maintenance
o 1098723
1848 639680
947 10241
1062 190
868 32472
613 189399
878 28968
1453 163863
730 101251
2083 1070811
Mean Sum x2
1048 3335600
SDiff t
463 1.57
Deck Ops.
o
2041
1923
952
2365
2062
3509
939
3947
o
Mean
1774
3146366
71396
22261
675355
349517
83059
3010919
696891
4722798
3146366
15924930
Result (dJ. - 18) 0.2
therefore null hypothesis (both sets from same distribution)
can be rejected at the 0.2 level
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It is noted that the individual data points in the tables represented results for different age
groups, Le. one pair of points for the 21 - 25 age group, another for 26 - 30, and so on.
The analysis must be considered to be somewhat weakened by this process, as any effects
actually related to age were ignored. This is similar to other analyses where, for example,
company comparisons utilise data points from different years, thereby ignoring any
temporal effects which act across all companies. For the present analysis, however,
Figure 3.16 indicates no significant trend with age for the activities under consideration.
I :::-t-------r------'------"'---'-~....-..L.----'--jf__H
§. 3000 -r---:-'---~--'\-_+--\;f----_tf-H
~ 2500 +--'---'--......,..,...~_=_-->>d_---f~_+_--H
~ 2000 t--I~......_-+-_hr--~~~+---_I__:_-l:1! 1500 +-I-----'----1I1r-----Ar-----:===~~~~
] 1OO0+t----:~---.......::...:=--------'-_r_t
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- - -Maintenance
_Deck Operations
Figure 3.16 - Accident frequency versus age
The results indicate with a reasonable probability that a significant difference exists in
likelihood of accident occurrence depending on the activity being undertaken. However,
many approaches require the null hypothesis to be rejected only if the calculated "t" value
exceeds the value indicated for chance occurrence at the 0.01 or 0.05 probability levels.
In the two cases above, however, rejection was only at the 0.1 level for the comparison of
production with drilling, and at the 0.2 level for the comparison of maintenance with deck
operations. This means that the probability that there are real differences is of the order of
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90% and 80% respectively. This leads to the conclusion that, whilst activity is clearly an
important factor, other elements have a significant impact on the likelihood of an accident.
This result is in line with the holistic philosophy proposed by this work.
Stronger conclusions could be drawn from the personal injury data shown in Figures 3.17
and 3.18, from the Norwegian offshore sector (NPD, 2004). The results of associated "t"
test analyses are presented in Tables 3.18 and 3.19. In both these cases, the null
hypothesis was rejectable at the 0.002 level. In this case, however, as mentioned above,
individual data points represented year by year data, so time related effects were ignored.
The time series charts shown below, however, did not show a strong consistent long-term
trend, so this was not considered to be a significant problem.
---~ ~~ 30.0 -" ....i 25.0 +--_rr '_-_c=lo.--=-\...~,__-_l
~ 20.0 +---------'-;-- -.. ....:.....,......:...-'...--->.~-'->--'---1
~ 15.0 +--.....---=------."""'-'---'---=---""'O===----~---L-~~ 10.0f-------~--~_·,_______j
0.0 -!---...--..--,__.....--r---.....------.-_____j
1992
--Drilling
- - -Catering
_Construction and
Maintenance
Figure 3.17 - Injuries on Norwegian permanently located installations versus time, by
activity
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Table 3.18 - "I" test comparing safety results for production and maintenance activities
on Norwegian permanently located installations
Production
14.9 0.2
16.2 3.2
16.7 5.2
17.6 10.2
15.8 1.9
14.7 0.1
14.1 0.1
13.7 0.5
11.2 10.3
9.2 27.1
Mean Sum x2
14.4 58.9
5DJft t
1.4 11.3
Maintenance
28.0
30.3
32.2
32.4
32.1
31.7
32.7
32.3
26.8
21.8
Mean
30.0
4.1
0.1
4.7
5.6
4.3
2.8
7.1
5.2
10.4
67.7
112.0
Result (dJ. =18) 0.002
Therefore null hypothesis (both sets from same distribution)
can be rejected at the 0.002 level
--Drilling
---Catering
_Operation and Maintenance
o+--.--,---.---r-----.---.---I
1992
Figure 3.18 - Injuries on Norwegian mobile installations versus time, by activity
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Table 3.19 "f" test comparing safety results for drilling and maintenance activities on
Norwegian mobile installations
Maintenance
20.9 9.2
18.1 34.0
18.9 25.3
27.5 12.7
22.0 3.7
30.4 41.9
34.1 103.4
32.6 75.2
22.7 1.5
12.1 139.9
Mean Sum x2
23.9 446.9
80iff t
3.4 4.9
Drillina
46.2
44.3
47.2
46.3
41.0
39.2
42.0
48.5
25.6
26.6
Mean
40.7
30.4
13.0
42.4
31.5
0.1
2.2
1.7
61.0
227.7
198.5
608.5
Result (dJ. - 18) 0.002
Therefore null hypothesis (both sets from same distribution)
can be rejected at the 0.002 level
It can be concluded from the data and analyses presented in this section that the activity
being undertaken plays a significant, though not the only, role in occupational accident
likelihood.
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3.5 Questionnaire results
3.5.1 General
Several aspects of the model proposed by this work and described in Chapter 4 required
the inclusion of offshore industry expert opinion. Various methods were available to
obtain this, for example direct interview, or review and interpretation of existing
documentation. Whilst direct interviews provide a significant degree of detailed and
qualitative opinion, the present need was for experience-based quantitative measures of
relative factor strengths and inter-dependencies. This, together with the requirement to
gather a broad range of input in a reasonable period of time, led to the choice of a survey
questionnaire* as the data gathering method, which was consistent with the method used
by other researchers (Mearns et aI., 2003, Brown et aI., 2000, Flin et aI., 1996) studying
variations of the occupational accident process. Questionnaires (See Appendix 2 for the
questionnaire form and a completed example.) were sent to a series of offshore safety
professionals. A breakdown of the respondents is shown in Table 3.20.
Table 3.20 - Respondent profile
Respondent Profile '," ..,~. ~, ,"'\',
Region ,r ,I
Americas Europe, Midddle East, Asia
Category & Africa Total Response %
Operator 4 5 1 10 24%
Contractor 1 6 1 8 24%
Regulator 10 9 3 22 50%
Researcher 4 1 0 5 100%
Total 19 21 5 45
Response % 50% 26% 83% 36%
* Attwood, D, Khan, F, and Veitch, B, 2005b. Offshore oil and gas occupational
accidents - what is important? Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries,
October, pp 1-13.
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The primary purposes of the survey were
• to quantify the relative strengths of the various factors thought to affect
occupational accidents
• to assess the degree of influence imposed by external elements (e.g. royalty
regime, value placed by society on life) on corporate decisions and actions (e.g.
company safety culture, provision of training), and the influence of these elements
on factors directly affecting the accident process (e.g. staff attitude, behaviour,
design of workplace safety arrangements, etc.)
Within the model structure, the factors are organised into a series of subgroups. Because
relative importance between group members was sought, rather than absolute importance,
the first section of the questionnaire comprised a series of nine questions, each requesting
an opinion of the importance of all members of a specific group. It was felt that the
commonly used 1-10 scale would be most familiar to respondents and was therefore the
chosen option. However, this system created a difficulty in comparing responses from
different individuals. For example, a score of "9" for each of two factors within a group
would indicate that the respondent considered the factors to be of equal importance, as
would a pair of "1" responses. The respondent answering with the "9's" clearly
considered both factors more important overall to the accident process than did the
respondent who answered "1". To cope with this and ensure a like-for-like comparison
between respondents, a common scale of intra group relative importance was needed, in
effect, a "normalisation" of the responses. The normalisation process, illustrated in Table
3.21, effectively decoupled the overall importance assigned to an element from the
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relative importance within the group, for example producing scores of 0.5 for each
element of a two-member group when they were assigned any equal scores.
Table 3.21 - Example ofnonnalisation process
Elementl
Element 2
Element 3
Total
Raw Score
7
5
3
15
Fraction of total points =
normalised score
0.47
0.33
0.20
1.00
Questions ten and eleven gauged expert opinion regarding the influence of senior
elements on junior factors. Respondents completed matrices for both sets of interfaces
(external - corporate and corporate - direct) and thereby provided infonnation on all
relationships realistically expected to contain a degree of influence. As before, a
nonnalisation process was used, again producing sets of results summing to 1 as required
by the model.
The use of the nonnalised survey results within the model is described more fully in
Sections 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3. However, the untreated (i.e. not nonnalised) results provided
significant and interesting infonnation concerning experts' views on the occupational
accident process, and were therefore not disregarded. The untreated results and their
analysis are discussed in Sections 3.5.2 through 3.5.6.
3.5.2 Overall safety performance
The literature (Thompson et aI., 1998, Tomas et aI., 1999) included the concept that pure
accident statistics may not, as is usually assumed, be the best measure of corporate safety
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performance. This is essentially because, thankfully, accidents remain relatively rare. The
conclusion that an organisation experiencing one accident in a year involving many
hundreds of thousands of man-hours worked had implemented a safety programme twice
as effective as one having two accidents while working a similar number of hours, is
questionable. Another possibility for measuring safety programme performance is internal
staffperception of its effectiveness.
The questionnaire asked the respondents to comment on the safety performance of their
respective organisations via the question "On a scale of1 to 10, how well do you consider
your organisation's safety programme to be operating?" Figure 3.19* and Table 3.22
show the results in graphical and tabular format respectively. The results showed that
most experts felt their organisations' programmes were working relatively well, with
averages in all regions and in all industry organisational types ranging between 7.0 and
7.5 on the 1-10 scale. The lower average score (5.8) reported from the researcher group
was based on a small (5) sample, but no specific explanation for this result is offered.
* It is recognised that the data collected in this exercise. would be most correctly
presented as series of bar graphs, as opposed to continuous curves, which are usually
associated with frequency distributions. However, the results were most clearly illustrated
by series of smooth curves drawn through values representing the number of responses
for each score, as presented for safety performance in this section, for relative importance
in Section 3.5.3, and for relative influence in Section 3.5.6.
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4
Safety Performance (1·10)
Figure 3.19 - Expert opinion of organisational safety perfonnance
Table 3.22 - Tabulation of self-reported safety programme perfonnance
Safety Performance
Score 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
Combined 0 0 0 1 5 5 12 14 5 0 7.1
Americas 0 0 0 0 3 3 4 5 3 0 7.1
Europe 0 0 0 1 2 1 6 8 1 0 7.1
Asia 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 7.4
Operator 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 2 0 7.1
Contractor 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 0 0 7.0
Regulator 0 0 0 0 1 2 7 8 3 0 7.5
Researcher 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 5.8
3.5.3 Ranking of all factors
The respondents were not offered detailed infonnation regarding the intra-group
nonnalisation process which would be applied to their responses. Ignoring for the
moment the grouping of the questions, the responses they gave to the request to "rate, on
a scale ofone (not important at all) to ten (crucial), the importance ofeach element in the
accident process" could reasonably be assumed to offer an indication of the elements
judged most important in the process, regardless of group. The five elements which
received the highest overall average scores were:
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Behavioural
Organisational safety culture
Organisational safety activities (i.e. versus direct and external factors)
Mental capability
Safety knowledge
The five elements receiving the lowest average scores were:
Royalty regime
Price of oil
External elements (i.e. versus direct and organisational factors)
Physical capability
Financial elements
It was not surprising to see safety behaviour, corporate culture, and organisational factors
at the top of the list. These elements receive significant attention in the safety literature
and are universally considered to be crucial to the accident prevention process. Similarly,
it was interesting and also not surprising to see that physical capability (compared to the
stronger mental capability) and financial elements received a relatively lower rating.
The appearance of "organisational factors" in the top five solidified its reputation as
outweighing either external elements or direct factors as a critical issue. This indicated
that most respondents felt that the organisation could influence safety results more than
either individual behaviour or external events, which was an encouraging and
empowering result for safety professionals.
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Tables and curves representing (by subgroup) the untreated scores are shown in Appendix
3. A few of the curves considered particularly worthy of discussion are shown in Figures
3.20 and 3.21. For completeness, all group elements have been included on the graphs.
Figure 3.20 shows the number of responses by importance value (1-10) for the "overall"
elements - direct factors, organisational elements, and external factors. The result was
encouraging for safety professionals and workers in the offshore business. Direct and
organisational factors were considered more important than external elements. This
implied a degree of control over the process, in effect indicating that the ability to reduce
accidents is more in the hands of workers and companies than depending exclusively on
external elements.
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Figure 3.20 Questionnaire responses - overall importance
Figure 3.21 shows the result for importance of fmancial factors versus value placed by
society on life. Safety experts considered the region-specific value placed by society on
life to be more important in the occupational accident process than the combined fmancial
factors (i.e. price of oil, shareholder pressure, and royalty regime).
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Importance Score
Figure 3.21 Questionnaire responses - financial factors and value placed on life
3.5.4 Correlation between various factors and overall safety performance
The correlation (Refer to equation 3.1) between self-reported safety performance (see
Section 3.5.2 for a discussion) and importance score for each individual factor has been
studied. It was hypothesized that good organisational safety performance would correlate
with the recognition of certain key factors as having relatively greater importance than
others in the accident process. The correlation coefficients between importance score and
self-reported safety performance for each element have been calculated and are presented
in Table 3.23.
Only two factors showed a correlation higher than 0.35, those being behavioural (0.47),
and mental (0.38). One might conclude from this result that those who believe in the
effectiveness of their safety programmes also believe that good worker behaviour and
mental capabilities are crucial to its success. Upon reflection, this result seems reasonable.
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Table 3.23 - Correlation between perceived element importance and safety performance
t ~- Correlation Coefficients
Overall system Direct layer
External 0.09 Behavioural 0.47
Organisational 0.14 Capability 0.21
I--~E~xt~er-n~al-el~em-e-n~~~_re_ct+-_o_.2_7...... safet;:::~:~ ~:~~
Financial 0.09 PPE 0.14
Value placed on life 0.21 Behavioural
Financial elements Attitude 0.03
Price of oil 0.02 Motivation 0.24
Shareholder pressure 0.12 ~.....C_a..pca_bi~lit~y~I-~~
Royalty Regime 0.121' Physical 0.20
Organisational Elements Mental 0.38
Safety Culture 0.15 Physical Capability
Training 0.00 Lack of fatigue 0.29
Procedures 0.20 Coordination 0.29
Fitl1ess 0.11
Mental capability
Knowledge 0.26
Intelligence 0.08
3.5.5 Significance of the differences
To evaluate the significance of differences between the respective rated strengths of pairs
of elements within their subgroups, statistical "t" tests were conducted for both
normalised and untreated results (see equations 3.5 and 3.6 fo~ methodology). The results
are shown in Tables 3.24 and 3.25. As can be seen, there were significant perceptions of
importance for 22 of the 26 pairs evaluated. It is not surprising that some pairs (price of
oil versus royalty regime, training versus procedures, capability versus safety design, and
attitude versus motivation) were judged very similar in importance, and this is accurately
reflected in the model through the use of average values of strength and influence.
However, it was noted that for the most part, safety experts saw real differences in the
importance of the respective groups of factors.
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Table 3.24 - Significance of differences between pairs - nonnalised results
"t"tests Significant?
',~ Sum of Squares sdlf t df (.05-2.00)
Externalvs Organisational 66.4 0.2 10.7 88 Yes
ExternalvsDirect 72.9 0.2 6.8 88 Yes
Organlsatlonalvs Direct 64.7 0.2 3.7 88 Yes
Financial vs Value of Life 207.9 0.3 4.5 88 Yes
Price of 011 vs Shareholder Pressure 155.6 0.3 4.7 88 Yes
Price ofOilvs Royalt Regime 121.9 0.2 1.7 88 No
Shareholder Pressure vs Royalty Regime 141.4 0.3 6.5 88 Yes
Safety Culture vs Training 13.3 0.1 3.3 88 Yes
Safety Culture vs Procedures 18.9 0.1 3.3 88 Yes
Training vs Procedures 13.8 0.1 0.7 88 No
BehaviouralvsCapablllty 11.0 0.1 5.2 88 Yes
Behavioural vs Weather 14.0 0.1 12.3 88 Yes
Behavlouralvs Safety Design 12.6 0.1 5.5 88 Yes
BehavlouralvsPPE 17.2 0.1 7.6 88 Yes
CapabilityvsWeather 11.5 0.1 8.5 88 Yes
Capabilityvs Safety Design 10.2 0.1 0.8 88 No
Capability vs PPE 14.8 0.1 3.7 88 Yes
WeathervsSafetyDeslgn 13.2 0.1 7.2 88 Yes
WeathervsPPE 17.8 0.1 3.4 88 Yes
Safety Design vs PPE 16.4 0.1 2.9 88 Yes
AttitudevsMotivation 179.2 0.3 0.4 88 No
Physlcalvs Mental 146.4 0.3 10.7 88 Yes
Lack of Fatigue vs Coordination 19.2 0.1 5.9 88 Yes
~:~~:I~::i~~uVeSv:lt~I~~:SS 22.9 0.1 8.6 88 Yes21.4 0.1 3.3 88 Yes
Knowled evslntellience 55.1 0.2 4.6 88 Yes
Table 3.25 - Significance of differences between pairs - untreated results
"t"tests Significant?
Factors Sum of Squares sdif t df (.05 ... 2.00)
Externalvs Organisational 350.9 0.4 8.6 88 Yes
Externalvs Direct 413.6 0.5 5.2 88 Yes
Organisatlonalvs Direct 249.2 0.4 3.5 88 Yes
Financial vs Value of Life 445.7 0.5 3.7 88 Yes
Price ofOllvs Shareholder Pressure 486.8 0.5 3.0 88 Yes
Price of Oil vs Royalty Regime 440.8 0.5 1.3 88 No
ShareholderPressurevs Royalty Regime 420.3 0.5 4.5 88 Yes
Safety Culture vs Training 140.8 0.3 2.3 88 Yes
Safety Culture vs Procedures 155.5 0.3 2.8 88 Yes
Training vs Procedures 154.0 0.3 0.6 88 No
Behaviouralvs Capability 133.2 0.3 5.0 88 Yes
BehaviouralvsWeather 219.2 0.3 10.5 88 Yes
Behaviouralvs Safety Design 135.0 0.3 5.8 88 Yes
Behaviouralvs PPE 255.4 0.4 6.4 88 Yes
CapabilityvsWeather 243.6 0.4 6.3 88 Yes
Ca abilitv·vs·Safet De in 159.4 0.3 0.8 88 No
Capabilityvs PPE 279.8 0.4 2.7 88 Yes
tweathervs Safety Design 245.4 0.4 5.6 88 Yes
WeathervsPPE 365.8 0.4 2.7 88 Yes
Safety Design vs PPE 281.6 0.4 2.1 88 Yes
Atlitudevs Motivation 355.6 0.4 0.5 88 No
Physicalvs Mental 248.9 0.4 9.5 88 Yes
Lack of Fatigue vs Coordination 187.6 0.3 3.9 88 Yes
Lack of Fatigue vs Fitness 160.0 0.3 7.0 88 Yes
Coordination vs Fitness 149.6 0.3 2.9 88 Yes
Know)edgevs Intelll ence 180.2 0.3 3.6 88 Yes
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Note that in this case there were sufficient observations to evaluate the normalcy of the
data. As examples, evaluations (Johnson, 2005) were conducted of the normalcy of the
untreated results associated with personal protective equipment and coordination,
resulting in the plots shown in Figures 3.22 and 3.23. The relatively linear result indicates
that the data were distributed approximately according to the normal distribution.
~
~
~............
~
~
Figure 3.22 - Normalcy evaluation - PPE - untreated results
Figure 3.23 - Normalcy evaluation - coordination - untreated results
-145 -
3.5.6 Levels of inter-layer influence
One of the foundations of this research is that external elements affect corporate decisions
and that these in turn affect the direct accident process. The questionnaire results provided
a means to quantify experts' perceptions of the relative degree to which each external and
corporate factor affects the lower level layers. In order to establish the relative total
impact of the influencing elements at both interfaces, the effects of each senior element
on all of its respective influenced junior factors have been combined. For example, the
effects of royalty regime on safety culture, safety training, and safety procedures were
combined to give an indication of royalty regime's total power as an influencing factor.
The results for the external - corporate and corporate - direct interfaces are shown in
Figures 3.24 and 3.25 respectively, and Table 3.26.
Figure 3.24 - Effect of external elements on organisational decisions
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Figure 3.25 - Effect of organisational decisions on the direct accident process
Table 3.26 - Combined measure of influence on all lower level elements
Combined average
Value placed on life
Price of oil
Shareholder pressure
Royalty regime
7.77
3.41
4.94
2.34
Training
Procedures
Safety culture
6.87
6.52
7.47 (
The results shown in Figure 3.24 and Table 3.26 indicated a clearly dominant factor at the
external - corporate interface. Value placed on life is considered to affect corporate
behaviour to a significantly greater degree than any of the three financial elements.
Shareholder pressure was considered to be the most prominent of the fmancial factors,
followed in turn by price of oil and royalty regime. It is interesting to note again that
amongst the financial factors, the one "closest" to the organisation itself (shareholder
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pressure) was considered most prominent. This is in line with conclusions drawn
elsewhere, i.e. that the organisation holds more "power" in the accident process than do
external elements.
The results of the corporate - direct analysis were not as clear - cut as for the external -
corporate interface. All three elements were perceived to be significantly important
(average values 6.3 - 7.4), but the differences between their respective influencing powers
on the direct factors were not very large. As expected, though, the experts viewed safety
culture to be more influential than either training or procedures.
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Model development
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4) Model development
This chapter is comprised of four sections, structured as follows.
1. In Section 4.1 the overall premise and model structure are described, followed by
a discussion of the choice of calculation methodology and associated details.
2. Section 4.2 includes a description of the process whereby the model is calibrated
and subsequently run for specific cases.
3. The effect of component changes on overall output is described in a parametric
analysis included as Section 4.3.
4. The final section, 4.4, includes a series of demonstrations of the model, describing
accident likelihood as hypothetical offshore assets experience changes in
operating conditions, for example during mobilization.
4.1) Basic premise, model structure, and calculation methodology
This section describes the model developed to study the accident process*. The overall
premise and model structure are described, followed by a discussion of the choice of
calculation methodology. Subsequent sections describe specific aspects of the model, for
example:
• how the relative importance of individual factors is accounted for
• the method for inclusion of the influences of (i) external factors on corporate
behaviour and (ii) corporate behaviour on the direct accident process
* Attwood, D, Khan, F, and Veitch, B, 200Sc. Can we predict occupational accident
frequency? Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Trans IChemE, Part B, 84(B2),
March, pp 1 - 14.
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• the details of the reliability calculation
• the method for calculating accident frequencies using system reliability values
• the inclusion of a cost element
An illustration of the spreadsheet used for the calculation has been included at the end of
the section as Figure 4.12.
4.1.1) Overall premise and model structure
The basic premise of the model may be stated as follows:
Occupational accidents result from an unsatisfactory direct interaction
between worker and the workplace environment, but the workers' actions
were influenced and the workplace environment provided by an organisation
whose actions were, in turn, influenced by external elements.
A schematic of the model philosophy is shown in Figure 4.1. More details of the basic
premise are presented in this section.
Figure 4.1 - Basic schematic of model
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Factors directly affecting accident likelihood include worker behaviours and capabilities,
weather conditions, safety related design of the workplace, and quality of protective
equipment. Most of the direct factors are heavily affected by the safety culture and
programmes provided by the employer.
Worker motivation, attitude and resulting behaviours are influenced by corporate safety
culture. Senior management, through its words, and more importantly, through its actions,
will foster safety attitudes ranging from the cavalier to the overly cautious. Employee
capability and knowledge can be positively affected by things such as effective safety
training programmes and procedures and facilities to encourage physical fitness.
Organisations prescribe the quality of safety design applied to the workplace environment.
Historically, safety groups have sometimes felt marginalised from the other design
departments, at times trying to "hang on to" or "keep up with" the rest of the group.
Modem offshore design programmes, however, usually require that safety representatives
participate in all elements of the design, and also that they be heavily involved in periodic
overall design reviews.
Corporate decisions also determine the quality of basic safety equipment provided to
workers. On modem oil and gas platforms in most regions, provision of the very best
quality safety equipment has become the norm.
Other researchers (for example Pate-Cornell and Murphy, 1996, Cheyne et aI., 1999,
Thompson et aI., 1998, and Tomas et aI., 1999) have considered the effect of corporate
actions on the accident process. The present model, however, extends the analysis by
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considering an external (to the organisation) level. Essentially, pressures imposed by
societal culture and financial realities are considered to influence the organisational
actions and decisions mentioned above, which in turn affect the direct accident process.
It has become accepted that the value placed by society on human life differs between
regions. Populations routinely experiencing large scale mortality due to unstable political
situations are more likely to accept death as a potential part of daily work life than groups
having little first hand experience with unnatural death. Governments, as represented by
their regulatory agencies, act as conduits of the attitudes of the populations they represent.
The degree of governmental pressure to enhance safety measures applied to operators will
therefore be proportional to the value placed on life by the region's population.
Financial drivers are also considered to affect accident frequency through organisational
behaviour. Corporate profitability affects how much available capital exists, which
partially determines safety spending (only partially because companies have different
views on how much of the available capital is directed to safety issues). Three financial
elements have been included in the model to represent this effect: price of oil (or gas, for
gas production installations), shareholder pressure, and royalty regime.
The following sections describe in more detail the components of the different levels, or
layers, which are shown in Figure 4.2. These components were chosen based on (i)
discussions with offshore oil industry colleagues, (ii) personal experience in the industry
and (iii) the literature review described in Chapter 2.
External Layer
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Figure 4.2 - Specific elements of model
With respect to the literature review, it was felt worthwhile to introduce a degree of rigour
to the review of factors suggested by others. Therefore, the groupings proposed in the
literature (see Section 2.3) were reviewed and the number of occurrences of specific
factors in the direct, corporate, and external categories counted. The result of this exercise
is shown in Table 4.1, with the numbers in brackets indicatin? the total number of times
the factors were proposed. Because researchers use slightly different terms to describe the
factors, the process required a degree of interpretation. However, the factors proposed
most frequently by others have been included in the present model, which provides
confirmation and validation to the choices. The relative scarcity of factors outside the
organisation proposed by previous researchers confirms the novelty of the present
approach, which includes external societal and economic forces.
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Table 4.1 - Frequency of mention of factors affecting safety results
Factors affecting occupational accidents (frequency of mention in brackets)
External Corporate Direct
Political influence (2) Economic pressure (3) Personnel experience (3)
Regulatory influence (1) Corporate Culture (11) Staffknowledge/learning (5)
Market influence (1) ProcedurelPermit syst. (8) Safety design/layout (10)
Societal influence (2) Corporate supervision! Staff errors (2)
audit programme (3)
Safety management (2) Safety behaviour (6)
Labour relations (2) Fatigue (2)
Accident management (3) Housekeeping (1)
Training (10) Physical fitness (1)
Human resources (4) Weather (2)
Quality ofPPE(3)
Attentiveness (2)
Motivation (2)
Compliance (1)
Visual environment (1)
Personnel attitude (4)
4.1.1.1) The direct layer
Occupational accidents result directly from the actions and ~hoices of workers as they
operate within a specific environment. Individuals' actions are driven by (i) chosen
behaviours and (ii) capabilities. Behaviours are personal choices, considered to be
heavily influenced by general attitude and motivation.
It is recognised that individual attitudes can sometimes be difficult to significantly change
and are probably best influenced at the hiring stage. However, this does not (and should
not) stop responsible organisations from encouraging good attitudes and discouraging
poor ones such as risk taking and mocking of staff considered overzealous in their
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concern for safety. Corporate encouragement of good safety attitudes will produce both
direct benefits and a general improvement of overall corporate safety culture.
Motivation to operate in a safe manner must be clearly provided by management and
supervisors. Positive reinforcement is the more frequent option and usually takes the form
of safety awards, financial or otherwise. Penalties for poor safety behaviour are less
common, but may become more so in reaction to increasing corporate penalties for
inferior safety performance. Some would question the effectiveness of the safety
award/penalty system, citing the encouragement of inappropriate non-reporting of
accidents. Nevertheless, the system probably, on balance, encourages behaviour
beneficial to both workers and the organisation.
Capabilities may be subdivided into mental and physical. Mental capabilities are of two
categories, knowledge based, and intelligence based (Hurst, 1998). The knowledge
component comprises the safety related information retained by the worker following
training sessions, which, if effective, cover both general safety issues and specific
requirements of the particular work environment. The intelligence component allows the
worker to cope with safety issues not specifically covered by training and procedures.
Physical capabilities associated with avoiding occupational accidents are considered to be
good coordination, a reasonable degree of fitness, and lack of fatigue.
To summarise, a worker with a good chance of avoiding an accident will have good
common sense, a sound knowledge of the safety procedures under which he should have
been trained to work, and be coordinated, reasonably fit, and not fatigued.
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Three other factors not related to personal behaviour or capability are considered to
directly affect the accident process and have therefore been included in the analysis. They
are (i) the weather conditions at the time when the work is performed, (ii) the~
related design (which would take into account the type of facility - oil or gas) of the
work environment and equipment (i.e. non-slip floor coverings, ergonomically designed
ladders) and (iii) the supplied personal protective equipment (PPE) (i.e. hat, boots,
safety glasses, and earplugs).
4.1.1.2) The corporate layer
The second fundamental layer is the safety related support provided by the organisation.
This support is considered to be comprised of the corporate safety culture nurtured by
the organisation, the specific safety training delivered to staff, and the procedures
offered to reduce accident risk.
Safety culture is difficult to quantify. Almost all operators today promote a commitment
to safety as their foremost concern. Annual reports and other p~omotional materials repeat
phrases and promises such as "safety takes precedence over production", "safety is job
one", and similar. Corporate policy statements carrying signatures from top executives
reinforce the statements. Senior executives use many approaches during "town-hall"
meetings to encourage attention to safety - for example, by displaying pictures of families
with an accompanying plea to "get home to them safely", or through a request to staff to
not burden the manager with the guilt associated with an employee injury or death "under
his watch". Further motivation for staff to support good corporate safety culture is often
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added by a public implementation of a reward/penalty scheme, as discussed in Section
4.1.1.1.
Corporate safety culture tends to be a fragile thing which can quickly collapse if the
workforce senses that the safety system has been created for political reasons only instead
of resulting from genuine concern for the workers. A common example of this is subtle
management encouragement to bend safety rules when doing so might mean avoiding
financial loss, for example, when continuous production is in jeopardy. Similarly,
motivations can be questioned when managers fail to encourage safety attention away
from the work environment, instead taking the view that risks taken during non-work time
are "none of my (the manager's) business".
In addition to nurturing an organisation-wide safety culture, offshore operators today take
many practical steps to ensure that the basic elements required for safe work activities are
in place. These include the development and enactment of impressive safety training
programmes and the distribution of safety procedures and guidance notes. The frequency
and content of safety training meetings can be immediately ~djusted to reflect the most
recent performance, and the style and location of the meetings is sometimes changed to
react to problem areas within the organisation. An example would be replacing office-
based meetings with "tool-box" talks held on the shop floor to raise awareness of specific
potential hazards.
It is important to develop and maintain an appropriate balance in the intensity and
quantity of training sessions and procedures. Too little of either can produce a work force
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ill equipped to face work activities in a safe manner, and one which feels unsupported by
those responsible for its ongoing safety. However, excessive and overly restrictive safety
procedures can create an unfortunate and unexpected negative result. Workers can feel
immune to dangers when armed with an overabundance of instructions, which can lead to
unsafe actions. Or, staff can occasionally find safety procedures so restrictive that they
lose their will to comply, cut comers, and become injured. Experience is gradually
producing the appropriate level of safety training and procedure.
A supportive safety culture combined with suitable training programmes and procedures
comprises the corporate layer of safety protection. Taken together, they form a safety
system that can be very effective.
4.1.1.3) The external layer
The view that safety results can be fundamentally and significantly improved solely by
changing elements at the direct level is not supported by this or previous research. Better
safety boots, a series of more visible warning signs, and similar initiatives may prevent an
accident or two, but fundamental change requires improvemynt at least at the corporate
level, which is usually driven by external factors such as the relative societal value placed
on life or market financial pressures. These external factors are discussed in this section.
Oil companies need to operate in regions where hydrocarbon reserves are discovered.
Cultural expectations differ enormously throughout the world, and region-specific
societal forces will affect corporate safety results in several ways. For example, certain
regions place a higher value on a human life than others. In regions where the value is
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high, operators will receive, usually through the regulatory process, a relatively high
pressure to impose a strict safety programme. This pressure will take many forms - for
example requirements for high expenditure on safety equipment through demanding and
prescriptive regulation, stiff penalties for injuries, both in terms of fines and public
embarrassment, and lengthy and expensive pre-project public safety performance forums.
The opposite relative effect will manifest in regions with a comparatively lower societal
value placed on life.
Financial pressures on oil companies originate from several sources, including global
price of oil, corporate shareholder pressure, and regionally based royalty regime. The
latter two are significantly driven by regional public opinion. Some examples of the
manifestation of public views on pressures felt by organisations were described by
Brotherton (2003) and discussed in Section 2.4.4. An additional hypothetical example
would be the election of a government whose campaign policy included a commitment to
oppose hydrocarbon development and impose a restrictive and lucrative (for the
population) royalty regime.
A reasonably strong inverse correlation has been shown (Section 3; 1.2) between price of
!ill and accident frequency. This is likely due to an effect which is more easily seen from
a negative perspective - when money is scarce, i.e. when the price of oil (or gas, for gas
production facilities) is low, there is an increased pressure to cut corners everywhere, and
this includes, unfortunately, the quality of the safety programmes enacted by operators.
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Shareholder pressure is primarily organisation specific, and is related to the degree to
which an organisation feels pressure from its ultimate owners to improve bottom line
performance. When they buy specific companies' shares, purchasers have certain
expectations related to corporate history and reputation. Organisational objectives to
return industry leading dividends can be felt throughout the organisation, often in ways
not popular with all employees, for example in a reduction of safety programme spending.
A secondary regional influence on shareholder pressure has arisen as companies continue
to divide themselves into regional legal entities. Some cultures support a greater degree of
capitalistic corporate philosophy than others, and shareholders in such regions will likely
exert a proportionally greater pressure to return high dividends.
Unduly high pressure to return dividends or retain money within corporate coffers rather
than spending it on what some shareholders perceive to be an unnecessary expense
lacking an obvious payback, such as the safety programme, wilt" negatively affect safety
results.
The fmal financial factor considered is the royalty regime, ~hich, similar to the value
placed on human life discussed above, is heavily region-specific. It is interesting to watch
the dynamic of different government and public behaviour following the euphoria of the
first oil or gas discovery in an area. Usually the initial reaction is to make life very
attractive for the companies, and a lucrative (for the organisation) royalty scheme is
discussed and proposed in general terms. Then, usually over a period of one to two years,
the historical values of the region are brought to bear on the process. If the region's long
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term economics have been acceptable or excellent, and the environment is of high
importance to the public (usually due to valuable tourism or fishing industries), pressure
is placed on government to enforce a strict royalty regime, which erodes project
profitability, increases financial pressure, and has the potential to produce a negative
knock-on effect on safety results. On the other hand, in areas where the population has
suffered from poor long-term economics, it is more likely that the public will encourage
government to ensure that oil and gas operators are made to feel welcome in every
possible way, including financially. This will have a positive effect on disposable
corporate cash, which has a good likelihood of being translated to increased safety
spending and improved performance.
4.1.2) Calculation methodology
This section includes descriptions of both the general methodology and specific
calculations used within the model to predict accident frequency, based on the
effectiveness of the influencing factors described in the previous section.
4.1.2.1 General method of analysis
Many methods are available to study probabilistic events such as offshore accidents.
These have been discussed in Chapter 2 (literature review), and include fault tree analyses,
event tree analyses, and others.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) have described several methods available to analyse
relationships between statistical data, including for example multiple regression analysis
and, most promising for application to the occupational accident issue, structural equation
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modelling, or SEM; SEM uses statistical techniques to evaluate the strength of the
relationships between variables associated with a given hypothesis. A diagrammatical
representation of the output of a typical SEM analysis is shown in Figure 4.3 (from
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
6~SAT/
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va
Figure 4.3 - Structural equation modelling - skiing example
The authors employed the following protocol in their representations of SEM analyses:
• Squares or rectangular shapes indicate measured variables, also known as
observed variables, indicators, or manifest variables.
• Round or oval shapes represent factors, also known as latent variables, constructs,
or unobserved variables.
• The collection of hypothesized relationships between the constructs is referred to
as the structural model.
• Sections of the model which relate unobserved variables to measured ones are
referred to as measurement models.
• Relationships between variables are represented by lines - no line symbolises a
prediction of no relationship; a line with one arrow indicates a direct relationship,
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with the arrow pointing to the dependent variable; and a line with two arrows
indicates a relationship with no implied direction of effect.
In the example shown in Figure 4.3, the authors evaluated the premise that two elements,
love of skiing (LOVESKI) and propensity for sensation seeking (SENSEEK), would
heavily influence satisfaction on a subsequent ski trip (SKISAT).
Love of skiing was represented by the participants' total number of days skiing (DAYSKI)
and total years during which skiing formed part of the respondents' leisure activities
(NUMYRS). Furthermore, love of skiing was also considered to influence both of the
latter variables (NUMYRS, DAYSKI).
Satisfaction with the trip was measured by satisfaction with snow conditions (SNOWSAT)
and food (FOODSAT). In addition, higher ski trip satisfaction was proposed by the
authors to predict greater satisfaction with the food and ski conditions, but a case could be
made that the direction of causality could be reversed, in other words that food and snow
condition satisfaction would predict overall trip satisfaction. .
An analysis of the covariance of responses to a questionnaire on the subject was
combined with a regression analysis to optimise regression coefficients between the
variables. The coefficients were adjusted until the difference between predicted and actual
results could be shown to have reached a minimum. The results of the process are shown
in Figure 4.3, with the strength of the relationships indicated by the relative size of the
numbers.
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SEM was given serious consideration for this work, since, as can be seen from the
discussion and figure above, similarities exist between the skiing example and the current
study of offshore occupational accidents. Specifically, in the same way that satisfaction
on a ski trip is thought to be influenced by love of skiing and level of sensation seeking, it
is proposed here that accidents are influenced by a series of direct elements, corporate
decisions, and external drivers. Figure 4.4 shows a SEM representation of the offshore
occupational accident process.
Figure 4.4 - SEM analysis of offshore occupational accidents
The following points are made with respect to the application of SEM to the occupational
accident process.
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• This application of SEM is significantly more complex than those described in the
literature.
• Some factors, such as safety procedures, weather, and price of oil can be directly
measured, for example by the number of safety procedures, days of good weather
per year, and daily price of oil, respectively.
• Other items, such as physical capability and behaviour, cannot be measured
directly, and would therefore need to be quantified by an evaluation of the
measurable elements with which they are associated. For example, physical
capability would be quantified by evaluating the more easily measurable physical
fitness and lack of fatigue.
• The primary structural model in this application is composed of the lines
connecting external influences, corporate safety programme, direct causes of
occupational accidents, and safety results.
• An example of a measurement model would be the measurement of a corporate
safety programme using a quantification of safety training, procedures, and safety
culture indicators. This measurement model sub-set is shown in the middle portion
ofFigure 4.4.
To understand the issues surrounding the application of SEM to the general accident
process, several related papers (for example Brown et a1., 2000, Tomas et a1., 1999,
Cheyne et a1., 1999) were reviewed. It was noted that SEM and, indeed, most of the other
statistical approaches considered, are primarily observational and static - they study the
situation as it is currently measured. There are advantages to an alternative method
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offering the capacity to predict accident frequency and grow and change to account for
improved information.
Following individual reflection, experimentation, and discussion with colleagues, it was
decided that the accident process would be best modelled using a modified reliability
network. Using this approach, the relationships between direct layer factors are similar to
those of a physical system, and, consistent with the general philosophy, their reliabilities
are influenced by the performance of the corporate and external elements. More detail
will be offered on the actual model in subsequent sections. It is emphasised that whilst the
reliability model was considered to be the best option, no particular problem is perceived
with using either SEM, the previously mentioned fault tree and event tree methods, or
other approaches.
The notion to model the accident process as a reliability network originated with the
recognition of several similarities between the components and interconnections of a
mechanical/electrical engineering system and the elements considered to affect safety
programmes and accidents, as mentioned below.
• Similar to an engineering system, success of accident reduction programmes
depends on the reliability of individual components.
• Individual components perform at different levels of reliability.
• System improvements are produced by improving component performance.
• The overall system can be realistically subdivided into sub-systems.
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• Some subsets of components in engineering systems are configured in series
setups having the fundamental properties that (i) the reliability of the subset is the
product of individual component reliabilities and (ii) the subset reliability is
always less than the reliability of the least reliable component (see Figure 4.5).
This corresponds to the concept that, for some subsets of a safety
programme/accident process, all elements must be operating relatively efficiently
to produce a satisfactory result.
• Other elements in engineering systems are configured in parallel setups having
the fundamental properties that (i) the reliability of the subset is calculated by
subtracting the product of individual component probabilities of failure from one
and (ii) the subset reliability is always greater than the reliability of the most
reliable component (s~e Figure 4.5). This corresponds to the concept that, for
some subsets of a safety programme/accident process, poor performance in some
elements can be compensated for by superior performance by others within the
subset.
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Figure 4.5 - Series versus parallel subsets
A mathematical example can be used to illustrate the final two points above, with
reference to the equations in Figure 4.5 (see also Table 4.2). Consider two subsets of
elements, each containing two elements, one connected in series, the other in parallel.
Assume a situation where each system reliability is approximately equal, produced when,
for example, component reliabilities of the series subset are 0.6 and 0.7, giving a system
reliability of (0.6 x 0.7 = 0.42), and component reliabilities of the parallel subset are 0.2
and 0.3, producing a system reliability of (1 - (1-0.2) x (1-0.3) = 0.44). Suppose system
failure is proposed to occur when overall reliability falls below approximately 0.35. In the
series arrangement, this occurs if the first component reliability falls below 0.5, a drop of
only 17% from the original value of 0.6. However, in the parallel arrangement, a fall
below system reliability of 0.35 would require the first component reliability to drop from
0.2 to approximately 0.06, a fall of 70%. A failure of the parallel system requires a much
greater percentage component reliability drop than is the case for the series system. This
-169 -
example shows how the effect of compensation by elements in the safety system is
modelled by the parallel arrangement of components in the reliability network.
Table 4.2 - Comparison of series and parallel arrangements
Config- Original System New System % Reduc.
uration Individual Reliability Component Reliability in Comp.l
Component Reliabilities Reliability
Reliabilities
Series Comp.1=0.6 (=0.6 x 0.7 =) Comp.1=0.5 (=0.5 x 0.7=) (0.6-0.5)
Comp.2=0.7 =0.42 Comp.2=0.7 =0.35 =17%
Parallel Comp.1=0.2 (=1-(1-0.2) x Cmp.1=0.06 (=1-(1-0.06) x (0.2-0,06)
Comp.2=0.3 (1-0.3))= 0.44 Comp.2=0.3 (1-0.3))= 0.34 =70%
Some other advantages of the modified reliability network over other approaches are as
follows.
• One of the primary tenants of this thesis is that the higher level (i.e. external and
corporate) layers of the system affect the lower level layers. The proposed model
includes a function to spread the effect of the higher levels to the lower layers.
• The relative importance of individual elements has been included, heavily relying
on industry expert opinion.
• The model can be easily modified. Importance of individual elements, strength of
relationships and even individual component location within the structure are
easily updated with improved information or revised philosophy.
The modified reliability system based model of the accident process is shown in Figure
4.6. A few points to note are as follows:
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• The direct layer elements (behaviour, capability, weather, safety design, PPE, and
their subcomponents) are connected in a reliability network. The reliability of the
system is calculated in much the same way as would be done for a physical
network (Billinton and Allan, 1983). The only departure from formal system
reliability calculation methodology is the necessary inclusion of relative strength
factors, which is discussed in Section 4.1.2.2.
• The external elements influence corporate factors, and these in turn influence the
direct components, as shown in Figure 4.6. The mathematics of this process is
described in Section 4.1.2.3.
• The main direct elements (behaviour, capability, weather, safety design, and PPE),
are connected in a series configuration, reflecting the belief that all must
contribute effectively in order to achieve satisfactory safety results.
• Some element subsets, for example (i) coordination, fitness, and lack of fatigue,
and (ii) knowledge and intelligence, are connected in parallel arrangements. This
reflects the belief that a d~gree of compensation is available in the process.
Examples of this would be when a high level of coordination and fitness allowed a
fatigued worker to successfully avoid an accident, or when good intelligence
facilitated accident avoidance for a worker having a less than ideal knowledge of
safety procedures.
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Figure 4.6 - Model structure
In the following sections several of the main features of the model are discussed,
specifically:
• the ability to apply varying strengths to individual components based on their
relative importance in the process
• the method by which the influence of external elements on corporate factors and
corporate factors on direct elements is modelled
• the exact method of reliability calculation
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• the method for predicting accident frequency once reliability has been established
• the inclusion of a cost element in the model
4.1.2.2 Strength of individual elements
The model accounts for the fact that not all elements affect overall safety performance to
the same degree. Expert opinion, as obtained from a survey (Section 3.5) of safety
professionals, has been used to quantify each element's relative effect (or "strength") on
accident frequency. The process used to transfer experts' opinions to values having the
form required by the model is described in this section.
Decisions needed to be made regarding relative importance of all subgroups and
individual elements within the model's direct layer. First, a decision was made regarding
the relative importance of the five overall elements (behaviour, capability, weather, safety
design, and PPE). Moving to the next level, within the group of capability elements, the
relative importance of physical and mental capability was assessed. Moving down still
further in the structure, the relative importance of the physical capability elements
(coordination, fitness, and lack of fatigue) was determined. ~irnilar quantitative choices
were also required for all the other direct elements. Relative strength of the corporate and
external elements was handled by their relative degrees of influence on lower levels,
which was also determined by expert survey and is discussed in Section 4.1.2.3.
As mentioned, quantified decisions regarding the relative importance of specific elements
was based on information gained via an industry expert survey. A questionnaire was used
for this purpose in which experts were asked to rate the relative importance of elements
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using a one (not very important at all) to ten (crucial) scale. A discussion of the choice of
a questionnaire as a method of gauging expert opinion is included in Section 3.5.1. Table
4.3 shows the resulting average values for the normalised importance of each element.
The normalisation process was described in Section 3.5.1. Curves showing the spread
(based on the questionnaire responses) of normalised results for each element are
included in Appendix 4. As an example, curves showing the relative response frequencies
for mental and physical capability are shown in Figure 4.7. Note the perceived higher
importance of mental compared to physical aspects.
Table 4.3 - Element strengths
Element Strength value Element Strength value
Main elements Capability
Behavioural 0.25 Mental 0.64
Capability 0.21 Physical 0.36
Weather 0.15 Mental capability
Safety design 0.21 Knowledge 0.54
PPE 0.18 Intelligence 0.46
Behavioural Physical capability
Attitude 0.49 Coordination 0.33
Motivation 0.51 Fitness 0.29
Lackof fatigue 0.38
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Figure 4.7 - Normalised importance ofphysical versus mental factors
The relative importance information is then transformed to the mathematical model by a
process of strengthening or weakening the various elements in the reliability network.
This is best explained by considering the effect of individual component reliability on
overall system reliability in a mechanical or electrical engineering system composed of
sub-groups of components, some arranged in parallel, others in series. Consider the series
arrangement shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8 - Series reliability
In this case, the reliability of the system is:
Rsys = Rl x Rl x R2 x R3 = R12 x R2 x R3 (4.1)
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Now consider the effect on system reliability if a 10% improvement is made in the
component reliability of the two Rl elements, as compared to the system improvement if
the same 10% improvement is made in the single R2 component. Table 4.4 shows that the
% improvement in system reliability associated with the 10% improvement in the two Rl
components is greater than the case when a 10% improvement is made to the single R2
component.
Table 4.4 - Effect of component reliabilities - series configuration
Case Component Reliabilities System % Improvement
Rl Rl R2 R3 Reliability in system
reliability
Base 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.240 Not Applicable
10% 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.291 21.3%
Improvement Rl
10% 0.70 0.70 0.77 0.70 0.264 10.0%
Improvement R2
Note that the absolute reliabilities in this discussion are not as important as the percentage
changes. This is because before the model is used to predict accident frequency for a
specific case, a calibration process is undertaken whereby ~omponent reliabilities are
preset to ensure that the starting point for the analysis will produce base case results
(usually industry average). Therefore, absolute individual component reliabilities are not
important, but changes in them are.
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Consider now a similar analysis applied to the parallel arrangement shown in Figure 4.9.
Figure 4.9 - Parallel reliability
In this case, the reliability ofthe system is:
Rsys = 1 - (l-RI/ x (I-R2) x (I-R3) (4.2)
As before, the effect of component improvements on system reliability is greater when
more components are involved. As shown in Table 4.5, when the reliability of the two RI
components increases by 10%, system reliability improves by 2.7%, but when the
reliability of the single R2 component (or, indeed R3) increases by 10%, system reliability
improves by only 1.4 %.
Table 4.5 - Sensitivity to number of elements, parallel system
Case Component Reliabilities System % Improvement
Rl Rl R2 R3 Reliability in system
reliability
Base 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.76 Not Applicable
10% 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.78 2.7%
Improvement Rl
10% 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.77 1.4%
Improvement R2
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These effects are used to apply relative strengths to the elements in the model. In the
foregoing system reliability equations, the exponents correspond to the number of
physical units. Similarly, the strength values in Table 4.3 are used as exponents in the
model reliability equations (described in more detail in Section 4.1.2.4). Those with
higher than average importance are therefore treated similarly to a physical subgroup of
components having relatively more units, and those with lower than average importance
like a group having relatively fewer units. Unlike the analysis of a physical system,
however, it is not necessary to use whole numbers for the strength values in the model.
The strength of each element is then directly proportional to its relative importance, as
derived from the results of the safety expert survey.
4.1.2.3 Influence of senior elements on junior factors
The model philosophy proposes that external elements affect corporate decisions and
actions, and these, in tum, influence items which directly affect the accident process. An
example would be the multiple positive effects of operating in a regime with a higher than
average value placed on life. The effects of operating in such a region would include
increased pressure on the organisation to improve safety culture and training procedures,
which in tum would result in improvements in such things as staff attitude and motivation,
safety design, and personal protective equipment.
The inter-layer influencing effects have been accounted for in the calculation. Using an
approach similar to that proposed by Sadiq (2003), matrices of influence coefficients have
been developed (see Table 4.6, external- corporate interfac~ matrix), which cause lower
level elements to be appropriately adjusted whenever the higher level elements change.
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For example, the reliability of safety culture is automatically increased with increases in
the values associated with either value placed on life, price of oil, shareholder pressure, or
royalty regime. The values in the influence coefficient matrices have been determined on
the basis of the expert survey questionnaire (See Section 3.5 for further comments).
Table 4.6 - Influence coefficients
External- Corporate Influencing Coefficients
Normalised Scores
OJ Training Procedures Safety Culture
Value placed on life 0.43 0.43 0.44
Price of oil 0.18 0.19 0.18
Shareholder pressure 0.27 0.26 0.25
Royalty regime 0.12 0.12 0.12
The specific calculation is as follows. Each more junior element's reliability is the sum of
the products of (i) the reliability and (ii) the associated influencing coefficient of those
more senior elements considered to have an influence on the junior element. For example,
safety training, as shown in Table 4.6, is considered to.be affected by value placed on life
(43%), price of oil (18%), shareholder pressure (27%), and royalty regime (12%).
Assuming, for the purposes of this example only, the reliabilities of those factors to be
0.60, 0.50, 0.40, and 0.60, safety training reliability would be calculated as shown in
Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7 - Method of element influence on junior elements
Component Influencing (Component
Safety Training Reliability reliability coefficient reliability) x
(influencing
coefficient) f
Value of life 0.60 0.43 0.26
Price of oil 0.50 0.18 0.09
Shareholder pressure 0.40 0.27 0.11
Royalty regime 0.60 0.12 0.07
Sum of the products = reliability 0.53
value
This process is repeated for all elements at the external - corporate interface and most at
the corporate - direct interface. Whilst all of the corporate factors are considered to be
influenced to some degree by each of the external elements, three of the direct elements
(intelligence, coordination, and weather) are considered to be independent variables and
hence require direct input.
Note that this process does not preclude the adjustment of any element reliability based
on stand alone specific changes made in the respective area. For example, improvements
in personal protective equipment may be made in isolati~n of any changes in the
corporate or external elements.
4.1.2.4) The reliability calculation
Overall system reliability is a function of the direct layer components' reliabilities. If the
direct element reliabilities are known, the overall system reliability can be calculated
directly. Otherwise, external or corporate component reliabilities can be used to
determine the direct component values using the method described in Section 4.1.2.3. The
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latter is consistent with the work's general philosophy of accidents being caused directly
at the workplace, but being affected by corporate and external elements. Once values for
component reliabilities have been determined (discussed elsewhere), the equation for
calculating system reliability is as follows.
R sys = (R,Jsb x (RJsC x (RwlW x (Rstdssd x (RppelPpe
where:
(4.3)
Rb = Reliability of behaviour
Rc = Reliability of capability
Rw = Reliability ofweather
Rsd = Reliability of safety design
Rppe = Reliability ofpersonal protective equipment
sb = strength of behaviour
S!r~n,gthof capability
strength ofweather
sd = strength of safety
design
sppe = strength ofpersonal
protective equipment
Rw (reliability value for weather conditions) is a direct input (i.e. it is an independent
variable not based on the values of other elements). Reliabilities ofthe other elements are
calculated as follows:
Behaviour:
composed of:
Attitude:
and
Motivation:
where:
(4.4)
(4.5)
(4.6)
~=~x~+~x~+~x~+~x~ ~~
Rpr = Rpo x I popr + Rsp x I sppr +Rrr x I rrpr+ RVl x I vlsp (4.8)
Rsc =Rpo x Iposc + Rsp x I spsc + Rrr x I rrsc+ RVl x I vlsc (4.9)
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R t = Reliability of training (defined below)
Rpr = Reliability of safety procedures (defined below)
Rsc = Reliability of safety culture (defined below)
Ita = Influence coefficient of safety training on attitude
Ipra = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on attitude
I sca = Influence coefficient of safety culture on attitude
I tm = Influence coefficient of safety training on motivation
Iprm = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on motivation
I scm = Influence coefficient of safety culture on motivation
Strength of attitude
Strength ofmotivation
Safety Training:
Safety Procedures:
Safety Culture:
where:
Rpo = Reliability ofprice of oil (direct input)
Rsp = Reliability of shareholder pressure (direct input)
Rrr = Reliability of royalty regime (direct input)
Rvl = Reliability of value oflife (direct input)
Ipot = Influence coefficient ofprice of oil on safety training
I spt = Influence coefficient of shareholder pressure on safety training
1m = Influence coefficient of royalty regime on safety training
I vlt = Influence coefficient of value oflife on safety training
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Ipopr = Influence coefficient ofprice of oil on safety procedures
I sppr = Influence coefficient of shareholder pressure on safety procedures
I"pr = Influence coefficient of royalty regime on safety procedures
I vlpr = Influence coefficient ofvalue of life on safety procedures
Ipose = Influence coefficient ofprice of oil on safety culture
I spse = Influence coefficient of shareholder pressure on safety culture
I rrse = Influence coefficient of royalty regime on safety culture
I vlse = Influence coefficient ofvalue oflife on safety culture
(4.10)
(4.11)
(4.12)
(4.13)
Re = direct input
Rf=Rt x Itf+ R pr x I prf + R se x Isef
RIJ =R t x I tIJ + R pr x IprIJ + R se x I sdfLack of fatigue:
and
Coordination:
where:
Itf= Influence coefficient of safety training on fitness
Capability:
composed of:
Physical capability:
composed of:
Fitness:
Iprf = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on fitness
I sef = Influence coefficient of safety culture on fitness
ItIf= Influence coefficient of safety training on lack of fatigue
Ipr/f = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on lack of fatigue
ISe/f= Influence coefficient of safety culture on lack of fatigue
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sp = Strength ofphysical capability
sme = Strength ofmental capability
sf= Strength of fitness
slf= Strength oflack of fatigue
Strength of coordination
Mental capability: R me =(1- (l-R,Jsk x (l-R/~
composed of:
(4.14)
Knowledge:
and
Intelligence:
where:
Rj = direct input
(4.15)
I tk = Influence coefficient of safety training on knowledge
Iprk = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on knowledge
Isck = Influence coefficient of safety culture on knowledge
sk = Strength ofknowledge
si = Strength of intelligence
Safety Design :
where:
Rsd = R t x I tsd + R pr x I prsd + R sc X I scsd (4.16)
I tsd = Influence coefficient of safety training on safety design
Iprsd = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on safety design
I scsd = Influence coefficient of safety culture on safety design
PPE:
where:
R ppe =R t x I tppe + R pr x Iprppe +R sc x Iscppe (4.17)
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I tppe = Influence coefficient of safety training on PPE
Iprppe = Influence coefficient of safety procedures on PPE
Iscppe = Influence coefficient of safety culture on PPE
4.1.2.5) Expected number of accidents
Once system reliability has been calculated, the expected number of accidents for a unit
time (usually taken as one year) is calculated according to the reliability formula
(Billinton and Allan, 1983) shown below.
where
R = system reliability at time t
A. = average failure (accident) rate
Taking natural logarithms ofboth sides and setting t = 1, we get:
A =-In(R)
(4.18)
(4.19)
This approach, in principle, assumes a relatively constant failUfe rate over the period. The
typical relationship between failure rate and time for physical components (Billinton and
Allan, 1983) is illustrated in Figure 4.10. The failure rate is usually initially relatively
high, until such time as initial inherent problems have been resolved. Following this, a
period of constant failure rate is experienced, until component wear-out results in an
increasing rate. It is during the middle period (sometimes called useful life) of constant
failure rate that the foregoing equation is valid.
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Burn in Wear out
Figure 4.10 - Failure rate versus time - the "bathtub" curve
Applying this philosophy to the offshore occupational accident situation, the analogy
could be drawn that, before accident causation became relatively well understood, the
accident rate was relatively high. However, evidence exists to confirm that the industry
accident rate has reached a relatively constant state. There is an obvious flattening of the
FAR curve between 1999 and 2003, as shown in Figure 4.11, and the average slope of the
TRIR curve from 1999-2003 is 26% less than the average between 1995 and 1999. These
results support the constant failure rate assumption required above.
Offshore Fatal Accident Rate ( FAR),
18.001I. :::: ~\ 1\~ ~ 1::~~ .=-==_=_-=:_\~----,\=,,- _-;f-~-'=-----'=':-;::-/""'=--:::g:=--=-~~-2~--~'\.~=.-=--==--==--==:--1
~ ~:~~ =_-==_-------==_-;::::==_-==_-:;::~=_-==_==...,.~=_ -==_:::::::==_-;::::=_~=_-==;:::"T""-=:_==:...,."""'==_--1=
1990
Figure 4.11 - Overall oil and gas fatal accident rate versus time
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4.1.2.6) The cost of accidents - input to management decisions
Accidents are costly - this is a well known fact in the offshore oil and gas industry which
has been discussed in Section 2.4.3. The model provides an easy method to evaluate cost
savings associated with accident frequency reduction, and, conversely, costs associated
with accident frequency increase. Incremental fmancial rewards can be immediately
observed upon improvements made in individual components, facilitating safety spending
optimisation.
This feature offers a tool to aid sound management decision-making related to safety
programmes. For example, the model could be run several times, with each scenario
assuming a different relative improvement in various components' performance, for
example a 20% improvement in safety design effectiveness or a 10% improvement in
safety training effectiveness. The model wo:ld predict, for each scenario, the associated
accident frequency improvement, and the cost associated with that level of accident
frequency. The operator will have gained, through experience, a good idea of the costs of
making the respective component improvements, and will -thereby be able to make
decisions in full knowledge of both the implementation and effect sides of the equation.
Similarly, model runs can be used to show the costs associated with increased accident
frequency upon relaxation of various safety initiatives. It is understood that a cost benefit
analysis such as this will be just one input to decisions related to safety, which may affect
worker well being.
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The model assumes that an average offshore accident will have costs as detailed in Table
4.8 (Attwood, 2005). It has been assumed that the injured worker remains unable to work
for an average period of two weeks. The cost element is determined by multiplying the
cost of an accident by the expected number of accidents.
Table 4.8 - Occupational accident cost
Element
First Aid
Procure and provide replacement worker
Salary cost of replacement worker
Management time in replacement
Accident investigation costs
Rehabilitation costs
Reputational cost
Total
<;:ost ($ Canadian)
500.00
2500.00
7000.00
3500.00
4500.00
2500.00
10,000.00
30,500.00
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Figure 4.12 - Model spreadsheet
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4.2) Model calibration and specific case analysis
The accident frequency prediction process requires the model to be run in two distinct
modes. First, a calibration run is executed, where known accident rates (in a situation
where the safety conditions are also known) are used to determine base case component
reliabilities. Second, the model is run in predictive mode following adjustment of the base
case component reliabilities. The degree of adjustment is determined using a quantified
comparison of safety conditions in the specific and base cases, which requires expert
input from safety personnel familiar with both situations. In many applications, the global
average safety situation, with documented results and generally known conditions, is used
as the base case. This section details the process of running the model in both calibration
(base case) and predictive (specific case) modes.
4.2.1) Calibration
The goal of the calibration process is to determine base case component reliabilities. Any
situation where both safety results and safety conditions are known can be chosen as the
base case. However, because the subsequent predictive model run requires a comparison
of specific and base cases, a convenient base case option is the average global offshore
industry. Global average safety results are available, and in most cases experienced safety
experts can offer a reasonable comparison of specific case conditions for any factor with
the global average situation for that element. The remainder of the discussion in Section
4.2 is based on the assumption of global average conditions as the base case.
The type of accident statistic used for calibration depends on which output statistic is
desired. For example:
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• If a particular (total recordable, lost time) accident rate in a region or industry
sector is sought, then the corresponding global average value of that particular rate
is used for calibration.
• If the expected annual number of a specific kind of accident (total recordable,
days away from work) on an installation having a given POB (persons on board)
is required, then the global average rate of that type of accident is combined with
the POB to determine accident numbers expected had the facility been operating
under average safety conditions.
An example of the latter type of calibration calculation is presented here. The most all-
encompassing (and therefore most appropriate for calibration) data source for global
average results is the annually released International Oil & Gas Producers (OGP)
database. Table 4.9 shows data for several types of accidents for 2003.
Table 4.9 - OGP 2003 average accident rates
Statistic Value
Offshore fatal accident rate (per 100,000,000 hours) 4.16
Offshore lost time injury frequency (per 1,000,000 hours) 1.27
Offshore total recordable incident rate (per 1,000,000 hours) 4.87
In this example it is assumed that the desired model output is installation specific annual
number of recordable incidents. Therefore, the global average TRIR value (4.87) is used
for calibration. Had we been interested in fatalities or lost time injuries, then the value
4.16 or 1.27 respectively would have been used (remembering that fatal accident rate,
contrasting with the others, is reported per 100 million hours worked).
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On a 200 POB installation operating twenty four hours per day, as most do,
approximately 100 persons will be working at any given time, while their counterparts
rest. The number of person-hours worked per year for the platform is then calculated as
below.
Person-hours worked =(100 persons) x (24 hours/day) x (365.25 days/year) =
876,600 person-hours
Based on the 2003 TRIR (4.87/1,000,000 hours), the expected number of installation
specific annual recordable cases under average safety conditions is then calculated as
follows.
Expected number of recordable cases =
(876,600 person-hours) x (4.87/1,000,000 person-hours) = 4.27 cases
This figure is then used to calibrate the model for average safety conditions. An iterative
process is used to determine the individual component reliabilities required for the model
to have predicted this number of annual accidents. Software tools (goal-seek function in
Microsoft Excel) are available to make the exercise a quick and easy affair.
It is worth mentioning that the calibration process results in the assignment of equal base
case reliabilities to all components. This result is based on two issues - the choice of the
input component reliabilities used to initiate the calibration process, and the mechanics of
the subsequent calculation of the remaining components' reliabilities. These issues, and
their implications for the prediction process, are discussed below.
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• In calibration mode, the model takes as its inputs those components which are
independent of other (higher level) components, namely (i) the four external
elements, and (ii) those direct elements (weather, intelligence, and coordination)
which are not influenced by either corporate or external factors. Because the
calibration run is typically concerned with global average conditions, there is no
basis for setting these inputs at values different from one another. It cannot be
confidently or precisely established, for example, that the global average royalty
regime reliability indicator should be set at a different value than the global
average shareholder pressure indicator. Assigning equal values to all calibration
input reliabilities is a valid starting premise, considering the global average nature
of the calibration run.
• Turning to the second issue mentioned above, and recalling the discussion of
Section 4.1.2.3, the reliabilities of junior elements are dependent upon, indeed
made up of, the values of their next higher level counterparts. Therefore, once the
input external elements (and the independent direct elements) are set at equal
values, the dependent corporate and direct components, which are based on them,
become equal also.
Many sets of component reliabilities could produce the output required for calibration
purposes. However, since model execution is based on a quantified comparison of
specific and base cases, the absolute values of base case component reliabilities are not
important. What is crucial, though, is the scale of their subsequent expert judgement
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based adjustments applied for the predictive run. The establishment of different
component reliabilities at calibration would be an unnecessary complication to the
process. This would be the case even if the base case was not global average conditions.
The model requires a comparison of specific case to base case, not absolute reliability
values.
An exception to the requirement to perform a base case calibration is when a prediction of
the effect of iterative change is required. A good example of this would be when a
prediction of year on year safety result changes on a specific installation or within the
same region is desired. Assuming a comparison to global average conditions was used to
make the initial prediction, and (different) component reliabilities for subsequent years
had been established (The method for doing this is described in the next section.), the
following year's predictions can be made by simply adjusting the previous year's
component reliabilities to reflect the new conditions.
4.2.2) Specific case runs
To predict accident frequency for a specific case, the model i~ run following adjustment
of the base case component reliabilities in line with the safety environment of the
installation or sector under study.
The degree of component reliability adjustment is based on the opinion of experts
familiar with both base (average global) and specific case safety conditions. The experts
assign scores from one to ten for each factor, representing the component's specific case
conditions, compared to global average, which is represented by a score of five. Higher
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scores, in all cases, represent situations more favourable to safety results - for example a
high score on royalty regime corresponds to a situation where the government takes
relatively less money in royalties, thereby leaving more free cash for operators to spend
on everything, including safety measures. Likewise, a lower score (i.e. less than five)
corresponds to a regime where more than average cash is taken by the government,
leaving relatively less for safety spending. A high score on PPE would indicate that the
specific case's quality of safety equipment was considered superior to global average.
At first glance it would seem reasonable to adjust component reliabilities in direct
proportion to the experts' assigned scores. Using this system, a score of 6 for a given
component would result in the base case reliability being multiplied by 6/5, or 1.2, whilst
a score of 10 would result in a doubling of base case reliability (10/5 = 2). However, other
functions can be used to transform the expert panel's subjective observations to factors
used to adjust the base case reliabilities. The literature (Ott, 1978) describes the design of
several alternative mechanisms for transforming subjective observations such as these to
useful indices. For example, the use of power functions to generate indices for water
quality, based on pollutant variables, is proposed.
For the present application, results were seen to be improved (Chapter 5 describes model
accuracy) by considering the importance of scores further away from the mean to be
greater than that for more centralised results, in effect magnifying extreme values' effects
beyond that applied when using a directly proportional approach. This is done by using a
"power 2" function, in other words making the changes (in component reliability in this
case) proportional to the square of the ratio of specific case to average case score (5). For
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example, an assigned score of 6 would produce a component reliability increase of (6/5/
= 1.44 and a score of 10 would produce a component reliability increase of (10/5)2 = 4.
Note that the difference between squared increases and the directly proportional approach
is only 20% (1.44/1.2) for values relatively close to the mean (6), but the difference is
100% (4/2) at the extreme value (10). This process has the· effect of making the
importance directly proportional to the magnitude of the score. The use of powers greater
than 2 makes the process overly sensitive to extreme values and is therefore to be avoided.
Once a panel has been established to determine specific case component reliabilities
(using the method described above), accident frequency predictions can be made by
running the model in either of three distinct ways.
• Direct layer component reliabilities can be input and system reliability and
accident frequency calculated directly.
• Corporate component reliabilities can be input and allowed to determine the direct
layer values using the process described in Section 4.1.2.3. (remembering that
weather, intelligence and coordination are independent from corporate or external
effects and require direct input). Following determination of the direct layer
reliabilities, the calculation proceeds as in the previous method.
• External reliabilities can be input and allowed to determine the corporate values
and, in tum, the direct values, facilitating the calculation as previously.
In general, if specific case expert scores are known for all components, the model is run
using all three methods, with the final prediction taken as the average of the three results.
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4.3) Parametric analysis
In order to evaluate and illustrate the relative importance of individual elements to
accident frequency, runs have been executed with several individual component base case
reliabilities increased by the same amount (30%). A spreadsheet showing the runs has
been included as Figure 4.15. It is not surprising that the most influential factor is value
placed on life, since, as can be seen in the influencing coefficient matrix shown in Table
4.6, it heavily affects all three corporate elements, which in turn affect most of the direct
layer elements. The effects produced by improvements in individual direct layer elements
such as lack of fatigue are not as great, as would be expected.
Figure 4.13 shows the effect on base case accident frequency as several individual
component reliabilities are increased by 30%. The greatest reduction is seen with
improvements in value placed by society on life, which is explained by the knock-on
effect mentioned above. The next most important elements of those presented are safety
culture and safety design. Safety culture significantly influences the direct level elements,
and safety design improvements prove more influential than price of oil, weather, and
lack of fatigue. The latter is due to the following considerations.
• Safety design (0.21) carries a higher strength value than weather (0.15) as derived
from the survey of safety experts.
• Lack of fatigue is one of three components of physical capability, which in turn is
one of two components of the main direct factor "capability". Safety design,
however, is a main direct factor all on its own. Therefore, a given improvement in
safety design will produce a greater effect on accident frequency than a similar
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improvement in lack of fatigue. Furthermore, physical capability, which includes
lack of fatigue, has been assigned a relatively lower strength value (0.36) than
mental capability (0.64).
• Price of oil was assigned lower influencing coefficients (reference Table 4.6) than
two of its three external layer competitors. Its ability to influence lower layer
elements is therefore relatively low.
# Accidents for with 30% improvement in several factors
4.2101--
4.1701-- ii ••
•
•
•Value Safety Safety Price of oil Weather Lack of
placed on culture design Fatigue
Life
Figure 4.13- Number of accidents with 30% improvement in several factors
The results show how the assigned component strengths and influencing values heavily
affect individual components' abilities to affect system output reliability, in much the
same way that changing the characteristics of individual safety elements having varying
importance within a real safety programme will produce different accident frequencies.
These results confirm the significant safety benefits operators could expect when moving
to a region with a comparatively higher societal value placed on life. In some cases,
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powerful operators may try, for many reasons, to actually change societal attitudes in the
regions in which they operate, especially when the area suffers from considerable poverty
and its associated social problems. However, attempts to do this represent a reversal in the
natural direction of influence proposed by the model. In general, external factors affect
companies, not the other way around. Furthermore, even the most powerful operator
would likely struggle to produce a 30% change in this factor. On the other hand,
organisations have it within their power to produce a 30% enhancement in things such as
safety design, safety culture, and (lack of) worker fatigue.
The results also emphasize the difficulties organisations face when oil and gas reserves
are discovered in regions where societal value of life is lower than that in more developed
locations. This will continue to be a challenge for operators as reserves in more safety
conscious areas are gradually depleted.
Figure 4.14 shows cost savings realised with 30% reliability improvements in the same
six individual components. In the current financial environment where the price of a
barrel of oil exceeds USD $50, possibly the only value which ~ould get the attention of a
major operator is that obtained with a 30% improvement in the value placed on life
element. Under the assumptions made here, the financial benefits are not compelling
arguments for improvements. Still, there appears to be a higher value attached to
excellent safety outcomes than would be explained by these modest financial rewards.
The value ofpolitical goodwill and other intangible benefits are not included in the model
output, although they may be valued significantly more than the financial ones.
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Cost savings with 30%improvements
Value placed Safety culture Safety design Price of oil Weather Lack of fatigue
on life
Figure 4.14 - Cost savings versus individual component reliability improvement
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4.4) Model demonstration
The model can be used for many purposes. Three hypothetical examples are presented in
this section. The first compares safety results in an ideal situation to those obtained in a
worst case scenario. Two subsequent examples show how the model can be used to
predict changes in occupational accident probability as an asset moves through different
stages in its operational life, i.e. from offhire to operating in a given regime, or during the
de-mobilisation process.
4.4.1) Example 1 - Ideal situation versus worst case scenario
This case considers a drilling contractor interested in comparing predicted safety results
under the opposite extremes described below:
Ideal Case:
• The society in the operating region places a high value on life.
• The client demands, and is offered, the very best safety equipment, procedures,
and training schemes.
• The weather conditions are benign.
• The available workforce has a generally cautious attitude toward safety issues.
• The price of oil is at a relatively high level.
Worst Case:
• The society in the operating region places a less than average value on life.
• The client is interested in developing a marginal field and is therefore satisfied
with safety equipment, procedures, and training schemes which (only) comply
with regulatory requirements.
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• The weather conditions are extreme.
• The workforce is categorised as generally more risk-taking than average.
• The price of oil is at a relatively low level.
The model can be used to predict the number of accidents under these two extremes, as
compared to average conditions. To do this the model is run three times:
1. a base case with all factor reliabilities set at average value
2. an ideal case where all factor reliabilities are set at average value + 20%
3. a worst case scenario where all factor reliabilities are set at average value - 20%
The result is shown in Figure 4.16.
Figure 4.16 - Opposite extremes
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The actual figures resulting from these extremes (4.8 for worst case versus 3.8 for ideal)
indicate that for a 200 POB (persons on board) platform, one less accident per year is
predicted for the ideal situation than for the worst case scenario. Assuming an average
accident (Attwood, 2005), the cost saving associated with this would be about CAD $30K,
which is not very significant in today's world of oil company finance. Things would be
very different, however, from many perspectives, if the accident which was avoided
turned out to be a fatality. On a percentage basis, a 21 % improvement in safety results is
achieved when the change from worst to best case conditions is made.
4.4.2) Example 2 - Rig hired and moved to location
The model can be used to predict changes in safety results as an asset moves through
stages in its life cycle. For mobile drilling units (MDU), a typical cycle includes idle time,
hiring, mobilisation, operating, and de-mobilisation. The corresponding stages for a fixed
installation include construction, installation, commissioning, operating, and
decommissioning. The examples in this and the next section concern an MDU.
Upon hire of an idle MDU, an operator will specify thing~ such as operational and
training requirements, safety targets, etc., all of which will affect safety results. The
drilling location will be specifie.d, and this will determine the reliability values assigned to
weather, value placed by society on life, and royalty regime. Furthermore, crew make-up
will affect safety results. In most cases operators will be required by national legislation
to employ local workers for most jobs. If this is not the case, however, some operators
prefer to avoid the perceived risk associated with using a local workforce that may, for
many reasons, be more likely to experience accidents than a group more familiar with the
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operator, the unit, and the offshore business. Alternately, occasionally operators prefer to
replace an underperforming crew with one having the benefit of working under a more
positive safety culture. Either way, crew make-up will affect safety results.
The specific case studied considers an MDU as it transforms from an idle condition to
one where enhanced safety procedures and training programme are implemented, a
workforce with superior safety attitude is hired, better PPE is purchased, and the vessel
moves to a harsh weather area where societal value placed on life is lower than average.
To predict changing accident frequency under this scenario, the model is run seven times
- once for each of the changes in situation indicated below. The changes are sequential,
and factor reliabilities are not reset to average values between runs.
1. base case - all factors set at average value
2. improve safety procedures - this factor adjusted to base case + 20%
3. improve safety training process - this factor adjusted to base case + 20%
4. take on staffwith superior safety attitude - this factor adjusted to base case + 20%
5. purchase enhanced PPE - this factor adjusted to base case + 20%
6. move to region with lower than average value placed o~ life - this factor adjusted
to base case - 20%
7. move to area with poor operating (weather) conditions - this factor adjusted to
base case - 20%
The results are shown in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.17 - Accidents versus position in hiring /operational cycle
Note that the number of predicted accidents reduces with each positive change, but
moving to an area with lower than average value placed on life and harsh weather
conditions returns the value close to the original prediction.
- 206-
4.4.3) Example 3 - Rig taken off-hire
This case studies accident probability as a rig is taken off hire. The scenario includes the
replacement of a local crew with one more familiar with the rig and its safety
arrangements (and accordingly exhibits improved capability and behaviour), rig
movement from harsh to calmer weather conditions, and a company decision to abandon
enhanced safety training and procedures.
To predict changing accident frequency, the model is run five times - once for each of the
changes indicated below. The base case in this scenario is taken to be the on hire
condition - subsequent runs predict incremental changes in accident rate from this base
case. As before, the changes are sequential, and factor reliabilities are not reset to average
values between runs.
1. base case - all factors set at average value
2. replace unfamiliar crew with one more familiar with rig - behaviour and
capability factors adjusted to base case + 20%
3. return to benign weather conditions - this factor adjusted to base case + 20%
4. abandon enhanced safety training - this factor adjusted to base case - 20%
5. abandon enhanced safety procedures - this factor adjusted to base case - 20%
The results are shown in Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18 - Rig taken offhire
The number of predicted occupational accidents is reduced upon crew replacement and
weather improvement, but again approaches the on-hire levels with the abandonment of
the enhanced safety training and procedures.
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Application to the Canadian and Gulf of
Mexico offshore oil and gas industries
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5) Application to the Canadian and Gulf of Mexico offshore oil and gas
industries
Application of the model to two producing Canadian offshore oil and gas installations and
the Gulf of Mexico drilling business is described in this chapter*. The data (and its
sources) required to run and validate the model for these cases are discussed. Required
input data included both published accident statistics, used to calibrate the model for base
cases, and quantified expert opinion, used to run the model for actual cases. Published
data were also used to evaluate the accuracy of outputs and thereby validate the model.
The general methodology for the case studies is detailed, followed by a discussion of each
5.1) Model input and validation data
Application of the model to real situations requires input data. Evaluation of the resulting
predictions requires actual results for comparison. The specific data requirements were as
follows.
• global average accident rates - to calibrate the model
• installation or sector specific expert opinion with ;espect to existing safety
programmes - to appropriately adjust base case component reliabilities and
thereby facilitate the model prediction process
• region specific accident rates - to estimate safety results on specific installations or
within industry sectors, which are used to evaluate model prediction accuracy
* Attwood, D, Khan, F, and Veitch, B, 2005d. Predicting offshore occupational
accident frequency - a practical demonstration using case studies. Accepted for
publication in Process Safety Progress, AIChE.
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This section provides summaries of (i) the databases from which accident data were
extracted and (ii) the qualifications of the panel members used to score the elements of
the specific safety programmes under consideration (compared to global average
conditions).
5.1.1) Data sources
Data for the calibration portion of model application were publicly available. For model
validation, the ideal data would have been installation specific accident frequencies, since
they would have provided an opportunity to directly compare predictions with specific
platform results. However, operators are reluctant to release this information. In general,
the data are released only when operators are legally obliged to do so, and only to those
parties authorised to have it. For this research, all operators of producing installations in
eastern Canada were requested to provide installation specific data. Despite an offer to
keep installation and operator names confidential, all operators refused the request. In the
absence of operator-supplied platform specific data, the next best thing was to use
statistics published by the provincial petroleum boards to estimate accident frequencies
on the installations. Because there is but a single operating project in Nova Scotia and two
in Newfoundland, these data provide a good approximation to installation specific values.
Listed below are the data sources which have been used to (i) calibrate the model for
average conditions and (ii) evaluate the subsequent predictions.
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• The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP, 2005) global TRIR
statistics.
• The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (CNSOPB, 2005) and the
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (CNLOPB, 2005)
annual TRIR values for the Nova Scotia and Newfoundland offshore areas
respectively. The Nova Scotia data are split into installations, vessels, and aviation,
but the Newfoundland and Labrador data cover all offshore activity.
• The International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC, 2005) LTIR data for
offshore drilling activities for several regions (for example USA, Canada, Africa).
A summary of the data used for calibration and validation is shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 - Accident rates
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Global Offshore TRIR (OGP) 8.84 6.85 5.77 4.87 6.36
Nfld Offshore TRIR (CNLOPB) 10.16 9.49 8.04 11.45 4.36
NS Installations TRIR (CNSOPB) 5.60 3.35 6.40 3.35 5.95
Gulf of Mexico LTIR (lADC) 3.35 2.52 2.57 2.11 1.96
Global Drilling LTIR (lADC) 3.09 2.71 1.81 1.56 1.92
5.1.2) The panel
Satisfactory model output accuracy requires a quality comparison of the specific case's
safety situation with global average conditions. This can be provided only by qualified
safety professionals having both specific project or region experience, and a significant
international offshore background. The present panel had both project-specific and
general experience in safety design, project management, and offshore surveying. The
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members averaged eighteen years of oil and gas industry experience, ensuring that the
group could draw from a sufficient depth of relevant knowledge. Details of the panel's
experience are as follows:
• surveyor one - thirty-five years oil and gas experience, the past eight surveying
Canadian oil and gas projects
• surveyor two - ten years oil and gas experience, the past five surveying Canadian
oil and gas projects
• project manager one - twenty three years oil and gas experience, most of the past
fourteen spent surveying and project managing Canadian and US projects
• project manager two - eighteen years oil and gas experience, the past three spent
surveying and project managing Canadian oil and gas projects
• project manager three - three years oil and gas experience, all spent project
managing Canadian and US oil and gas projects
• safety design appraisal specialist - twenty five years oil and gas experience, the
past eight partially spent appraising safety designs on Canadian and US projects
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5.2) Case studies
Three case studies are described in this section, as follows:
• A comparison of predicted and actual annual accident occurrence on a Nova
Scotia based production installation
• A comparison of predicted and actual annual accident occurrence on a
Newfoundland based production installation
• A comparison of predicted and actual lost time incident (LTI) rate in the Gulf of
Mexico drilling business
5.2.1 General methodology
The general process for running the model was discussed in Section 4.2. The specific
methodology for these case studies was as follows.
1. In cases one and two, published global average accident rates (OGP) were used to
estimate how many accidents would have occurred on the installations had they
been operating under average conditions. In case three, the global average
accident rate was directly available from the published data (IADC).
2. Using the results obtained in Step 1, a calibration run was executed to calculate
component reliabilities which would have produced the average conditions,
thereby producing base values for the component reliabilities.
3. Each component reliability was then adjusted according to the location-specific
scoring assigned to each factor by the expert panel as the members compared the
specific situation to global average (using a 1-10 scale and assuming 5 = global
average).
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4. The model, using the updated component re1iabi1ities, then predicted accident
occurrence numbers or rate for the specific situations.
5. For cases one and two, published, region specific accident rates (CNSOPB,
CNLOPB) were used to estimate the number of accidents likely to have been
experienced on installations in the areas covered by the data. For case three, the
region specific accident rate was directly available from published data (IADC).
These were taken to be the actual values against which the predictions generated
in Step 4 were evaluated.
A few additional details on the process are noteworthy, as follows.
Because of the subjective nature of the component scoring process, an analysis was
conducted to study the sensitivity of output predictions to changes in individual
component scorings. It was discovered that the greatest percentage change in prediction
with a single step change (for example from 7 to 8) in anyone component's score was
less than 3%. This means that if the panel erred (Perhaps erred is too strong a word for
this subjective activity.) by a single digit in its scoring of a sp~cific component, the effect
on accident frequency prediction would be relatively small. Furthermore, since (i) the
directions (i.e. overrating versus underrating) of individual component scoring errors are
expected to be equally divided and (ii) the prediction process relies on the scoring of
multiple components, the effect of the errors is expected to cancel out. It was important
for the panel to have an accurate general view of the overall situation, but a precise
measure on each and every individual component is not essential. The opinion-based
nature of the scoring process likely made such precision impossible in any event. Within
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the context of using expert opinion to produce a quantitative prediction of accident
frequency, the effect of component scoring errors is considered to be acceptably small.
Three separate methods of using the model to determine accident frequency were
discussed in Section 4.2.2. For these case studies, the experts' opinions allowed the
calculation to be performed using either method. For comparison purposes, all three were
used. The final accident prediction (Step 4) was taken as the average of the results from
the three runs, which are described in principle below.
• Run I - the external element reliabilities were adjusted (from base case values)
according to the assigned scores. The effect of this change spread through the
corporate elements to the direct elements, thereby facilitating accident prediction.
• Run 2 - the corporate elements were adjusted according to the assigned scores.
The effect of this change spread through the direct elements, thereby facilitating
accident prediction.
• Run 3 - The direct elements were adjusted according to the assigned scores,
thereby facilitating accident prediction
It is noted that three direct factors (weather, coordination, and intelligence) are not
influenced by either corporate or external elements. Therefore, in all three runs, their
adjusted reliabilities were determined by the expert panel's assigned scores.
5.2.2) Nova Scotia production installation
A Nova Scotia based 70 POB (persons on board) installation was chosen as a case study
for the model. The data in Table 5.2 are discussed in this section.
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Table 5.2 - Nova Scotia case study
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
1 Global average TRIR 8.84 6.85 5.77 4.87 6.36 6.54
2 Nova Scotia TRIR 5.60 3.35 6.40 3.35 5.95 4.93
3 Number of accidents (based on 2.71 2.10 1.77 1.49 1.95 2.00
global average TRIR)
4 Number of accidents predicted 2.26 1.65 1.32 1.03 1.50 1.55
by model
5 Number of accidents (based on 1.72 1.03 1.96 1.03 1.83 1.51
Nova Scotia TRIR)
6 % Error 32 61 -33 0 -18 3
Step 1 - Accidents under global average conditions
The number of accidents expected on a 70 POB installation operating under global
average conditions was calculated by combining the annual global average accident rates
(TRIR) available from the OGP database (Table 5.2, Row 1), with the POB. The
assumption was made that, as is the norm on offshore oil and gas installations, at any
given time, 50% of the workers are on shift, whilst their opposite numbers rest. This
produced the same numerical result as if 50% of the POB were working continuously. As
an example, the expected number of accidents for the 2004 data was calculated as follows.
Expected accidents = 6.36 accidents /1,000,000 manhours x 70 persons x
0.50 working x 24 hours/day x 365.25 days/year = 1.95
The results ofthis by year are presented in Table 5.2, Row 3.
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Step 2 - Calibration Run
In order to set base case component reliabilities, the model was run for each year with the
results preset to the number of accidents expected under global average conditions, shown
in Table 5.2, Row 3.
Step 3 - Component reliability adjustment
Table 5.3 shows the component scores assigned by the expert panel to the Nova Scotia
installation, as mentioned, on a scale of 1-10 compared to an industry average value of 5.
These scores were used to adjust the base component reliabilities calculated in Step 2.
Table 5.3 - Component ratings for Nova Scotia installation
Factor Expert Score Factor E~pertScore
Direct factors
External factors !.l Attitude
Value placed on life 9 Motivation
Price of oil 10 Lack of fatigue
Shareholder pressure 3 Coordinati<:.n
Royalty regime 4 Fitness
Knowledge
Corporate factors Intelligence
Safety culture Safety design
Safety training Weather
Safety procedures Personal protective
equipment
Step 4 - Prediction
The results for the three model runs conducted for 2004 are shown in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 - Nova Scotia installation - results of 2004 model runs
Number of
accidents
Actual (based on published Nova Scotia accident rate 1.83
Base Case (based on published global average accident rate) 1.95
Run 1 - Based on changing external elements 1.44
Model I-0_n...::ly ~.,;.+-----__I
predictions Run 2 - Based on changing organisational 1.50
elements only
Run 3 - Based on changing direct elements 1.56
't,' Average prediction (average of three runs) 1.50
It is noteworthy that accident predictions resulting from the three independent runs were
relatively consistent (Note the three results 1.44, 1.50, and 1.56, represent a spread of
only 8%). The experts offered a view on factors at all levels, and did so by considering
the existing situations associated with each factor in isolation of their views on other
factors and levels. Despite the independent nature of the individual element scoring
process and irrespective of the level at which change was initiated, the results were
consistent with one another, which indicates that (i) the panel provided a consistent view
of the safety situation at all levels, and (ii) the model accurately handles the extemal-
corporate-direct layer influencing processes.
The predicted numbers of accidents per year by year are shown in Table 5.2, Row 4.
Step 5 - Comparison ofpredictions with estimates of actual numbers of accidents
Actual number of accidents expected on the platform were estimated by repeating the
calculation in Step 1, but, instead of using global average values, substituting the annual
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accident rates (TRIR) available from the CNSOPB (Table 5.2, Row 2). The results for
2000 - 2004 are shown in Table 5.2, Row 5. The errors between the predicted and actual
results (i.e. using Nova Scotia accident statistics) are shown in Table 5.2, Row 6.
A graphical comparison of actual and predicted results by year is shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1 - Predicted versus actual accidents, Nova Scotia installation
The good agreement between the actual and predicted results served to validate the model.
Some specific points follow.
• It could be argued that results for any specific year have questionable reliability,
and that five year rolling averages are more appropriate. The five year average
number of accidents was predicted with a very small (3%) error.
• The result for 2003 was excellent (0% error), and that for 2004 (-18% error) was
very good.
• Trend matching on the basis of five data points may be of limited value, but it was
interesting to note that with the exception of the 2001 - 2002 transition, the
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directions of year on year changes in actual accident frequency were matched by
the predicted values.
With some assumptions, predictions of expected number of annual accidents can be used
to give an operator an idea of the probability of experiencing specific numbers of
accidents around the mean value. The Poisson distribution (Billinton and Allan, 1983)
represents the probability of an isolated event occurring a specified number of times in a
given time interval when the average rate of occurrence is fixed. The assumption of
constant failure rate for the present application was discussed in Section 4.1.2.5.
Assuming a constant failure rate (A) then, the Poisson distribution proposes the equation
below to calculate the probability of "x" occurrences in a unit time (one year in this
example).
(5.1)
where
Px = Probability of "x" occurrences;
A. = Average or expected number of occurrences
As reported in Table 5.2, in 2004, the model predicted the expected number (A) of
occupational accidents on the installation for one year to be 1.50. Using the Poisson
assumptions, the operator could expect his probability of having 0, 1,2.... accidents to be
as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 - Probability of accidents, Nova Scotia installation
The operator could conclude from this, for example, that assuming no safety related
changes are made, his probability of having zero accidents would be 0.22, of having zero
or one accident would be 0.55, of having two or fewer would be 0.80, and so on. Similar
calculations could be made for other years, or assuming the five year average value to be
applicable over the long term.
Many companies and managers, possibly as a result of moral pressure, publicly proclaim
a goal of zero accidents. However, such a target is an extremely difficult one to achieve.
An analysis such as this could be used by an operator to make reasonable safety
challenges to its workforce or set key performance indicator (KPI) targets for itself or its
contractors. Calculations such as these, however, would provide managers with more
achievable, yet challenging, targets. Staff could be asked, for example, to improve on the
number of accidents expected on a platform with a probability of, say, 60%. Or,
contractors could earn scaled rewards based on beating the number of accidents expected
with probability of 80%, 70%, and so on.
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5.2.3) Newfoundland production installation
The model has been applied to a Newfoundland installation, specifically a 100 POB
facility. The data in Table 5.5 are discussed in this section.
Table 5.5 - Newfoundland case study
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
1 Global average TRlR 8.84 6.85 5.77 4.87 6.36 6.54
2 Newfoundland TRIR 10.16 9.49 8.04 11.45 4.36 8.70
3 Number of accidents 3.87 3.00 2.53 2.13 2.79 2.86
(based on global average
TRlR)
4 Number of accidents 3.68 2.80 2.33 1.93 2.59 2.67
predicted by model
5 Number of accidents 4.45 4.16 3.52 5.02 1.91 3.81
(based on Newfoundland
TRIR)
6 % Error -17 -33 -34 -62 36 -30
Step 1 - Accidents under global average conditions
The number of accidents expected on a 100 POB installation operating under global
average conditions was calculated by combining the annual global average accident rates
(TRIR) available from the OGP database (Table 5.5, Row 1), with the POB (and
assuming that 50% of them are working continuously). As an example, the expected
number of accidents for the 2004 data was calculated as follows.
Expected accidents = 6.36 accidents /1,000,000 manhours x 100 persons x
0.50 working x 24 hours/day x 365.25 days/year = 2.79
The results of this by year are presented in Table 5.5, Row 3.
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Step 2 - Calibration Runs
To set base case component reliabilities, the model was run for each year with the result
set at the number of accidents expected under global average conditions, shown in Table
5.5, Row 3.
Step 3 - Component reliability adjustment
Table 5.6 shows the scores assigned to model components by the expert panel for the
Newfoundland installation.
Table 5.6 - Component ratings for Newfoundland installation
Factor Expert Score Factor Expert Score
Direct factors
External factors Attitude 6
Value placed on life 9 Motivation 7
Price ofoil 10 Lack of fatigue 8
Shareholder pressure 3 Coordination 5
Royalty regime 4 Fitness 6
Knowledge 8
Corporate factors
.,.,.
Intelligence 5
Safety culture Safety design
Safety training Weather
Safety procedures Personal protective
equipment
Step 4 - Predictions
The predicted numbers of accidents per year by year are shown in Table 5.5, Row 4.
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Step 5 - Comparison ofpredictions with estimates of actual numbers of accidents
Actual number of accidents expected on the platform were determined by repeating the
calculation in Step 1, but, instead of using global average values, substituting the annual
accident rates (TRIR) available from the CNLOPB (Table 5.5, Row 2). The results for
2000 - 2004 are shown in Table 5.5, Row 5. The errors between the predicted and actual
results (i.e. using Newfoundland accident statistics) are shown in Table 5.5, Row 6.
A comparison of actual and predicted results for each year is shown in Figure 5.3.
Actual vs Predicted, Newfoundland installation
Figure 5.3 - Predicted versus actual accidents, Newfoundland installation
These results were less encouraging than those obtained in the Nova Scotia case study. A
possible explanation for this follows.
The Newfoundland published (actual) TRIR results, compared in Figure 5.4 with global
average values, were, from 2000 - 2003, consistently and significantly worse than
industry average.
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Figure 5.4 - Newfoundland and global average TRIR
However, as discussed elsewhere, (Section 3.5.2, Thompson et aI., 1998, Tomas et aI.,
1999) safety experts' views can offer an alternative (some say better) indicator of safety
performance to the more commonly used accident statistics. The panel rated the
Newfoundland offshore safety environment equal or superior to the average global
situation in more than 86% (44/51) of the elements considered. This is consistent with the
2004 results, when Newfoundland's statistics bettered the global values, but not with
those from the previous four years. It could be argued that because the evaluation took
place in mid-2005, it was most heavily influenced by the sittiation over the most recent
few years. However, in the absence of an explanation for why Newfoundland safety
performance would be significantly worse than global average from 2000 - 2003, and
then suddenly better in 2004, and based on the panel's views, it is probably more likely
that the Newfoundland offshore industry has in fact been performing better than global
average over the entire 2000-2004 period. This conclusion requires explanations of (i)
why the relationship between global and Newfoundland published TRIR values from
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2000-2003 was opposite from the expert panel's views and (ii) why this effect was not
evident in the Nova Scotia case study. Two possibilities are offered here.
• The Newfoundland data included accidents on supply boats, which are not usually
included in oil and gas statistics. This made the Newfoundland data less
applicable than the Nova Scotia data for the present exercise, which was
concerned with activities on installations. The five-year average TRIR. for vessels
in Nova Scotia was 38% higher than for installations, so the inclusion of the
supply boat data may have inflated the Newfoundland TRIR. results.
• The Newfoundland statistics may have suffered from a greater propensity to over-
report occupational accidents than the Nova Scotia results. A possible explanation
may be associated with the different union status of workers in the regions. Unlike
the Nova Scotia sector, both of the Newfoundland projects' workforces are
unionised. A successful union certification vote for one project was held in late
2001 (Hatfield, 2003), and for the other in 2002 (CBC, 2003). In situations where
a struggle to unionise has recently been won, the workforce can sometimes be
characterised by both an exaggerated and newfound perception of job security,
and significant anger with the employer. In such situations, a healthy and
appropriate willingness to report accidents can gradually tum into a desire to do so,
resulting in trivial accidents finding their way into the statistics. Following a three
year downward trend in the Newfoundland published accident rate from 2000 -
2002, an upward spike occurred in 2003, in the first full year when both
installations were operating with a unionised workforce. It is noted that the 2004
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value could have been predicted by approximately continuing the 2000 - 2002
downward trend.
The panel's view of safety performance in the Newfoundland offshore industry (relative
to global average), contrasting as it does with the published TRlR values, explains why,
with the exception of 2004, the model under-predicted the Newfoundland installation
accident frequency.
The model can be used as a diagnostic tool to investigate unexpected safety results. In this
case, for example, a trial and error exercise was conducted to determine some component
scorings necessary for the model to have accurately predicted the actual results. Figure
5.5 shows the comparison of predicted and actual values when external elements were
scored as three, instead of the values in Table 5.6. Under this scenario, predictions
matched actual values quite well for the years 2000 - 2002. The 2003 prediction implied
a continuation of the trend for the previous three years, which did not compare well with
the rise experienced in the 2003 published data. Replacing both the 2003 and 2004
"actual cases" (5.02, 1.91) by their average (3.47) removed the 2003 - 2004 fluctuations
and produced even better matching (see circles in Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5 - Predicted versus actual accidents, Newfoundland installation, external
elements set below global average
5.2.4) Gulf of Mexico drilling sector
In this case the model has been used to predict lost time incident (LTI) rate in the Gulf of
Mexico drilling business. This application showed that the model can be used in different
modes, in this case to predict accident rate in a given region rather than previously where
it was used to predict number of accidents on a specific platform. The data in Table 5.7
are discussed in this section.
Table 5.7 - Gulf of Mexico case stucfy
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Average
1 Global average LTIR 3.09 2.71 1.81 1.56 1.92 2.22
2 Gulf of Mexico LTIR 3.35 2.52 2.57 2.11 1.96 2.50
3 Predicted LTIR 3.19 2.81 1.91 1.66 2.02 2.32
4 % Error -5 12 -26 -21 3 -7
Step 1 - Average global LTI rate
Global average drilling LTI rates are shown in Table 5.7, Row 1.
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Step 2 - Calibration Run
To set base case component reliabilities, the model was run for each year with the result
set at the global average accident rates shown in Table 5.7, Row 1.
Step 3 - Component reliability adjustment
Table 5.8 shows the scores assigned to the Gulf of Mexico offshore drilling industry by
an expert panel. Note that, in general, the values in this table are lower than those
presented in the Newfoundland and Nova Scotia cases. This reflects the panel's view that
safety climate in the Gulf of Mexico is, on balance, of poorer quality than that existing in
eastern Canada.
Table 5.8 - Component ratings for Gulf ofMexico drilling business
Factor
External factors
Value placed on life
Price of oil
Shareholder pressure
Royalty regime
Corporate factors
Safety culture
Safety training
Safety procedures
Step 4 - Prediction
Expert Score Factor
Direct factors
Attitude
Motivation
Lack of fatigue
Coordination
Fitness
Knowledge
futelligence
Safety design
Weather
Personal protective
equipment
Expert Score
The results by year ofpredicted accident rate are shown in Table 5.7, Row 3.
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Step 5 - Comparison of predictions with actual accident rate
Annual Gulf of Mexico drilling sector LTI rates are available from the IADe website and
are presented in Table 5.7, Row 2. The errors between the predicted and actual results (i.e.
using Gulf ofMexico accident statistics) are shown in Table 5.7, Row 4.
A comparison of actual and predicted results for each year is shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6 - Predicted versus actual LTIR results, Gulf ofMexico business
The predictions matched the actual results well. In all cases err9r percentage was less than
27%, and in three of the five years studied it was less than 13%. With the exception of the
2004 - 2005 transition, the year-to-year trends were matched, and the five year average
predicted value was within 7% of the actual value.
This case demonstrated the versatility of the model. The previous cases considered
accidents expected on specific production platforms in different regions, whereas this
case considered accident rate in a region specific drilling sector.
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5.3) Conclusions
The model has been validated against actual accident results. Results were most accurate
in the Nova Scotia installation case study, and were very good in the Gulf of Mexico
drilling sector analysis. Results in the Newfoundland study were less accurate than the
other two, but the published accident data in this case may be unreliable. Potential
explanations for this were described in more detail in Section 5.2.3.
It was demonstrated that the model can be used as a diagnostic tool to study unexpected
safety results. For example, by adjusting input scores, we can simulate situations that
would have been required to match actual results. If the theoretical input ratings are
clearly at odds with reality, we may have possible grounds to question the reliability of
the reported data. An example of this process was the exercise of assigning scores of 3 to
all external factors for the Newfoundland case, when this was clearly not the case, as
described in Section 5.2.3.
The versatility of the model has been demonstrated. It can be used to predict accident
numbers on a single specific platform or accident rates in a specific sector.
Conclusions
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6) Conclusions
By most measures, an offshore oil and gas worker's likelihood of suffering an
occupational accident is relatively low. However, the level of risk continues, for many
reasons, to be considered unacceptable by industry stakeholders. The offshore
occupational accident process has been studied, and a holistic, quantitative model capable
of predicting accident frequency has been developed and validated. The model's approach
combines concepts favoured by safety representatives from the engineering, psychology,
and management disciplines. The conclusions of the work are presented here, subdivided
according to its main components.
Literature Review
The literature review revealed that industrial accidents have been studied for more than
half a century. Many and varied approaches have been developed and applied within
different industries. Early models originated in the nuclear and medical industries. Model
philosophy then showed a progression from a concentration on direct causes, to holistic
views of major accidents, to statistical approaches. However, a gap in the knowledge was
confirmed, specifically the absence of a holistic, quantitative approach to oil and gas
occupational accidents.
The choice of component influencing factors used in the current model was based
partially on the elements receiving significant attention in the literature. A quantitative
review of the factors mentioned in the literature was conducted to confirm a degree of
continuity between factors proposed by previous researchers and those presently used.
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The present work has built upon previous concepts, drawing from both the statistical
methods suggested by some researchers and the holistic view taken by others to offer a
unique offshore oil and gas - specific approach to the occupational accident process.
Data Analysis
An analysis of existing offshore oil and gas occupational accident data was conducted.
The work included both observation of graphical representations and a series of statistical
analyses, including level of significance tests, Mann - Whitney tests, analyses of variance,
and Tukey HSD (honestly significantly different) tests. The analyses led to the following
specific conclusions.
• Following a relatively continuous and steady improvement in accident frequency
through the 1990's, a levelling trend is observable over the past four to five years.
• A reasonably strong negative correlation exists between price of oil and accident
frequency. This indicates that fmancial factors play a partial role in accident
likelihood. This conclusion is consistent with the additional observation that, in
general, regional safety performance is approximately aligned with the associated
local level ofprosperity.
• Safety results vary significantly between regions. This indicates that cultural and
societal issues playa part in accident frequency.
• The likelihood of workers to report accidents differs on a regional basis, which
may itself affect safety statistics.
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• Safety results vary significantly between companies and between types of
companies. This indicates that corporate culture and organisation-specific safety
programmes and hardware also affect accident frequency.
• Safety results between regions within individual projects tend to vary less than for
the general inter-regional case, which implies a degree of corporate protection and,
combined with the forgoing conclusions, suggests that a holistic approach
including direct, corporate and cultural elements is most appropriate.
• Safety results varied significantly with activity being undertaken (for example
production, drilling, construction), which supports the importance of direct factors
in determining accident likelihood.
The data analysis confirmed real differences in safety results between regions and
companies, and according to activity being undertaken. This supports the holistic
philosophy of accident causation proposed by this research.
Questionnaire
To provide numerical input to specific aspects (relative component strength, inter-layer
relationships) of the accident model, a survey of safety experts was conducted which
extracted quantitative views on the accident process. Some of the conclusions of the
survey exercise follow.
• Safety professionals believe that the combined effect of corporate elements (e.g.
safety culture and programmes) is more influential in the accident process than the
combined effects of either direct elements (e.g. PPE, staff behaviour), or external
elements (e.g. price of oil, royalty regime).
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• Of the external elements, the respondents considered value placed by society on
life to be more influential than fmancia1 elements such as shareholder pressure.
• The factor receiving the highest individual score was staff behaviour, followed by
organisational safety culture and general organisational elements (safety culture,
training, and procedures).
• The respondents considered their organisations' safety programmes to be
operating relatively well, reporting an average efficiency score of 7.1 on a one to
ten scale..
Model Development
A model to predict occupational accident frequency has been developed, which provides
a quantitative representation of the layered, holistic view of the process proposed by the
research. The approach is based on a chain of influence originating with external factors,
which act through corporate elements to affect factors directly influencing the accident
process. A calculation determines overall safety system reliability based on the
component re1iabilities of the elements considered to directly affect accident frequency.
The direct elements' reliabi1ities are influenced by the effectiveness of the corporate
elements, which are, in turn, affected by external factors. The degrees to which the layers
influence one another, and the relative importance of the elements directly affecting
accident frequency, are based on the results ofthe safety expert survey mentioned above.
A parametric analysis has been conducted to demonstrate the effect of component
efficiency changes on accident frequency. Example runs have been conducted to
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demonstrate model use in three realistic hypothetical scenarios - comparison of worst
case and ideal conditions, drilling rig hire / mobilization, and drilling rig demobilisation.
Model Application
The model has been validated by using it to hindcast accident results on oil and gas
installations in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, and in the Gulf of Mexico drilling
business. Since platform specific results were not made available by operators, the
Canadian "actual" results were based on data published by the respective provincial
petroleum boards. For the Gulf of Mexico drilling example, the actual accident
frequencies under study were publicly available.
A panel of experts with both project/region specific and general industry experience was
assembled to score the model elements according to the actual installation/regional
situations compared to average global conditions. Model runs based on the inputs were
able to hindcast actual accident frequencies with good accuracy in the Nova Scotia and
Gulf of Mexico examples. The results for the Newfoun.dland example were less
encouraging, but this might be explained by the inclusion of supply boat data in the
published accident statistics, or some potential over-reporting of accidents.
The versatility of the model was demonstrated by using it to predict both accident
numbers on specific installations (in the Canadian examples) and accident rates in
regional industry sectors (for the Gulf ofMexico example).
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Further work
Suggestions for future work are proposed here, specifically associated with probabilistic
analyses, fuzzy approaches, multilevel analysis, and model adjustment with industry
knowledge improvement.
Probabilistic analysis - Several aspects of the model rely on averaged values of subjective
expert opinion (i.e. strength of components, relationships between layers). Model output
is a prediction of an expected number of accidents or an expected accident rate. The
model could be enhanced by adopting a probabilistic approach to inputs, for example
assuming distributions for inputs having the calculated mean but assuming appropriate
distribution parameters. Such an approach would more realistically represent the
uncertainty associated with subjectively judging the safety conditions on specific
installations or in specific regions compared with the global industry. Monte-Carlo style
analyses could then be carried out to establish a probability distribution of output results,
rather than a prediction ofmean value only.
Fuzzy approaches - Instead of taking experts' individual co.mponent scoring as single
values, fuzzy methods could be used, including experimentation with different
membership functions. Similar to the probabilistic approach mentioned above, fuzzy
methods offer a means to handle the uncertainty associated with input subjectivity.
Multilevel analysis - A recent approach to the statistical analysis of situations involving
complex data sets including units of more than one type is known as multilevel analysis.
Lewis-Beck et al. (2003) suggest as an example studies on educational achievement, in
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which pupils, teachers, classrooms and schools might all be important units of analysis.
There are clear parallels in principle between this example and the safety performance of
an offshore installation, where workers, supervisors, the primary work environment, the
operator, and external factors would be important factors. Future researchers may be
interested in applying the multilevel analysis method to the oil and gas safety process.
Model structure refinement - The oil and gas industry has a significant thirst for accident
knowledge. Through steady work, approaches are improved year on year, although the
majority of the advancements have originated in mature operating regions. As activity in
frontier regions increases, accident knowledge there will increase along with it. The
present model can be easily adjusted to cope with new information or philosophies, either
by appropriately adjusting element strengths, layer relationship matrices, or even
component makeup and location.
Overall
Because occupational accident frequency on offshore oil and gas installations remains at a
level unacceptable to industry stakeholders, further effort is required to understand the
process and improve results. The present work offers a contribution. Accident likelihood
is affected by direct, corporate, and external factors. Drawing from engineering, safety,
psychology, and management philosophies, a validated, holistic, quantitative occupational
accident frequency prediction model has been proposed.
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Appendix 1.2 BP (BP, 2003)
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Appendix 1.3 ConocoPhillips (ConocoPhillips, 2002)
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Appendix 1.4 ExxonMobil (ExxonMobil, 2003)
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Appendix 1.6 Shell (Shell, 2004)
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Appendix 1.7 Talisman (Talisman Energy Incorporated, 2004)
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Appendix 1.8 Total (TotalElfFina, 2002)
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Appendix 1.9 ChevronTexaco (ChevronTexaco,2004)
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Questionnaire
Factors that influence oHshore
occupational accidents
As part of a university research programme, we are performing a quantitative study of offshore
occupational accidents (i.e. this research is not related to major accidents such as explosions).
Part of the research involves the development of a mathematical model of the accident process. A
description of the basic model premise is included at the end of the questionnaire for those
interested. The questionnaire's goal is to ensure that the model accurately reflects expert
opinion/judgement in two essential areas, specifically:
1. the relative importance of certain factors in the accident process; and
2. the degree (causal strength) to which external forces and organisational factors influence the
direct causes of accident
The whole exercise should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete
Your responses will be combined with others and used in the model - the identities of
individual respondents and their organisations will be kept strictly confidential
Importance of elements
This section concerns the relative importance of elements. You are asked, for each subset below,
to rate, on a scale of one (not important at all) to ten (crucial), the importance of each element in
the accident process.
Rating (1-10)
External effects (i.e. price of oil, value placed by
Rate the relative society on life, etc)
importance of direct Company effects (i.e. safety culture, procedures,
issues, the company, and training programme, etc)
external drivers f-D-ir-ec-t-"'-eff"-ec---'ts'-(-i.e-.P-e-rso-n---'al-P-ro-te-cti-'v-eE-"q-Ul-'pm-e-n-t,--+---~
weather, etc)
Rating (1-10)
Which external driver is
more important: financial
pressures, or the value
placed by society on life
Financial drivers (i.e. price of oil, royalty regime,
shareholder pressure)
Value placed by society on life (specific to the
operating region)
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Rating (1-10)
Price of oil
Rate the relative
importance of the
external financial drivers
Rate the relative
importance of the
following organisational
elements
Rate the relative
importance of these
factors directly affecting
the accident process
Shareholder pressure (consider its effect on decision
making through "boards of directors" to senior and
middle managers)
Royalty regime
Corporate safety culture
Training programme
Safety procedures
Individual behaviour (Le. attitude and motivation)
Individual capability (includes physical and mental)
Weather conditions
Design of safety arrangements at the workplace
Personal protective equipment
Rating (1-10)
Rating (1-10)
~ Rating (1-10)
Is general staff attitude Attitude
toward safety or the level f----------------+-----j
of motivation more Motivation (i.e. the degree of incentive felt by staff
important? to avoid accidents)
~ Rating (1-10)
Which is more important,
physical capability or
mental sharpness?
IQuestion 8
I
Rate the relative
importance of the
following physical factors
Which of the following
mental capabilities is
more important
Physical
Mental (Le. knowledge of procedures, ability to
deal with unexpected situations)
Lack of fatigue
Coordination
General physical fitness
Knowledge (of safety procedures, practices, and
equipment)
Intelligence (Le. ability to cope with situations not
covered by procedure)
Rating (1-10)
Rating (1-10)
Influence of external factors on organisations, and organizational
factors on individuals
This section comprises two "affecting matrices". You are asked to place scores from one (light influence) to ten (heavy influence) in each
box corresponding to how heavily you think the element heading each column is affected by each of the elements along the left side of the
matrix.
For example, if you think the likelihood of an organisation to enact an effective safety training programme is affected relatively heavily by
the region-specific value placed by society on life, but less so by the three financial factors mentioned (price of oil, shareholder pressure,
royalty regime) then you might place the values "8", "3", "5", and "2" in the appropriate boxes, as shown below (please replace these
example values with ones reflecting your actual belief). The chosen values should indicate the relative degree with which you believe each
factor along the left side affects the factors at the top of the columns. This process should be repeated for each column in the following two
matrices.
Question 10
The effect of external drivers on organisations
Company safety training programme I Company safety procedures
Value placed on life by society
Price of oil
Shareholder pressure
Royalty regime
Question 11
The effect of organisational elements>on individual behavior
Company safety culture
N
0\
o
Company safety training programme
Company safety procedures
Company safety culture
Staff
attitude
towards
safety
Staff
motivation to I Staff
improve fitness
safety results
Staff
Staff lack I knowledge
of fatigue concerning
safety
Safety
design
Provision
of Personal
Protective
Equipment
•
General
Please indicate:
Country in which your primary
activities are carried out
The nature of your organisation's
business (e.g.) operator,
contractor, regulatory agency,
etc)
On a scale of 1 to 10, how well do
you consider your organisation's
safety programme to be
operatinR?
Company name (Optional)
Other general comments you
may wish to include
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Model Basic Overall Premise
Occupational accidents result from an unsatisfactory interaction between workers and their
environment. At the most direct level, accidents occur when people perform tasks in an unsafe
manner. At this level, the definition of "an unsafe manner" needs to consider things such as
weather conditions at the time of task execution, quality of protective equipment used, safety
design of the immediate workplace, and the behaviour and capabilities, both physical and mental,
of the worker.
Moving to a "higher", or organisational level, many of the aspects at the direct level are heavily
influenced by the work environment provided by the organisation. For example, worker attitudes
and resulting behaviours can be heavily influenced by the "safety culture" developed by the
organisation. Senior management, through its words, and more importantly, through its actions,
will foster within the workplace, attitudes toward safety which can range from the cavalier to the
excessive.
More directly, the organisation will decide on the level to which safety design is applied to the
workplace environment. In years past, safety group sometimes tended to feel marginalised from
the remaining elements of the design team, at times trying to "hang on" or "keep up" with the
rest of the group. Recent design processes, however, have required that representatives from the
safety group participate in all elements of design, and also that they be heavily involved in the
periodic design reviews which have become a part of all offshore design processes.
The quality of safety training and procedures is also a matter of organisational choice. Providing
an appropriate level of effort, resource, and quality is at the same time a difficult and crucial
matter. Too little of either can produce a work force both ill equipped to face daily work activities
in a safe manner, and also feeling unsupported by those responsible for their ongoing safety. But
excessive and overly restrictive safety procedures can produce a negative effect as well. Workers
can feel immune to dangers in the face of an overabundance of safety procedures, which can lead
to unsafe actions. Or, workers can occasionally find safety procedures so restrictive that they lose
their will to comply completely, cut corners, and become injured. Experience is gradually
producing the appropriate level of safety training and procedure.
Organisational decisions will also determine the quality of basic ~~ety equipment provided to
workers. Thankfully, on modern oil & gas platforms, provision of the very best quality safety
equipment has become the norm.
Previous work in other industries by other researchers, discussed elsewhere, has considered the
effect of company actions on accident occurrence. The model proposed here, however, takes a
further outward step by considering an external (to the organisation) level affecting the accident
process. Essentially, pressures imposed by societal culture and regional or global financial
realities are considered to influence the organisational actions and decisions mentioned above
which, in turn, affect the direct accident process.
The value placed on a human life is an extremely uncomfortable concept for anyone to consider,
but it has become accepted that this implied value differs from one region to another.
Governments act on the implied or direct wishes of the populations they represent, and the
degree of pressure applied to oil & gas operators to enhance safety environments will be
proportional to the value placed on safety by the region's population.
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Similarly, the profitability of an organisation's operation in a region will affect how much
available capital exists, which partially determines available capital for safety programmes (only
partially because organisations will have different views on how much of the available capital is
directed to safety issues). The profitability is in turn heavily dependant on such things as the
current price of oil and existing royalty regime, which, as in the case of safety, is indirectly
determined by the views of the public. Regions experiencing tough financial times will be more
likely to encourage an attractive (to the organisation) royalty regime than areas where the
economic situation is more positive.
To reiterate the general premise, occupational accidents may well occur through the direct
interaction between worker and workplace, but the workers' actions were influenced and the
workplace environment provided by an organisation whose actions were in turn influenced by
external elements.
A schematic of the model philosophy is as shown below.
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Example of a completed questionnaire (3 pages)
Factors that infl1l6nceoffshol'G
occupational accidents
As part of II university reseatch program, we are performlng a quantitative study of offshore
occupational accidents (I.e. this research is not related to mator acciden~ such as explosions).
ParI of the research involves the develnpment of a mathematical model of t1:w! acddimt process. A
description of the basic model premise is included at the end of the questionnaire for those
interested. The questionnaire's goal is 10 ensure that the model accurately reflecb expert
opinion/judgement in two essential areas, specifically:
1. the relative importance of certain faclo~ in the accident process; and
2. the degree (causal strength) to which external forces and organ:Lsatio:nal faCIOts 1nflue:nce the
directcau5eSofaccidents.
The whole elCercise should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete
Your responses will be combined with othol'$ and used in the model- the identities of
individUal respondents end their Qrganisations will be kept strictly confidentlal
Importance of elements
This section concerns the relative importance of elements. You are asked, for each subset below,
to rate, on & scale of one (not important at all) to ten (crucial), the Importance of each element in
the accident process.
~ . l'i~tI;g'{1:iO)""t
Rate the relative <J~~~~~::~;ci';~foi1'~I~pia--;dbY--'-'-;-l
importance ofdJrect Company effects (te. safety culture•.P~d;.:;';~---9-~;:~~ ~~.~~~~~r.~~~~
pressures. or the value Value placed by society 0l11lfe (specific to the I
placed by society on life __~~~~~~~! .. _. __.. .. _._ .._._ _~_J __..__~ __ ..J
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QuestJon3
RalBthetelatlve
importance of the
external financial drivers
Quostion 4
Rate th& relative
importaliCEl of these
ofganlsatfolial elements
Ralethe relative
Importance of these
factorsdirecUyaffecting
theaccidenlprocess
Is general staff attitude ~'-A~itit~d;- -~~~---_ .._.._...._._- ..-------. -.-.. -----
toward safety or the level of ~;(i.~-th;d;;:ee·~f~ti:;;r;itbY·~·;ff;
moUvaUon more important? avoid accident\;)
~
Which Is more important,
physical capability or
mental sharpness?
~
Rata the relative
Imporlance of the
following physical factors
Quution 9
Whlch of the following
menial capabilities is
more important
--_.._.-.-_.._---------_.._----_._--_._--_.._------'------'
Influence of external factors on organisations, and organisational factors on IndivIduals
This sectioncompdses two "'affectingmatricesH • You are asked to place scores from one (light influence) to ten (heavy1n£luence)
In each box corresponding to how heavily you think the element Mmf!!!g each column is affectud bv each of the elements!!l.m.!g
the left sitle of the matrix.
Fot example, if you think the li/q/1ihQod of an organisation to enact an effective safety training program is affected relatively heavUy by the
region-sped1lc value placed by society on llIe" but less so by the three financial factors mentioned (price of oil shareholder pressure"
royalty regime) then you might place the values "8", "'3", "5" and "2" In the appropriate boxes, as shown below (please replace these
example values with anes reflecting your actual belief). The chosen values should indicate the relative degree with which you believe each
factor along the left side affects the factors at the top of the columns. This process shouldbe repeated for each column in the following two
matrices.
~
The effect of external driVers on organisatiOns
Qumlon11
The effect of organIsational element$ on IndMdual behaViour
I -. Staff -;~~---1 ; : staff I D~gn of IProvision of
I attitude motivation to I Staff ; Staff lack : knowledge tNt ety ts Personal
: towards improve I fitness ~ of fatigue ! conalrning II~.. ~ Pro'_
___ _.... ! safety safety tesults I ~ I sa:ety "i" ..:!!.or lace Equipme~
,Com!""Y""'Yttalnlhg '. • i 7 iE" 10~~_:e!~~&__!__~ - ----7··-::{_6__~ 7 6: t 9
I Company safety culture • 10 -=r 9 : 8 : ~==:f ; __9 -+---i
-
N
0\
0\
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Appendix 3 - Survey responses - untreated results
Appendix 3.1 - Actual survey responses
Appendix 3.2 - Histogram data of responses
Appendix 3.3 - Curves showing number of responses by score
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Appendix 3.1 - Actual survey responses
Key:
A: Americas
S: Asia
E: Europe, Middle East, and Africa
Notes:
1. Appendix 3.1 contains nine tables.
R: Regulator
U: Researcher
C: Contractor
0: Operator
• Tables 3.1.1 - 3.1.3 show the results of questions 1 - 9 of the
survey, concerning the relative importance of model elements
and groups of elements.
• Tables 3.1.4 - 3.1.6 show the results of question 10 of the
survey, concerning the influence of external elements on
corporate elements.
• Tables 3.1.7 - 3.1.9 show the results of question 11 of the
survey, concerning the influence of corporate elements on direct
elements.
2. The indicators AJ,A2,A3...etc. refer to the first, second, and third
respondents from the Americas, and so on.
Table 3.1.1
Respondent Respondent region Al A2 A3 ~ As A6 A7 As A9 A IO All A I2 A 13 A14 A 1S
characteristics Category R R R R R R R R R R U U U U C
External 6 4 7 8 5 5 4 6 3 7 6 1 7 5 7
Overall layer Corporate 10 8 9 10 10 5 10 7 9 9 8 6 5 8 9
Direct 7 8 6 10 8 8 6 8 2 8 10 10 3 8 8
External Financial -- 9 4 7 5 5 7 4 4 7 7 5 1 7 7 6
elements Value placed on life 7 8 5 6 8 8 5 7 2 9 7 1 5 9 8
Financial Price ofoil 6 5 7 6 5 6 1 7 7 7 1 1 7 4 6
elements Shareholder pressure 7 5 8 5 8 4 7 6 5 6 5 1 5 4 9
Royalty regime 4 5 2 4 8 7 1 4 2 7 1 1 5 7 2
Safety culture 10 6 9 10 10 9 10 8 8 10 9 6 5 9 9
Corporate layer Training 9 7 9 9 7 10 8 8 9 8 6 7 7 8 7
Safety procedures 9 8 9 9 6 10 8 7 8 7 7 8 9 7 5
Behavioural 10 8 8 10 10 9 10 10 9 9 10 8 5 7 9
Capability 7 7 8 9 8 8 6 8 7 9 8 7 7 6 8
Direct layer Weather 5 5 6 8 6 6 5 8 4 7 7 7 4 7 7
Safety design 9 8 8 8 8 10 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 7
PPE 8 8 6 10 8 7 6 6 3 8 7 10 4 7 8
Behavioural Attitude 10 7 9 10 10 10 10 9 9 7 10 8 8 8 9
elements Motivation ,f' _ 9 8 9 9 7 8 7 7 7 8 8 8 5 6 9
Capability Physical -. 5 5 7 5 7 8 5 7 7 6 5 7 5 6 7
elements Mental 10 8 9 7 8 10 8 8 9 8 9 8 5 8 9
Physical Lack of fatigue 10 7 8 9 9 10 8 9 8 8 9 4 5 8 8
Coordination 7 5 9 7 7 8 7 8 6 7 7 4 3 8 7
capability
Fitness 5 7 6 8 5 9 5 7 7 7 5 6 6 5 6
Mental Knowledge 10 8 9 9 6 10 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
I capability Intelligence 9 7 7 6 7 8 8 7 7 9 10 8 5 5 7
Safety program performance 9 8 5 9 6 8 7 6 8 8 7 5 5 6 7
N
0\
\0
Table 3.1.2
Respondent Respondent region A l6 Al7 AlB A l9 SI Sz S3 S4 Ss E1 Ez E3 E4 Es E6
characteristics Category 0 0 0 0 R R R C 0 R R R R R R
External 3 4 5 10 8 3 2 2 5 2 2 1 10 5 6
Overall layer Corporate 8 6 9 10 8 7 10 5 8 7 8 8 10 8 10
Direct 5 8 9 9 9 8 7 8 4 7 8 8 10 7 5
External Financial 5 6 4 4 6 7 3 9 2 2 3 1 8 4 4
elements Value placed on life 4 5 7 10 8 1 7 9 7 5 8 10 10 8 6
Financial Price of oil 5 0 3 3 5 5 3 2 2 2 3 1 6 4 8
elements Shareholder pressure 4 7 5 8 7 9 7 8 2 3 3 5 10 6 5
Royalty regime 2 5 3 3 4 3 1 2 2 1 3 5 8 2 5
Corporate Safety culture 8 8 8 8 8 10 9 8 9 7 7 8 10 7 8
Training 6 8 9 7 7 10 8 9 7 8 7 8 9 4 8layer
Safety procedures 7 6 9 7 9 10 5 10 4 8 9 8 9 8 6
Behavioural 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 9 9 8 8 10 9 9
Capability 8 8 9 8 8 5 9 8 8 10 6 8 9 7 9
Direct layer Weather 4 8 9 2 6 5 4 2 5 7 4 2 9 4 4
Safety design 6 7 8 7 7 9 7 4 7 6 8 8 10 3 6
PPE 5 7 10 8 8 0 6 4 4 10 8 8 8 5 6
Behavioural Attitude 10 8 9 8 9 0 9 8 7 8 8 8 10 7 6
elements Motivation -·8 6 7 5 9 10 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 10
Capability Physical 7 5 6 5 4 0 5 6 3 5 5 2 8 5 6
elements Mental 9 8 8 10 9 9 8 9 9 8 8 8 10 9 8
Physical Lack of fatigue 7 8 8 8 8 7 9 8 7 9 8 8 10 7 8
Coordination 5 7 7 7 7 9 8 9 7 5 7 8 9 5 8
capability
Fitness . - 6 7 7 6 6 4 7 6 4 5 5 4 8 4 8
Mental Knowledge 8 6 8 10 8 9 8 10 6 8 9 6 10 7 5
capability Intelligence 7 8 7 7 9 5 7 2 6 7 5 8 10 8 8
Safety p.r:ogram performance 8 7 8 9 7 9 7 8 6 8 8 7 8 8 8
N
-...l
o
Table 3.1.3
Respondent Respondent region E7 Es E9 E IO Ell E I2 E l3 E I4 E I5 E I6 E l7 E is E I9 E20 E21
characteristics Category R R R U C C C C C C 0 0 0 0 0
External 2 5 6 8 7 3 7 3 7 2 5 2 2 2 1
Overall layer Corporate 8 10 8 8 8 9 10 9 10 8 8 8 6 8 10
Direct 8 8 7 8 7 6 4 6 6 7 4 6 8 6 4
External Financial 3 8 6 6 2 4 8 5 4 7 7 3 5 5 1
elements Value placed on life 7 8 8 8 10 10 6 3 9 3 8 8 5 8 4
Financial Price ofoil 3 8 5 0 3 3 5 4 6 9 5 2 2 0 1
elements Shareholder pressure 4 8 7 2 3 2 8 3 7 7 8 1 3 8 5
Royalty regime 2 4 3 2 3 3 7 3 5 5 3 1 1 5 0
Corporate Safety culture 9 10 8 8 8 10 10 9 10 9 9 10 6 9 8
Training 8 10 6 9 6 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 9 6 8layer
Safety procedures 7 7 7 9 7 8 8 8 8 9 7 8 10 6 8
Behavioural 10 10 9 6 10 9 10 7 9 10 8 9 10 9 8
Capability 9 10 6 7 5 6 8 7 8 7 8 8 10 6 4
Direct layer Weather 6 2 3 3 3 7 5 5 5 6 8 6 8 6 3
Safety design 7 7 8 5 7 8 8 6 8 7 8 8 9 8 5
PPE 7 8 7 9 3 5 8 5 7 7 4 6 8 6 3
Behavioural Attitude .. 7 10 8 0 8 9 10 9 8 10 7 8 10 0 8
elements Motivation <1(' 7 8 5 9 6 7 10 9 5 10 6 9 10 10 6
Capability Physical 5 7 4 0 5 6 8 0 6 2 4 6 7 0 3
elements Mental 7 10 8 7 9 8 10 9 8 7 9 9 10 7 7
Physical Lack of fatigue 7 10 8 10 10 9 10 8 6 7 9 9 8 7 3
Coordination 6 7 4 6 7 8 8 7 6 8 5 8 8 6 5
!
capability
Fitness 5 6 4 7 7 6 6 7 6 6 5 7 6 6 6
Mental Knowledge 9 10 8 8 8 9 8 8 9 8 9 9 9 7 7
capability Intelligence 8 6 8 9 10 6 8 5 8 7 5 8 5 9 6
Safety program perfonnance 7 7 7 5 7 9 8 6 8 5 4 7 9 8 5
tv
-.l
Table 3.1.4
Respondent Respondent region Al A2 A3 ~ As A6 A7 As A9 AIO All A I2 A13 AI4 A1S
characteristics Category R R R R R R R R R R U U U U C
Value placed on life 7 8 9 8 9 9 8 7 7 10 7 4 8 8 8
Influence on Price ofoil 6 3 5 2 4 3 2 6 2 3 1 1 3 3 6
training Shareholder pressure 8 5 6 4 8 5 6 5 4 6 5 1 5 5 8
Royalty regime 4 2 2 1 8 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 2 4 2
Value placed on life 7 9 8 7 8 6 9 7 8 10 8 5 7 8 9
Influence on Price ofoil 6 3 7 2 2 8 2 6 2 3 1 1 4 4 6
procedures Shareholder pressure 8 3 7 3 6 7 6 5 4 6 6 1 7 4 9
Royalty regime 4 3 2 3 8 5 1 4 1 3 1 1 4 6 2
Value placed on life 7 9 9 7 8 6 10 6 8 10 9 5 8 10 8
Influence on Price of oil 6 3 5 2 7 8 2 6 2 3 1 I 2 5 6
Safety culture Shareholder pressure 8 3 7 3 2 7 6 4 5 6 6 1 6 4 9
Royalty regime 4 3 2 3 8 5 1 4 1 3 1 1 4 6 2
IV
-....l
IV
Table 3.1.5
Respondent Respondent region A l6 A l7 Al8 A l9 SI S2 S3 S4 Ss E l E2 E3 E4 Es E6
characteristics Category a a a a R R R C a R R R R R R
Value placed on life 7 8 7 9 8 8 7 10 8 7 8 8 8 9 10
Influence on Price of oil 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 6 2 5 2 2 5 4
training Shareholder pressure 6 5 5 7 7 5 5 8 4 5 5 4 5 6 5
Royalty regime 1 2 3 3 2 2 4 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 5
Value placed on life 8 7 7 9 7 10 7 9 8 8 8 10 8 9 10
Influence on Price of oil 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 5 2 3 2 2 4 4
procedures Shareholder pressure 6 5 5 7 7 5 5 8 4 5 3 2 5 5 5
Royalty regime 1 2 3 3 2 0 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 5
Value placed on life 9 7 8 9 7 10 7 9 8 8 8 10 10 9 10
Influence on Price ofoil 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 3 2 2 4 8
safety culture Shareholder pressure 6 5 5 7 7 5 7 8 4 2 3 2 5 5 8
Royalty regime 1 2 3 3 3 0 4 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 5 j
Table 3.1.6
Respondent Respondent region E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell El2 En E14 E15 E16 E l7 E18 E19 E20 E21
characteristics Category R R R U C C C C C C 0 0 0 0 0
Value placed on life 8 8 8 8 8 10 8 3 8 8 8 2 8 8 3
Influence on Price ofoil 3 3 6 2 2 6 3 6 3 2 2 2 2 3 2
training Shareholder pressure 5 5 7 2 2 4 7 3 5 3 6 1 3 5 1
Royalty regime 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 0
Value placed on life 8 8 8 8 8 10 8 3 8 7 7 2 8 9 3
Influence on Price ofoil 3 6 4 2 2 7 3 6 4 6 2 1 2 4 2
procedures Shareholder pressure 5 10 6 2 2 5 8 3 5 3 5 1 3 7 1
Royalty regime 2 4 2 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 0
Value placed on life 7 8 8 9 8 10 8 5 10 6 6 2 8 8 6
Influence on Price ofoil 3 7 4 2 2 3 3 6 4 4 2 1 2 4 2
safety culture Shareholder pressure 6 10 6 2 2 3 8 3 6 2 5 1 3 6 1
Royalty regime 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 4 0
IV
-..l
.;..
Table 3.1.7
Respondent Respondent region Al A2 A3 ~ As A6 A7 As A9 AIO All Al2 Al3 A I4 Ais
characteristics Category R R R R R R R R R R U U U U C
Influence on Training 8 8 8 9 9 8 7 8 9 8 5 6 7 9 8
attitude Procedures 8 8 8 9 8 6 6 7 8 7 6 7 6 8 7
Safety culture 9 8 9 9 8 4 10 9 9 10 8 7 6 6 10
Influence on Training 8 8 5 8 4 8 7 7 8 9 5 6 5 8 9
motivation Procedures 8 8 7 8 2 5 5 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 7
Safety culture 9 8 9 8 6 3 10 7 8 10 8 7 4 6 9
Influence on Training 2 6 5 8 5 7 3 3 7 8 2 4 4 7 7
fitness Procedures 2 6 5 8 5 5 2 3 6 4 2 4 6 8 6
Safety culture 6 6 7 8 6 4 4 4 6 7 2 4 5 6 8
Influence on Training 2 6 5 9 10 8 2 4 6 6 1 4 3 7 8
lack of fatigue Procedures 2 6 5 9 10 8 1 4 6 8 3 4 7 6 7
Safety culture 6 6 8 9 10 8 5 4 6 8 4 4 4 6 8
Influenc~ on Training 9 8 9 7 8 6 9 8 8 8 7 6 5 8 9
knowledge Procedures 9 8 8 7 8 5 8 5 7 10 5 7 6 6 6
Safety culture 6 8 8 7 8 7 10 7 6 9 6 7 4 6 8
Influence on Training 4 8 4 8 9 7 4 5 8 8 7 7 5 8 8
safety design Procedures 4-, 8 8 8 10 5 8 7 8 10 8 7 7 8 8
Safety culture 8 8 8 8 10 8 10 6 7 9 8 7 5 4 9
Influence on Training 6 8 4 10 10 7 8 4 7 7 8 8 5 7 10
Procedures 6 8 9 10 8 6 7 9 7 10 8 8 5 6 9PPE,
Safety culture 6 8 9 10 8 5 9 8 7 9 8 9 5 6 8
N
-...l
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Table 3.1.8
Respondent Respondent region A l6 A I7 A l8 AI9 SI S2 S3 S4 S5 E 1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6
cl).aracteristics Category 0 0 0 0 R R R C 0 R R R R R R
Influence on Training
~ 8 6 9 9 8 10 7 9 6 8 8 10 10 5 10
attitude Procedures 7 5 8 6 8 7 6 10 6 9 3 10 8 6 10
Safety culture 9 8 8 9 9 10 10 10 8 10 8 10 8 8 10
Influence on Training 8 6 9 9 6 10 7 8 8 8 8 10 8 4 4
motivation Procedures 7 5 8 6 7 7 6 9 7 8 3 8 8 5 10
Safety culture 9 8 8 9 8 10 7 9 8 9 8 8 8 9 10
Influence on Training 8 5 3 8 6 5 6 4 6 5 2 2 5 4 4
fitness Procedures 7 5 3 6 6 5 5 2 5 5 2 2 5 4 4
Safety culture '. 9 5 3 9 6 5 6 2 5 6 5 2 5 6 5
Influence on Training 8 6 3 8 7 7 6 8 7 2 2 8 8 7 4
lack of fatigue Procedures 7 7 7 6 7 7 5 8 7 7 2 8 5 7 4
Safety culture 9 7 7 9 8 7 6 8 7 8 5 8 5 8 8
Influence on Training 9 7 8 8 7 10 8 9 8 10 9 8 10 6 10
knowledge Procedures 8 5 7 6 7 10 5 9 7 5 7 8 7 7 6
Safety culture 7 7 6 9 8 10 8 9 7 7 7 8 8 9 8
Influence on Training 7 6 5 8 7 10 7 9 8 8 8 8 10 4 3
safety design Procedures
t:,. 8· 5 8 6 7 10 5 8 5 8 8 8 9 4 1
Safety culture 9 7 8 9 6 10 8 8 7 8 8 8 9 6 10
Influence on Training 7 7 9 8 8 10 9 9 4 5 8 8 8 6 1
PPE Procedures 8 8 9 7 7 10 5 9 4 8 8 8 5 6 5
, Safety culture 9 8 8 9 7 10 9 9 4 9 8 8 5 6 8
tv
-..J
0\
Table 3.1.9
~es.pond~nt. Respondentregion E7 E8 E9 EIO Ell El2 E13 E l4 El5 El6 En El8 El9 E20 E2l
characteristics Category R R Rue C C C ceo 0 0 0 0
[raining 8 8 8 8 8 9 10 9 8 10 7 7 8 7 7
)rol~edures 6 6 7 9 8 9 10 7 8 8 7 6 8 7 5
;afc:tY'culture 7 10 8 7 10 9 10 9 10 10 9 9 10 9 9
[taming" 7 8 7 7 8 7 10 9 8 8 7 7 8 7 7
'rbcedures 6 6 5 7 8 8 10 6 8 8 5 6 8 7 4
WlLurt: 8 10 8 7 10 9 10 9 9 10 8 9 8 10 9
'ra:mng 1 8 1 7 3 5 5 5 7 2 6 5 6 5 6
'r4~eduies 1 6 1 7 3 4 5 3 7 2 4 4 6 5 3
:Ly CUltUre 1 10 1 7 3 6 5 6 7 2 5 6 6 7 2
'raping 3 6 1 8 3 8 6 5 6 5 6 4 8 7 4
'rocedures 3 8 1 8 3 6 6 3 8 5 4 4 8 7 3
lavA Vl. l.aLt~UC 5 10 1 7 3 6 8 6 8 5 5 4 8 9 2
'raining 9 9 7 9 8 9 8 9 8 7 9 8 9 8 6
Jrocedmes 7 8 6 9 8 8 6 7 8 7 4 5 9 6 3
,~, 8 10 6 9 10 6 10 9 8 9 7 9 9 8 7
11' 'raimng ~. 7 9 7 6 8 7 6 7 7 5 4 8 9 8 3
rocedllres 8"' 10 7 8 8 8 6 8 8 4 3 5 9 8 7
UAV', 'un...... ' 8 8 7 6 10 7 10 7 8 7 7 9 9 8 6
'raining 7 9 7 9 8 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 6 3
rocedures 9 8 8 9 8 8 7 8 7 6 7 5 8 7 8
6 10 6 9 10 8 10 9 8 5 8 9 8 8 9
N
--J
--J
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Appendix 3.2 - Histogram data of importance results
The results of survey questions 1 - 9, included in Appendix 3.1, are placed in categories
in this table.
External
Organisational
16 45Direct
Financial ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ 13 ~ ~ 45Value laced on life
Pr1ceofoU
Shareholder pressure
45Royalty Regime
OrganlsatlonalElements
SafelyCu!ture
Training
11 13 10 45Procedures
Direct layer
Capability
7
safetYde~~~
13 45
Behavioural
Motivation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : 12 10 45
Caoabill
Physical
ci ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 17 14 ~ 45Mental
Physical Capability
Lack of fatigue
Coordination
16 11 45
Mental capability
Knowledge ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : 12 12 ~ 45Intelllence
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Appendix 3.3 - Curves showing number of responses by score
- 280-
Overall Importance Frequency
18 -,-----------------,
16 +---------------..-\-------j
14 +------------4--h-------j
12 +------------7-~------j
10 +-------------,r---"-'\---F-1
8+-----J"--"-.....-..--------.__-----::-I---=-,--~
6+-----1--~---I-----'~~~.__--__l
4+----,~--__"'_......._J<----___r----1-~--_____..I
2+--;F------L------r..--....:.::!-.::::.....--~---=--____7l
O-J&-~"""""'--_"T"""--~--__.--_____,-~~
o
Importance Score
Financial vs Value of Life - Importance Frequency
- -Organisational
- - -Direct
Importance Score
Financial Factors - Importance Freque;'cy
10 -,---------------,
9+---...---=--....---.."L---,---,------I
8+-----'-~~-...Lfr'I~--f-----"r----I
7t--;"---r--tt~rhrrr_--.l<------\--;:l_-----__,
6+----I--\-~-I--_;\___3Io_.::::_l_--.._---1
5+--~--I----7""r\-_Jll_j~~~~-+__---j
4++-~--;------'-'\J+-__+_+_~-_r_---j
3~--"'-'---............--'----'L--A'----'\--_\_-br_---------'
2 '
1-f-7-----------!....--f---~...:=---1
O~-_____,_--...,.._-~--___.__~~
Importance Score
- 281-
Organisational Elements· Importance Frequency
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Physical vs Mental - Importance Frequency
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Appendix 4 - Survey responses -
normalised results
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1
External 0 12 12 20 0 1 0 0 0 0
Organisational 10 20 13 1 1 0 0 0
External elements
Direct 0 1 5 17 18 3 0 0 0 0
Financial ~ ~ ~ 10 14 : 6 1 ~ ~ 0Flnan~::Ue~:~:Cn~: on life 1 6 14 9 0
Price of 011 3 3 4 18 14 3 0 0 0 0 0
Shareholder pressure 0 0 12 10 2 2 0
RoyaltvReglme 7 7 0 0 0 0
Organisational Elements
Safety Culture 0 0 2 17 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
Training 0 0 1 36 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Procedures 3 34 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
OirectlaY:-ehaVloural 0 0 22 22 1 0 0 0 0
Capability 0 0 39 6 0 0 0
Weather 0 20 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Safety design 0 2 38 5 0 0 0 0 0
1 7 0 0 0 0
Behavioural
Altitude 3 0 0 2 21 19 0
Motivation 0 0 0 19 21 2
Capability
Physical 4 0 2 7 28 4 0 ~ ~ 0 00 0 0 0 4 0 4
PhyslcaiCapabliity
La;:o~~~~::~~ 0 0 1 6 34 4 0 0 0 0 00 0 33 10 1 0 0 0 0
Fitness 0 7 34 4 0 0 0 0 0
Mental capability
1~~e~:I:~~: 0 0 0 0 15 23 15 0 ~ 0 00 0 1 0 6 0 0 0
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Overall Importance Frequency (Normalised)
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Organisational Elements - Importance Frequency (Normalised)
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Physical vs Mental - Importance Frequency (Normalised)
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